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 Introduction 1 
Introduction.  
The Repers Project, Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA and the Cross-Border Transfer  
of Prisoners in the EU 
Stefano Montaldo 
This book is one of the outcomes of the RePers - Mutual Trust and Social 
Rehabilitation in Practice research project, co-funded by the European Union 
Justice Programme 2014-2020. The project was led by the Law Department of 
the University of Turin and involved a set of academic, institutional and civil 
society organisations, namely the University of A Coruña, the Italian Ministry 
of Justice, the Italian association Amapola - Progetti per la sicurezza delle per-
sone e delle comunità, the think-tank Romanian Centre for European Policies, 
and the Romanian association Liderjust. 
The collection contains original contributions regarding Framework Deci-
sion (hereinafter ‘the Framework Decision’) 2008/909/JHA on the cross-bor-
der transfer of prisoners in the EU, with a specific focus on its implementation 
and application in Italy, Romania and Spain, the three Member States covered 
by the project. 
The Framework Decision in question applies the principle of mutual 
recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or 
measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement 
in another Member State. 1 
The judicial cooperation mechanism established by this act aims to identify 
the most appropriate place for serving a sentence, with a view to maximising 
the chances of the convict’s social rehabilitation. As such, it allows the prison-
er to be transferred to the Member State in which his or her (societal, family, 
work, cultural, ...) centre of gravity is located, in order to facilitate his or her 
social reinsertion in a post-release era and avoid recidivism. 
 
 
1 Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA on the application of the principle of mutual recogni-
tion to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving depri-
vation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union. 
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Building on the premise of mutual trust between domestic judicial authori-
ties, this Framework Decision replaces the intergovernmental footprint of pre-
existing conventions and obliterates the role of the political branch. As is the 
case for other EU judicial cooperation instruments, this advanced mechanism 
is centred on horizontal cross-border judicial dialogue between the issuing and 
executing authority. More specifically, the authorities identified as competent 
by the issuing (i.e. sentencing) State adopt a decision on transfer and forward 
it to those of the executing Member State. The latter may be the convict’s 
State of nationality, the Member State to which he or she will be deported or 
any other Member State, but in this case the relevant authorities must express 
their consent to the forwarding.  
The procedure is, in itself, simple and rapid, as it keeps the formalities to a 
minimum and sets clear deadlines. 2 The issuing State transmits a certificate, 
the template of which is attached to the Framework Decision. This document 
contains all relevant information, ranging from the identity of the person con-
cerned to the facts of the case, their legal qualification and the sentence im-
posed. In addition, the judgment is attached to the certificate. 3 On this basis, the 
authority of the executing State is, in principle, expected to recognise the for-
eign judgment and order its enforcement, making any adaptation with regard to 
the duration or nature of the sentence, so long as it is actually compatible with 
national law. 4 
The Framework Decision reiterates two major recurring features in this do-
main of EU law: the abolition of the double criminality check in relation to a list 
of serious offences 5 and the provision of an exhaustive list of optional grounds 
for denying recognition. 6 
The role of the sentenced person is also a distinctive aspect. In fact, whereas 
his or her consent is, in principle, a mandatory condition for the transfer, this re-
quirement is lifted in three situations. Crucially, these are by far the most recur-
 
 
2 Except in the case of postponement, recognition should occur as soon as possible and, in any case, 
within ninety days from receipt of the judgment and the certificate (Art. 12 (1) and (2)). Recognition 
may be postponed if the certificate is incomplete or does not correspond to the judgent (Art. 11). 
3 The certificate must be translated into the official language or one of the official languages of the 
executing State. 
4 In any case, the adapted sentence cannot aggravate the sentence passed in the issuing State (Art. 8). 
In addition, partial recognition and execution are allowed (Art. 10). 
5 Art. 7(1)(2) Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, which reflects corresponding provisions included 
in most of the EU secondary acts in this domain. 
6 Art. 9 Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA. Art. 10 also allows for partial recognition and execu-
tion. In addition, Art. 11 provides for postponement of execution if the certificate is incomplete or 
does not correspond to the judgment. Another key departure from the previous intergovernmental 
regime is the provision of strict deadlines for handling the procedure and issuing a final decision: 
see Artis. 12(1)(2) and 15(1). 
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ring cases of cross-border transfers: consent is not required when the judgment 
is forwarded to the Member State of nationality in which the prisoner lives or 
to which he or she will be deported, or the Member State to which he or she 
has fled or returned before the conclusion of the proceedings or following the 
conviction in the issuing State. However, the sentenced person has the right to 
express his or her opinion on the transfer, which must be taken into account by 
the authority of the sentencing State when deciding whether or not to issue a 
transfer request. 
More than ten years after its adoption, this instrument is increasing in im-
portance in the scenario of the European judicial space, albeit that its practical 
application by the national judicial authorities is still not entirely satisfactory. 7 
The unexplored potential of transfer procedures has led to a very limited body 
of EU and national case law and has further fuelled the silence of legal schol-
ars. As a consequence, most of the significant theoretical knots in this Frame-
work Decision are still to be undone. 
This is due to several converging factors, which are addressed from differ-
ent perspectives in this book.  
Firstly, the implementation of the Framework Decision was belated in 
many Member States, most of which failed to comply with the transposition 
deadline of December 2011. 
Secondly, the wording of this act represents the result of three years of 
heated negotiations within the Council. The imminent entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty was actually the most effective impetus towards achieving an 
agreement, under pressure of the planned eradication of the third pillar, along 
with the intergovernmental nature of its legal sources. 8 This final hastiness led 
to inevitable compromises affecting the internal coherence and conceptual ac-
curacy of the act. 9 For example, the Framework Decision provides no guid-
ance on the scope of the notion of offenders’ rehabilitation, the elusiveness of 
which blurs the purpose and content of the cooperation duties incumbent upon 
the issuing and executing Member States. 
Thirdly, although apparently confined to an advanced and specialised seg-
ment of criminal (procedural) law, the Framework Decision reveals crucial con-
 
 
7 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, ‘Criminal Detention and Alternatives: Funda-
mental Rights Aspects in EU Cross-Border Transfers’ (2016), also available online at https://fra. 
europa.eu/en/publication/2016/criminal-detention-and-alternatives-fundamental-rights-aspects-eu-cross-
border (accessed 5 March 2019). 
8 V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Third Wave of Third Pillar Law’, European Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2009, pp. 
523-60. 
9 A. Martufi, ‘Assessing the Resilience of ‘Social Rehabilitation’ as a Rationale for Transfer: A Com-
mentary on the Aims of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA’, New Journal of European Criminal 
Law, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2018, pp. 49-51. 
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nections with other key aspects of EU law, such as the protection of fundamen-
tal rights, the limits of Union competences, the freedom of movement of EU cit-
izens and the European Union migration policy. This inherent systemic com-
plexity poses significant legal and political challenges. From the latter point of 
view, for instance, a closer look at the preparatory works to the Framework De-
cision and at the practice of some Member States 10 reveals that this act is not 
immune from de facto managerial uses, as it adds a new instrument to the na-
tional authorities’ toolbox of forms of control over – and removal of – undesired 
EU citizens. 
Fourthly, Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA covers the criminal execu-
tion phase, which is one of the most delicate fields in judicial cooperation pro-
cedures. This domain is still now perceived as a secret garden of the Member 
States, where the process of Europeanisation of penal justice comes up against 
a solid barrier, delimiting exclusive national competences. The limited room 
for EU intervention entails the absence of harmonisation measures and a sub-
sequent high degree of fragmentation of domestic legal orders. The wide vari-
ety of penitentiary benefits, alternatives to detention and related measures, 
pursuing the goal of enhancing the inmate’s chances of successful re-sociali-
sation after conviction, is an illustrative example, which goes straight to the 
core of the scope and rationale of transfer procedures. 11 
The outlined combination of elusive notions of EU law, opposing teleolog-
ical priorities and legal fragmentation represents a favourable breeding ground 
for the many facets of the dark side of mutual trust: mutual distrust, mutual 
mistrust, or even just a lack of confidence in the feasibility and usefulness of 
judicial cooperation procedures. It follows that, at this stage, several substan-
tive and procedural hurdles block the full effectiveness of this Framework De-
cision, from both the quantitative (number of transfers) and qualitative (genu-
ine attempt to pursue social rehabilitation goals) perspectives. 
In this scenario, the varied practice of the national judicial and governmen-
tal authorities is clearly a key factor, as it can amplify or neutralise the above 
described concerns. In fact, beyond mere effectiveness-oriented arguments, a 
closer look at how cross-border transfers work at domestic level provides il-
lustrative insights into how judicial cooperation mechanisms are perceived by 
the authorities concerned and into the degree of consistency between expected 
EU patterns and law in action within the national realm. 
 
 
10 S. Neveu, Le transfert de l’exécution des peines alternatives et restrictives de liberté en droit 
européen. A la recherche d’un équilibre entre intérêts individuels et collectifs, Anthemis, Limal, 
2016, p. 440. 
11 See the analysis of the legislation of the Member States annexed to G. Vermeulen, et al., Cross-
border Execution of Judgments Involving Deprivation of Liberty in the EU. Overcoming Legal and 
Practical Problems through Flanking Measures, Maklu, Anvers, 2011, pp. 236-54. 
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In this context, Italy, Romania and Spain represent promising test-beds for 
assessing the advances and shortcomings of cross-border transfer procedures, 
on two main grounds. Firstly, Italy and Spain are among the countries with the 
highest rate of Romanian prisoners in Europe. To a lesser extent, this also ap-
plies to Italian and Spanish prisoners in Spain and Italy, respectively. This ba-
sically entails remarkable (quantitative) opportunities for resorting to transfer 
mechanisms and ensuing enhanced institutional efforts to cope with this phe-
nomenon. Secondly, these Member States share the common problem of pris-
on overcrowding, albeit at differing degrees of intensity. Deficiencies con-
cerning detention conditions have triggered diversified formal and informal 
reactions, which, in one way or another, influence the scope of cross-border 
transfers. In Italy, the Torreggiani pilot judgment, 12 in which the Strasbourg 
Court urged Italy to take action to solve this structural criticism, led the Minis-
try of Justice to encourage the judicial authorities to use Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA as a means for deflating prison overcrowding. Conversely, 
Romania has enacted new legislation allowing for a reduction in sentence for 
each detention period suffered in inhumane or degrading conditions. For its 
part, Spain reveals a generalised preference for deportation measures, which to 
some extent erode the domain of cross-border transfers. 
The book addresses the main legal challenges raised by Framework Deci-
sion 2008/909/JHA in general and as reflected in the Italian, Romanian and 
Spanish experiences. As such, on the one hand, the analysis is closely con-
nected to the experience of these Member States and is not intended to provide 
an all-encompassing study of domestic trends, implementation strategies and 
practices regarding cross-border transfers. On the other hand, these case stud-
ies provide added value to the analysis, as, in all chapters, the theoretical ap-
proach is combined with a detailed study on how the cross-border transfer 
procedure is actually dealt with by the judicial authorities. 
This mutually beneficial combination is particularly evident in Ana Neira-
Pena’s chapter, which focuses on the identification and designation of the is-
suing and executing domestic authorities. The author offers an overview of the 
different competence models existing in Member States and critically address-
es the leeway left to Member States in this regard. With this aim, she provides 
an in-depth analysis of the advances and shortcomings of the Spanish model, 
which she criticises for being fragmented and inconsistent. 
The following chapter frames Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA within 
the general quest for enhanced fundamental rights protection in the implementa-
tion of EU judicial cooperation instruments in criminal matters. I present the 
case law developed by the Court of Justice in relation to the EAW and discusses 
 
 
12 Torreggiani and Others v Italy, App. No. 43517/09 et al. (ECHR, 8 January 2013). 
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its relevance to cross-border transfer procedures. I contend that the peculiarities of 
Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA make it difficult to extend the Court find-
ings to the subject matter under consideration, especially in relation to the de-
nial of execution of a cooperation request in the event of a serious risk of vio-
lation of a right. This entails an urgent need for effective judicial remedies 
both in the issuing and executing States, to avoid abusive transfers and chal-
lenge any undue rejection of a prisoner’s request to be transferred abroad. 
Patricia Faraldo-Cabana’s contribution builds on these premises and discuss-
es the more specific aspect of the prisoner’s rights in the event of a forced trans-
fer. The rationale behind the Framework Decision is that allowing prisoners to 
serve their sentence close to home is a significant instrument in improving their 
chances of social rehabilitation. Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA removes 
the previous veto right of the sentenced persons in the 1983 Council of Europe 
Convention. This change has a significant impact on the position of the senten-
ced person and questions the coherence between the transfer of non-consenting 
prisoners and the rehabilitation perspective, given that social rehabilitation in-
trinsically requires the cooperation of the person involved. The author contends 
that the abolition of the prisoner’s right to veto makes the European instrument 
appear more concerned with the needs of the issuing states than with those of 
the affected individuals. 
The following two chapters make a step forward and focus on the interplay 
of the Framework Decision in question with other parallel instruments of EU 
law. Alessandro Rosanò discusses the coordination of Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA with the EAW Framework Decision and another two comple-
mentary instruments, namely Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA and Frame-
work Decision 2009/829/JHA. Although apparently clear-cut, the interconnec-
tions between these instruments can be difficult to manage in practice, for in-
stance due to their diverging objectives and the possible evolution in itinere of a 
case, which could trigger a parallel shift of legal regime. José Angel Brandariz 
addresses the much debated role of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA in the 
wider set of measures stemming from EU law, allowing for an undesired EU 
citizen to be returned his or her home country. To do so, the author provides an 
overview of the main domestic approaches to the deportation of aliens within 
the Union. He then discusses if and to what extent the momentum recently 
gained by the deportation of EU nationals has contributed to hampering the ex-
pected consolidation of an Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA-based prisoner 
transfer system. 
The final two chapters distil some of the outcomes of the RePers project 
activities concerning the Italian, Romanian and Spanish legal orders. The first 
focuses on the implementation of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA in these 
Member States, covering both formal transposition measures and the ensuing 
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practices. The chapter also provides relevant statistics and discusses domestic 
institutional arrangements for dealing with cross-border transfer procedures. 
The final chapter puts forward some recommendations and proposals with a 
view to improving the application of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA in 
the three Member States concerned and – hopefully – beyond. The analysis 
addresses a limited set of issues that have proven to be particularly sensitive 
for the judicial authorities of the countries concerned, such as the identifica-
tion of potential transferees, the burden of proof regarding the prisoner’s cen-
tre of gravity, the appropriate filling out of the certificate, the translation of the 
sentence, and the coordination with the EAW.  
The RePers project activities were oriented towards fostering the improve-
ment of transfer procedures both in terms of their effectiveness and their com-
pliance with fundamental rights standards and social rehabilitation goals. From 
a methodological point of view, the activities combined a varied set of ap-
proaches. Following a preliminary desk review phase of existing studies and lit-
erature, each unit distributed an online survey. The survey was sent to selected 
categories of recipients, namely members of the judiciary and public prosecu-
tion offices, ministerial officers, prison administration staff, lawyers and aca-
demics. About one hundred replies were collected from the three Member States 
involved. The survey results provided a general picture of the degree of know-
ledge and awareness of the main features of the Framework Decision, and il-
lustrated reactions on personal perceptions and views as to the main hurdles to 
the implementation of this act.  
The interim outcomes of this activity were then used to hold ad hoc inter-
views with key stakeholders from the national judiciary and the Ministries of 
Justice, with a view to investigating further some of the issues broadly raised 
by the participants in the survey. This activity was supported by quantitative 
research on the overall number of transfers involving Italy, Romania and 
Spain in their capacity as issuing or executing States. Official statistics were 
collected and analysed, thanks to the invaluable cooperation of the Ministries 
of Justice of the Member States concerned. 
The third step of the research entailed both qualitative research of the data 
collected and a more in-depth analysis of specific files. In particular, the Ro-
manian Ministry of Justice granted access to specific landmark cases, which 
are illustrative of the main trends in Romanian practice. The Italian Ministry 
of Justice, which is party to the project consortium, authorised the research 
unit of the University of Turin and Amapola to analyse the documentation 
concerning pending and concluded transfer procedures. About 400 files were 
considered, covering most of the transfers processed in 2016 and 2017 and in 
the first-half of 2018 by the competent ministerial department. Whilst per-
forming this analysis, specific attention was paid to a series of key factors, 
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namely: the actual role of social rehabilitation concerns, the prisoners’ con-
sent/opinion and the way it is expressed and collected, exchanges of infor-
mation between the issuing and executing authorities, the role of the lawyer (if 
any), the length of the transfer procedure and its link with the sentence re-
maining to be served, the outcome of the transfer procedure. 
This remarkable body of information fuelled the fourth and final phase of 
the research. The consortium conducted a series of mutual learning meetings 
involving selected experts and practitioners from Italy, Romania and Spain. 
Initially, these meetings were aimed at allowing the national authorities to 
share their concerns and views on the shortcomings of cross-border transfers. 
At a later stage, they became fruitful for an in-depth discussion on possible 
shared best practices and solutions to common problems, which could also be 
beneficial for other Member States in the long run. 
 National Competence Rules. The Case of Spain 9 
 
National Competence  
Rules in the Application of  
Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA. 
The Case of Spain  
Ana Neira-Pena 
Abstract: Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA leaves Member States free to designate the 
competent authorities for both the transmission and the execution of judicial decisions im-
posing custodial measures. This freedom of designation, which is a consequence of the pro-
cedural autonomy that informs EU law, leads to a wide variety of competence models among 
the Member States. This paper reflects on the limits to that state power of designation, basi-
cally related to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, and then offers an overview 
of the different competence models existing in the Member States. Thereafter, the Spanish 
competence provisions are analysed, in order to determine the extent to which the election of 
the Spanish legislator contributes to the effective application of this instrument or, converse-
ly, is an obstacle to its effectiveness. For that purpose, an in-depth analysis of the gaps and 
interpretive difficulties of the Spanish regulation is carried out. The difficulties presented by 
the Spanish rules in determining the competent authorities are, in most cases, a consequence 
of the fragmentation and inconsistency of the legislation, which ignores the interrelation be-
tween the different instruments of mutual recognition. 
Keywords: Competence, judicial authority, prison administration, principle of effectiveness, 
transfer procedure. 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. National Authorities Competent to Enforce Framework 
Decision 2008/909/JHA and Some Limits on the Freedom of Choice. – 3. The Spanish Case. – 
3.1. Authorities Competent to Decide on the Transmission and Recognition of Custodial 
Sentences or Measures Involving Deprivation of Liberty. – 3.1.1. Spain as Issuing State. – 
3.1.2. Spain as Executing State. – 4. Interrelations of Transfers with Other Mutual Recognition 
Instruments and Need for Coordination between Judicial Authorities. – 5. Involvement of 
Other Spanish Authorities in the Transfer Procedure. – 5.1. The Intervention of the Ministry of 
Justice. – 5.2. The Intervention of the Public Prosecution Service. – 5.3. The Intervention of 
the Prison Administration. – 6. Concluding Remarks. 
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1. Introduction 
Procedural autonomy means that  
since the Union does not have procedural law […], it is for the domestic legal 
system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having 
jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for 
safeguarding rights [...] derived from Union Law. 1 
Therefore, according to the aforementioned principle, Member States are 
free to implement and enforce the EU law in accordance with their own judi-
cial system, their own institutional setting and through those judicial proceed-
ings envisaged by their national legislation, provided that such autonomy does 
not undermine the principles of equivalence 2 and effectiveness, 3 which also 
inform EU law. 4 
Where national authorities are responsible for implementing a Community regu-
lation it must be recognised that in principle this implementation takes place with 
due respect for the forms and procedures of national law. 5 
 
 
1 K. Lenaerts, I. Maselis, K. Gutman & J.T Nowak (Eds), EU Procedural Law, Oxford European Union 
Law Library, New York, 2014, p. 108. 
2 The equivalence principle means that national rules regulating actions derived from EU law must 
not be less favourable than those established for the exercise of domestic law actions, thus ensuring 
identical protection for the rights arising in both areas. Cf. F. Moya Hurtado de Mendoza, 
‘Efectividad del Derecho de la Unión Europea vs. principio constitucional de imperio de la ley’, 
Revista de Derecho Político, No. 99, 2017, p. 407. 
3 The principle of effectiveness means that national rules must not make it impossible or extremely 
difficult, in practice, to apply EU law. The ultimate purpose of this principle is to ensure the 
integrity, coherence and uniformity of the European legal system as a whole, as opposed to the 
possibility of national standards preventing the effective application of EU rights. See M. Accetto & 
S. Zleptnig, ‘The Principle of Effectiveness: Rethinking Its Role in Community Law’, European 
Public Law, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2005, p. 392. 
4 In this vein, the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter, the ‘CJEU’) states that “in the 
absence of community rules on this subject, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State 
to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to determine the procedural conditions governing 
actions at law intended to ensure the protection of the rights which citizens have from the direct 
effect of community law (procedural autonomy), it being understood that such conditions cannot be 
less favourable than those related to similar actions of a domestic nature” (equivalence criterion) 
and that the conditions laid down by the domestic norms should not make it “impossible in practice 
to exercise the rights which the national courts are obliged to protect” (effectiveness criterion). Cf. 
Judgment of 16 December 1976 in Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v 
Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland, [1976] ECR 1989. 
5 Judgment of the CJEU of 11 February 1971 in Case 39/70, Norddeutsches Vieh- und Fleischkontor 
GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen, [1971], para. 4. 
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Consequently, as observed by the European Commission,  
Member States are entitled to adopt rules of procedure of a formal nature which 
define, for example, the form of the request, the competent authority and other 
details which the Community provisions cannot regulate. 6 
The duty of Member States to implement and enforce EU law through their 
own legislative, judicial and administrative systems entails the obligation to 
designate the competent national authorities responsible for assuming such ob-
ligations. Accordingly, in relation to the instrument at issue, Article 2 of Frame-
work Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the 
principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing cus-
todial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of 
their enforcement in the European Union (OJ L 327, 5.12.2008, pp. 27-46, 
hereinafter, the ‘Framework Decision’) provides that each Member State 
shall communicate to the General Secretariat of the Council the authority or 
authorities that are, in accordance with their national legislation, competent 
both for forwarding and recognising custodial sentences in cross-border trans-
fer procedures.  
Pursuant to the aforementioned provision, Spanish Law no. 23/2014 of 20 
November, on mutual recognition of criminal decisions in the EU (hereinafter, 
‘LRM’ by its Spanish acronym), has established a system of powers that lar-
gely corresponds to the current competence scheme laid down in the domestic 
Spanish legal system for the execution and supervision of prison sentences, 
which is based on the duality between sentencing courts, responsible for en-
forcing criminal judgments, and the prison supervisory judge, which have a 
residual competence in the criminal execution, consisting of supervising the 
execution of prison sentences. 7 
Such a scheme has the advantage of being consistent with the judicial 
competence rules provided by domestic law. However, it also has certain 
drawbacks as a result of the strong decentralisation that it implies between the 
different national judicial bodies. Excessive decentralisation in decision-ma-
king on the transfer procedure hinders the specialisation of the bodies in-
volved, makes their actions more unpredictable and, above all, makes it diffi-
cult to standardize the procedures. 
 
 
6 Observations submitted to the CJEU by the Commission of the European Communities in Case 
39/70, Norddeutsches Vieh- und Fleischkontor GmbH.  
7 At the XIX meeting of Spanish prison supervision judges and magistrates, it was requested that 
such competence distribution model between sentencing courts and prison supervisory judges be 
respected in transposing Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA into domestic law. The conclusions of 
this meeting were retrieved on 26 September 2019 from www.derechopenitenciario.com/docu 
ments/criterios2010.pdf. 
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On the other hand, in choosing the competent authority in the LRM, the in-
tervention of certain administrative entities closer to the executive branch, 
such as the Public Prosecutor’s Office and, notably, the Prison Administration, 
is missing. However, these bodies are usually in a better position to detect po-
tentially transmissible cases, to assess the appropriateness of issuing and recog-
nising custodial sentences, as well as to detect problems arising from the exist-
ence of other pending proceedings or convictions handed down to the same 
person. 8 
First of all, we will analyse to what extent Member States face limits deriv-
ing from EU law in selecting their competence models to enforce the Frame-
work Decision. Thereafter, a comparative note will be made to determine the 
competence rules envisaged by other Member States. 
Secondly, in order to study the legislative treatment of the competence is-
sue in Spanish law, firstly, Article 64 LMR, in which the issuing competent 
authorities are established, will be analysed. Finally, we will explore some 
problems arising in cases of interrelation between various instruments of mu-
tual recognition, particularly when different judicial authorities are involved 
without adequate coordination between them. Subsequently, the intervention 
of the Ministry of Justice, the Public Prosecution and the Prison Administra-
tion in the transfer procedure will be examined. 
The chapter will end with some proposals for improving the current Spanish 
competence system for the transfer of prisoners within the European Union. 
2. National Authorities Competent to Enforce Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA and Some Limits on the Freedom of Choice  
Contrary to what might be assumed at first glance, the discretion enjoyed 
by Member States in designating the competent authorities to enforce instru-
ments of mutual recognition is not absolute, since the CJEU has stated that the 
notion of ‘judicial authority’ is an autonomous concept of EU law when it co-
mes to some judicial cooperation procedures. 9 Moreover, the inherent limits 
 
 
8 In the second part of the chapter we will discuss the possible intervention by these public entities in 
the different phases of cross-border transfer procedures. 
9 The autonomous concept of ‘judicial authority’ has been developed by the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU in relation to Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA: Judgment of 29 June 2016, in Case C-
486/14, Piotr Kossowski [2016]; Judgment of 10 November 2016, in Case C-452/16 PPU, Krzystof 
Marek Poltorak [2016]; Judgment of 10 November 2016, in Case C-453/16 PPU, Halil Ibrahim 
Özçelik [2016]; Judgment of 10 November 2016, in Case C‑477/16 PPU, Ruslanas Kovalkovas 
[2016] and Judgment of 27 May 2019, in Joined Cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU [2019]. In these 
latter cases, the CJEU states that “Although, in accordance with the principle of procedural 
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to the concept of procedural autonomy, namely the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness, must also be taken into consideration. 
Firstly, it is interesting to reflect on the appropriateness of expanding the 
case law on the autonomous concept of ‘judicial authority’, developed in rela-
tion to Article 6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on 
the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member 
States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, pp. 1-20), to Article 2 of Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA on cross-border transfers. The CJEU, in the judgments in which 
it has been shaping that concept, is particularly concerned about the risks of the 
influence of the executive branch in the decision to issue a European Arrest 
Warrant (hereinafter, ‘EAW’). Therefore, in accordance with its case law, inde-
pendence is the defining feature in indicating which national authorities are in-
cluded in the concept of ‘judicial issuing authority’ within the meaning of Arti-
cle 6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA and which ones are not. 10 
On the one hand, it seems clear that the risk of political influence might al-
so arise in relation to cross-border transfers when the issuing authority is ad-
ministrative in nature and, therefore, directly or indirectly dependent on the 
executive branch. This risk could advocate the convenience of extending this 
autonomous concept of ‘judicial authority’, put together for EAWs, to cross-
border transfers. However, so far, the CJEU has limited the scope of applica-
tion of this autonomous concept of EU law to the EAW. In addition, the Euro-
pean Court holds that “the term ‘judicial authority’, contained in Article 6(1) 
of the Framework Decision, requires, throughout the Union, an autonomous 
and uniform interpretation, which […] must take into account the terms of that 
 
 
autonomy, the Member States may designate, in their national law, the ‘judicial authority’ with the 
competence to issue a European arrest warrant, the meaning and scope of that term cannot be left to 
the assessment of each Member State” (para. 48). “That term requires, throughout the European 
Union, an autonomous and uniform interpretation, which, in accordance with the settled case-law of 
the Court, must take into account the wording of Article 6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584, its 
legislative scheme and the objective of that framework decision” (para. 49). 
10 See Judgment of 27 May 2019, in Case C-509/18 in which is stated that “‘issuing judicial 
authority’, within the meaning of Article6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584, must be interpreted 
as including the Prosecutor General of a Member State who, whilst institutionally independent from 
the judiciary, is responsible for the conduct of criminal prosecutions and is independent from the 
executive”. However, that term “must be interpreted as not including the public prosecutors’ offices 
of a Member State which are responsible for the prosecution of criminal offences and are 
subordinate to a body of the executive of that Member State, such as a Minister for Justice, and may 
be subject, directly or indirectly, to directions or instructions in a specific case from that body in 
connection with the adoption of a decision to issue a European arrest warrant” (Joined Cases C-
508/18 and C-82/19 PPU). Likewise, an organ of the executive, such as the Ministry of Justice of 
the Republic of Lithuania, must be excluded from being designated as an ‘issuing judicial 
authority’, within the meaning of the same Article 6(1) (Case C‑477/16 PPU, Ruslanas Kovalkovas) 
as well as the police service, such as the Rikspolisstyrelsen (National Police Board, Sweden), which 
are within the province of the executive (Case C‑452/16 PPU, Krzystof Marek Poltorak). 
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provision, its context and the objective of the Framework Decision”, 11 ele-
ments that are clearly not common to both instruments. 
Leaving aside the differences in the legislative context and the purposes of 
both instruments, the literal argument cannot go unnoticed. Thus, the first rea-
son supporting the non-extension of the autonomous concept of judicial au-
thority to cross-border transfers is based on the lack of use of the term ‘judi-
cial authority’ in the provisions of the Framework Decision, which always re-
fer to the ‘competent authority’ without specifying its jurisdictional nature. 12 
This different terminological use seems to be a deliberate decision by the Eu-
ropean legislator, which may, precisely, seek to give access to other types of 
authorities, notably those that, in accordance with the internal legislation of 
the different Member States, have been granted functions related to compli-
ance with prison sentences and, notably, powers to assign the prison centre of 
offenders, as well as to decide on transfers between national prisons. 13 
However, the fact that Member States are not limited by the aforementio-
ned autonomous concept of judicial authority in determining the competent au-
thorities to enforce the Framework Decision does not imply that they enjoy un-
limited freedom to design their competency model. That decision is conditioned 
by the necessary respect for the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, re-
quirements with which national law related to procedure must comply. 14 
The above limits essentially imply that the competency model chosen by 
each Member State should not make it impossible or excessively difficult to 
achieve the objective pursued by the Framework Decision, that is, to facilitate 
the social rehabilitation of offenders. Furthermore, the choice of the national 
competent authority must not discriminate community inmates against na-
tional inmates in terms of the possibilities of serving their jail sentence in a 
place where they have better prospects for rehabilitation and reintegration in-
to society. 
 
 
11 See Cases C‑452/16 PPU, para. 32; C‑477/16 PPU, para. 33; and Joined Cases C-508/18 and C-
82/19 PPU, para. 49. 
12 The literal argument is also pointed out by K. Ambos, ‘Sobre las fiscalías alemanas como 
autoridad de emisión de la orden europea de detención y entrega. Comentario a las sentencias del 
Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea (Gran Sala), en los asuntos acumulados C-5081/18 y C-
82/19 PPU, y en el asunto C-509/18, de 27 de mayo de 2019’, Revista española de derecho europeo, 
No. 71, 2019, p. 15, when considering the extension of the autonomous concept of judicial authority 
to other instruments of mutual recognition. 
13 For example, in the case of Spain, this competence falls to the Prison Administration at national le-
vel, with little judicial intervention limited to deciding appeals that may be brought against admi-
nistrative decisions made on internal transfers (Article 31 of Royal Decree No. 190/1996, of 9 Fe-
bruary, and Article 79 of Organic Law No. 1/1978, of 26 September, General Prison Act, hereinafter 
‘LOGP’ by its acronym in Spanish). 
14 Leanaert et al. 2014, p. 109. 
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Thus, considering those requirements – derived from the principles of equiv-
alence and effectiveness – it should be noted that, for example, if, in a given 
Member State, the Prison Administration is the authority that is in the best posi-
tion to evaluate the offender’s prospects of social rehabilitation and the one with 
the best means to carry out this assessment, that Prison Service, should inter-
vene in the management of prisoner transfers also at the European level. 
Of course, the legitimacy of this administrative body to take action is not 
incompatible with a final decision made by a judicial authority after hearing 
the offender and with an adequate judicial recourse system. This judicial 
control would serve to prevent abuses or deviations of executive power, 
when, for example, the transfer was based on different purposes or purposes 
even contrary to improving the offender’s prospects of social rehabilitation. 
In addition, judicial intervention grants a greater degree of reliability of the 
decision for the purpose of being recognised in the executing State. On the 
other hand, the intervention of the Prison Administration would lead, in a 
case like the one described, to greater effectiveness of the social rehabilita-
tion purpose and, therefore, would contribute to achieving the aim of the 
Framework Decision. 
Through consultation of the European Judicial Atlas, 15 as well as the in-
formation published by the General Secretariat of the Council based upon in-
formation provided by the different Member States, 16 it can be seen that the 
designation of the competent authorities for both issuing and recognising and 
enforcing custodial sentences or measures involving a loss of liberty differs 
greatly from one Member State to another. 17 
 
 
15 Retrieved on 26 October 2019 from www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu/ejn/AtlasChooseMeasure/EN/0/354. 
The ATLAS responds to the need for more practical information on the national procedure of other states 
to enhance cooperation. According to the European Organization of Prison and Correctional Services 
(2013), ‘Expert Group on Framework Decision 909’, Working Group Report, p. 13, retrieved on 25 
September 2019 from www.europris.org/file/report-europris-expert-group-on-framework-decision-909/? 
download=1, “there is a widespread variety in some elements of the legal implementation, organisation 
and practical application (…). These variations include, inter alia, the variation in the type of competent 
authority competent in the whole process (…) and the fact that some Member States have not appointed a 
central authority (…) so that the issuing Member State has to identify the proper competent authority”, 
which is greatly facilitated with the ATLAS. 
16 Retrieved on 24 October 2019 from www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu/ejn/libdocumentproperties/EN/ 
1897. 
17 According to I. Durnescu, ‘Obstacles and Solutions in the implementation of the FD 2008/909/JHA. 
STEPS2 Resettlement: Support for Transfer of European Prison Sentences towards Resettlement’, 
2016, p. 11, retrieved on 22 September 2019 from www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-d&q= 
Obstacles+and+Solutions+in+the+implementation+of+the+FD+2008%2F909%2FJHA, one of the prac-
tical obstacles of this instrument is due to the large number of competent authorities. In this sense, it 
can be predicted that the wide variety of situations regarding the competent authority between the 
Member States will lead to different practices and a low level of predictability, above all in areas of 
the law amenable to interpretation. 
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While several States continue to grant powers to the Ministry of Justice, 
others indicate certain administrative authorities linked to the Prison Admin-
istration as being competent. There are also those who choose to designate the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office as the competent body, along with another group of 
countries which, like Spain, with a greater or lesser degree of decentralisation, 
resort to attributing competence to one or more judicial bodies. 
Accordingly, it is clear that many Member States still have a central authori-
ty in charge of issuing and receiving the certificate and the rest of the documen-
tation required for the transfer, as in the case of, amongst others, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Italy, England, Wales, Latvia, the Netherlands and Romania, where the 
authority in charge of issuing and receiving the case file is the Ministry of Jus-
tice, although the decision is made by judges or prosecutors’ officers. 
To our mind, the option of designating a central governmental authority, 
while undoubtedly facilitating the determination of the foreign competent au-
thority and speeding up communications, distorts, to a certain extent, what 
should be direct communication between the judicial authorities, as required 
by Article 5(1) of the Framework Decision. 18 This intervention by the Minis-
try of Justice constitutes a clear footprint of the outdated model of inter-
governmental cooperation. In this regard, it should be noted that one of the 
features of the principle of mutual recognition is, precisely, this direct com-
munication between the members of the judiciary, without intermediation by 
the executive authority, which is, to some degree, altered by the leading role 
of the Ministry of Justice as intermediary, even though it does not hold the 
power to make the final decision. 19 
Other States have opted to designate the Crown Prosecution Service as the 
central authority competent to recognise and execute this instrument, as in the 
case of Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Malta and Portugal. In turn, another 
group of countries, aware of the advantages of having a centralised decision-
 
 
18  Contrary to Article 7 of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, which provides for the designation 
of central authorities, Article 5(1) of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA clearly states that “The 
judgment or a certified copy of it, together with the certificate, shall be forwarded, by the competent 
authority of the issuing State directly to the competent authority of the executing State”. It also adds 
that “All official communications shall also be made directly between the said competent autho-
rities”. 
19 “Mutual recognition is understood as procedure(s) of national authorities avoiding central national 
authorities when a Member State of the EU recognises criminal decisions of another Member 
State(s) without cumbersome formalities giving them status of domestic decisions”. Cf. L. Klimek, 
Mutual recognition in European decisions in European Criminal Law, Springer, Bratislava, 2017, p. 
6. For its part, the preamble of the LRM provides that the new model of judicial cooperation, based 
on the principle of mutual recognition, entails, among other things, a radical change in relations 
between the Member States of the EU, replacing communications between central or governmental 
authorities with direct communication between the judicial authorities. 
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making authority, have designated certain services or offices responsible for 
the administration and management of prisons as the competent bodies. These 
include Finland, with its Central Administrative Office of the Criminal Sanc-
tions Agency, along with Sweden, Scotland and Northern Ireland, which des-
ignate their respective Prison Services as the competent authorities. 
Lastly, there is another set of Member States in which the authorities des-
ignated as competent to recognise and enforce custodial sentences imposed 
abroad are territorially decentralised, determined on the basis of the prisoner’s 
domicile or residence in the executing State. This group includes Austria, Fran-
ce, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Germany and Slovenia. It also inclu-
des Romania and Italy where, in the former case, if the prisoner does not have a 
domicile in Romania, the Bucharest Court of Appeal will have jurisdiction, 
while in Italy, if there is a lack of information about the prisoner’s domicile or 
residence, the Court of Appeal in Rome will have jurisdiction. 
The response time and the sense of decisions, as well as the speed of prior 
consultations between the authorities of the different Member States involved 
in the transfer or the internally developed procedures for assessing the merit of 
the transfer in terms of the prisoner’s social rehabilitation vary significantly 
from one Member State to another, which may, to some extent, be affected by 
the type of competent authority. Thus, for example, as Sanz Álvarez points 
out, there are States, like the Netherlands, which reply quickly, as they have a 
special service within the Ministry of Justice, while others take longer to reply 
and make decisions on procedures. 20 
It may be assumed that, in general, the centralisation of the authorities 
would lead to greater specialisation and, therefore, to quicker and more ef-
ficient management of these procedures. However, it appears difficult to 
identify a general criterion to this effect, since the territorial extension of 
the State in question, its jurisdictional organisation or the excessive work-
loads existing in the different jurisdictional and/or administrative services 
involved are just some of the factors that could influence the determination 
of the optimal competence model for processing cross-border transfer pro-
cedures.  
However, with regard to the Spanish system, which will be analysed in some 
detail below, it can be stated that the strong level of decentralisation in the de-
termination of the authorities competent to handle this issue, together with the 
lack of authority of the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Prison Administra-
 
 
20 A.C. Sanz Álvarez, ‘La Orden Europea de Detención y Entrega y la DM 909/2008 de 27 de no-
viembre de 2008 relativa a la aplicación del reconocimiento mutuo de sentencias en materia penal por 
las que se imponen penas u otras medidas privativas de libertad a efectos de su ejecución en la Unión 
Europea’, in AA.VV., Jornadas sobre la Orden Europea de Detención y Entrega, Centro de Estudios 
Judiciales, Madrid, 2017, pp. 37-38. 
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tion to propose or request the start of the transfer procedure, result in a compe-
tence system that, in addition to being excessively complex and plagued with 
interpretive questions, is not effective in practice.  
3. The Spanish Case 
3.1. Authorities Competent to Decide on the Transmission and Reco-
gnition of Custodial Sentences or Measures Involving Deprivation of 
Liberty  
3.1.1. Spain as Issuing State 
As regulated by Article 64(1) LRM, in order to determine the competent 
body for the transmission of a decision imposing custodial sentences or 
measures, two cases should be differentiated. On the one hand, the case in 
which an offender has already begun to serve his or her sentence and is, there-
fore, imprisoned and, on the other hand, the case in which s/he has not begun 
to serve his or her sentence. 
In the first case, that is, when the offender is already imprisoned, regardless 
of whether s/he is serving the sentence that is intended to be forwarded or a 
different one, the competent authority for forwarding the judgment will be the 
prison supervision judge in charge of the prison in which the offender is held 
or, where appropriate, the central prison supervision judge, if any of the penal-
ties were imposed by the National High Court. 
With regard to the competence of prison supervision judges, one question 
arises concerning the determination of territorial competence, which the LRM 
does not resolve. If the offender is transferred to another national prison dur-
ing the transfer procedure, it is not clear which judge will be territorially com-
petent. Unlike what is provided by the legal regulation of other mutual recog-
nition instruments, which establish the general procedural rule of perpetuatio 
iurisdictionis 21 – according to which any changes that occur, once the proce-
dure has been initiated, in terms of the domicile of the parties or the situation of 
the subject of the procedure, will not modify the jurisdiction or competence –, 
 
 
21 For instance, the legislation on orders freezing property or evidence states that any change of the 
location of the object to be frozen will not imply any loss of competence of the investigating judge or 
the Prosecutor who had agreed to the recognition and enforcement of the resolution transmitted to 
Spain (Article 144(2) II LRM). Likewise, the law regarding the mutual recognition of confiscation 
orders contains a similar rule (Article 158(2) II LRM). In addition, with regard to resolutions imposing 
financial penalties, it is also stated that the change of the offender’s residence, registered office, real 
estate or sources of income will not imply an unexpected loss of jurisdiction of the judge initially 
competent (Article 174(2) LRM). 
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nothing is said about this issue in the Section related to the transmission of 
custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty. 
Despite the aforementioned legal loophole, according to Sanz Álvarez, the 
principles of procedural economy, legal certainty and public order infer that it 
would be worth applying the general rule of perpetuatio iurisdictionis also in 
the case of the instrument in question, so that any change of prison, if the 
transfer procedure has already begun, would not modify the competent judi-
cial body.  
The same conclusion would be reached by applying the rules on lis pen-
dens and res judicata. In this regard, de Marcos Madruga 22 points out that, if 
the inmate is transferred from one prison to another and reiterates his or her 
transfer request before the new prison supervision judge competent to super-
vise the execution of his/her sentence, this judge shall respect the decision 
made by his or her predecessor due to the force of res judicata of judicial 
decisions, 23 while, if a transfer request is pending before another court, a 
new procedure could not be initiated by virtue of the effects of lis pendens.  
As noted at the beginning of this section, there is a second rule of compe-
tence, less frequently used in practice. 24 This rule states that if the transfer pro-
cedure begins when the custodial sentence has not yet started to be served, and 
the offender is therefore free, the competent authority to decide on the transmis-
sion will be the sentencing court and, more specifically, the judicial body that 
handed down the first-instance ruling (Article 64(1) LRM). 
The aforementioned competence rule means that virtually any Spanish 
judge or court may be competent to issue this instrument. Thus, taking into 
account the combination of the different competence criteria (seriousness of 
the offence, nature of the crime and some special competence rules ratione 
 
 
22 F. de Marcos Madruga, ‘La transmisión de sentencias en materia penal por las que se imponen penas 
privativas de libertad. España como Estado de transmisión: regulación y examen de problemáticas 
surgidas en la práctica’, paper presented in a course on Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA and its 
transposition in Spain held on 20 and 21 May 2019, 2019, p. 13. Retrieved on 15 October 2019 from 
www.cej-mjusticia.es/cej_dode/flash/ebook/assets/img/cejponencia1560180533759/cejponencia 
1560180533759.pdf. 
23 Contrary to this interpretation, it is argued that the nature of the executive procedure leads to the 
fact that, if the transmission request is rejected by the competent authority, the request could be 
raised again, invoking any change in circumstance. See M. Fernández Prado, ‘Cuestiones prácticas 
relativas al reconocimiento de resoluciones que imponen penas o medidas privativas de libertad’, in 
C. Arangüena Fanego, M. de Hoyos Sancho & C. Rodríguez-Medel Nieto (Eds), Reconocimiento 
mutuo de resoluciones renales en la Unión Europea, Aranzadi, Navarra, 2015, p. 134. 
24 In this sense, it must be borne in mind that the offender’s request to be transferred should not be a 
cause for suspension of his or her imprisonment and, once the entry into prison occurs, the competence 
shall correspond automatically to the prison supervision judge. Consequently, the competence of the 
sentencing court will be practically reduced to those cases where the offender is not in Spain, but in the 
executing State. See Fernández Prado 2015, p. 133. 
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personae for certain public positions) any of the following judicial bodies 
could be competent to decide the case in the first-instance and, therefore, to 
forward the final judgment to another Member State: Criminal Courts, Provin-
cial High Courts, Central Criminal Courts and even the regional Superior 
Courts and the Supreme Court for certain offenders (e.g. those entitled to par-
liamentary immunity). 
The first problematic issue raised by the aforementioned competence rule 
derives from the strong level of decentralisation of the authorities competent 
to decide on the issuance and forwarding of this instrument. 25 The implication 
of numerous and diverse judicial bodies increases the lack of homogeneity of 
their decisions, above all when considering that the judicial authorities are 
sovereign in the interpretation of the laws, and it is not possible to impose up-
on them binding guides or protocols on how to apply legal rules, as their inde-
pendence would be undermined. 
Moreover, this second rule of competence also presents certain gaps. For 
example, it does not resolve the competence issue if there are several custodial 
sentences involving the same individual, when none of them have started to be 
served. In such a case, the law does not indicate which of the different sen-
tencing courts would be competent in the transfer procedure. The competence 
may be held by the last sentencing court, 26 the first 27 or the one that handed 
down the highest penalty. 28 What seems clear is that, regardless of which of 
them is competent to decide on the transfer, communication and coordination 
between them is essential . However, such coordination is not expressly envis-
aged by the current legislation, which is aggravated by the lack of existence of 
 
 
25 According to M. de Hoyos Sancho, ‘El reconocimiento mutuo de resoluciones por las que se 
impone una pena o medida privativa de libertad: análisis normativo’, in C. Arangüena Fanego; M. 
de Hoyos Sancho & C. Rodríguez-Medel Nieto (Eds), Reconocimiento mutuo de resoluciones pena-
les en la Unión Europea, Aranzadi, Navarra, 2015, p. 113, it is a fully decentralised competence 
model. 
26 This is the solution proposed by the Office for International Relations of the Spanish General 
Council of the Judiciary, expressed in the Guide on the recognition to judgments imposing custodial 
sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty, published on 27 February 2015, p. 4; 
Fernández Prado 2015, p. 133, also attributes the jurisdiction to the last sentencing court, responsi-
ble for the accumulation of sentences.  
27 Organic Law No. 5/2000 of 12 January, on criminal juvenile justice (hereinafter, ‘LORPM’ by its 
acronym in Spanish) establishes the opposite rule: the first one that handed down the sentence is 
responsible for the execution (Article 12(1)). 
28 In this regard, the Additional Provision 5th of the Organic Law No. 6/1985 of 1 July, of the 
Judiciary (hereinafter, ‘LOPJ’ by its acronym in Spanish), states that, in order to decide on appeals 
against decisions of prison supervision judges, the sentencing court will be competent and, in the 
event that the offender is serving several sentences, the jurisdiction shall correspond to the court that 
imposed the most severe penalty, while if several courts imposed the same penalty, the jurisdiction 
shall correspond to the one that handed down the last sentence. 
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a register recording the different European orders issued or recognised in rela-
tion to a given individual, together with the absence of a register of non-final 
convictions. 
The legislation on the issuing competent authorities also includes a confus-
ing Article 65(2) LRM, which seems to contain a clause extending the juris-
diction of prison supervision judges. This provision indicates that, when the 
offender is still free, the resolution ordering the transfer to another Member 
State can be transmitted, either directly by the sentencing body or via the pris-
on supervision judge. 
A joint interpretation of Articles 64 and 65(2) LRM leads to the conclusion 
that the scope of competence of the prison supervision judge is not limited on-
ly to cases where the prisoner is already serving the sentence, but is also ex-
tended to those cases where the penalty has not yet started to be served, when-
ever the sentencing judge, once the judgment become final, decides to trans-
mit the file via the prison supervision judge. 
In our opinion, the main problem posed by Article 65(2) LRM, aside from 
its difficulty of interpretation, lies in the fact that it seems to leave the deter-
mination of judicial competence to the sentencing court. This way of deter-
mining jurisdiction clashes with the nature of criminal competence rules, 
which are mandatory (Article 8 Spanish Criminal Procedure Act), and consti-
tute authentic procedural prerequisites. This is the reason why those acts, made 
by or before a court without objective or functional competence, are null and 
void (Article 238(1) LOPJ). Moreover, the legal determination of the competent 
authority is part of the basic content of the fundamental right to the ordinary 
judge predetermined by law, which, in turn, is crucial to ensuring the inde-
pendence and impartiality of the judiciary. 
Accordingly, in order to avoid inadmissible discretion in determining the 
competent authority introduced by the literalness of Article 65(2) LRM, De 
Marcos Madruga 29 makes a systematic interpretation of the rule, according to 
which the transfer decision will be issued by the prison supervision judge or 
by the sentencing judge, depending on whether or not it is considered neces-
sary to adopt precautionary measures against the sentenced person, as Article 
72 LRM designates the prison supervision judge as the body exclusively com-
petent to request such precautionary measures. 30 In this way, paraphrasing the 
aforementioned author, it would not be the mere discretion of the sentencing 
 
 
29 De Marcos Madruga 2019, p. 11. 
30 According to this interpretation, the prison supervision judge would be competent to forward the 
judgment when the offender is in the executing State and the adoption of a personal precautionary 
measure must be requested to ensure that they remain in that territory. Conversely, when the adoption 
of precautionary measures is not necessary, the sentencing court itself shall be competent to forward 
the custodial sentence directly to the competent authority of the executing State. 
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judge that would entitle the prison supervision judge to act, but the need to 
guarantee the offender’s presence in the executing State through the request 
for precautionary measures. 
In addition, Article 65(2) LRM presents another interpretative problem, 
since it does not determine which prison supervision judge would be territori-
ally competent, in the event that the sentencing court decided to defer the 
transfer procedure to it, without the offender yet being deprived of liberty and, 
therefore, without having a specific prison centre as a reference. In this case, 
the preliminary draft of the LRM provided that the prison supervision judge 
corresponding to the judicial district of the sentencing court would be compe-
tent. However, in the current legal order, as there is no such provision, the 
question of territorial competence remains unanswered. Two alternative op-
tions are available here: the prison supervision judge of the prisoner’s domi-
cile provided that such information is available, 31 or the prison supervision 
judge of the judicial district of the sentencing body, as envisaged by the 
aforementioned draft. 
Another difficulty that arises due to the jurisdictional duality existing be-
tween the sentencing court and the prison supervision judge occurs when, 
once the custodial sentence has started to be served, the offender escapes and 
is found in the executing State. In this case, the most appropriate solution 
would be to attribute the competence to the sentencing body, despite the sen-
tence having already started, given that the offender, not being in prison, 
would no longer be under the jurisdiction of any prison supervision judge. 32 
However, Spanish law also fails to clarify this point. 
Finally, for the forwarding of the judgment imposed in accordance with 
Organic Law No. 5/2000 of 12 January, on criminal juvenile justice, specifi-
cally for custodial measures for minors, juvenile courts are competent for issu-
ing this instrument regardless of whether or not the measure has begun to be 
fulfilled. This competence rule is consistent with the centralisation of compe-
tences in the juvenile courts both for the prosecution of minors (Article 2 
LORPM) and for the execution and supervision of custodial measures im-
posed upon them (Article 44 LORPM). 
The only doubt that may arise in the latter case refers to the event in which 
 
 
31 For some scholars, the judge of the offender’s domicile would be competent by analogy with 
other cases in which there is no imprisonment, such as in the supervision of the enforcement of 
sentences involving community services or post-penitentiary probation measures. Cf. de Marcos 
Madruga 2019, pp. 10-11. 
32 The following scholars argue in the same vein, Fernández Prado 2015, p. 133; A.M. González 
Álvarez & J. Nistal Burón, ‘El reconocimiento mutuo de resoluciones penales en la Unión Europea. 
El cumplimiento en España de penas privativas de libertad impuestas en otros Estados Miembros de 
la Unión Europea’, La Ley Penal: Revista de Derecho Penal, Procesal y Penitenciario, No. 114, 
2015, p. 8; de Marcos Madruga 2019, p. 11. 
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the minor, upon reaching adult age, is transferred to a prison centre (Article 14 
LORPM). However, in accordance with the LRM, it can be assumed that, 
even when the juvenile court has lost jurisdiction regarding the execution and 
supervision of the measure in Spain, it will retain the competence to forward 
the judgment to another Member State. 33 
On the other hand, although the LRM does not expressly state as such, it 
seems logical that, in terrorist offences or in crimes committed abroad by 
minors, the competent body is the Central Juvenile Court, which ordinarily 
deals with prosecuting such offences when they are committed by under-age 
offenders and also executes any measures imposed (Article 2(4) LORPM). 
Once again, the legislative omissions denote a certain lack of care in deter-
mining the competent authorities for the transfer procedure, forcing the in-
terpreter to seek systematic solutions, with the risk that the lack of a clear 
legal basis for such attribution of judicial competence may lead to the emer-
gence of conflicts of jurisdiction, 34 to conflicting decisions being made or 
even to the annulment of proceedings held before an non-competent court 
(Article 238(1) LOPJ). 
3.1.2. Spain as Executing State 
As provided by Article 64(2) LRM, the authority competent to recognise a 
foreign custodial sentence is the Central Criminal Court, while the authority 
competent to supervise the execution of the sentence is the central prison su-
pervision judge. However, when the conviction refers to a custodial measure 
imposed upon a minor, the Central Juvenile Court is competent both for the 
recognition and for the execution and supervision of the measure. 
When comparing the rules determining the issuing competent authorities 
with those identifying the executing competent authorities, it can be seen that 
the executing authorities are much more centralised, being concentrated on the 
Central Courts, which belong to the National High Court, a judicial body lo-
cated in the city of Madrid, having jurisdiction over the whole Spanish territo-
ry, without being territorially decentralised. 35 
Centralisation can contribute to homogeneity in recognition decisions. It 
must be borne in mind that recognition decisions, although they may apparent-
ly seem highly regulated, include an important component of discretionary as-
sessment, as social rehabilitation is undefined legal concept and the non-con-
 
 
33 De Marcos Madruga 2019, p. 11. 
34 Fernández Prado 2015, p.133. 
35 According to Fernández Prado 2015, p.141, the Spanish legislator has opted, in this case, for a 
centralised competence model. 
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tribution to social rehabilitation is provided as a ground for refusing the trans-
fer request. 36 
 On the other hand, centralisation can facilitate the determination of the 
Spanish competent body by the issuing state. In any case, it may not be easy 
for the foreign authority to determine the competent authority to which the 
certificate must be forwarded, along with the custodial sentence. Therefore, if 
the certificate is received by an non-competent judicial body, the latter will be 
obliged to send it to the competent judicial authority, informing the prosecutor 
and the foreign issuing authority (Article 5(5) of the Framework Decision and 
Article 16(2) LRM). 
4. Interrelations of Transfers with Other Mutual Recognition Instru-
ments and Need for Coordination between Judicial Authorities 
The interrelationships between the different mutual recognition instruments 
are plentiful and very significant. However, the fact that the Spanish regula-
tion of these instruments occurs unsystematically and in a fragmentary way, 
through the transposition of successive relevant acts, may cause the overall vi-
sion to be blurred and may lead to underestimating the need to establish coor-
dination mechanisms between them. However, if the aim is to create a genuine 
area of freedom, security and justice throughout the EU territory, the panoply 
of instruments of mutual recognition must be seen as a comprehensive set. 
It is important to consider, for example, the partial overlap between cross-
border transfers pursuant to Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA and the Eu-
ropean Arrest Warrant, regulated in Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA. 37 Si-
milarly, there is a clear complementary relationship between the transfer of 
prisoners and the instrument regulated in Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA 
 
 
36 As held by the experts group in European Organization of Prison and Correctional Services, 
‘Expert Group on Framework Decision 909’, Working Group Report, 2013, pp. 7, 10-11, retrieved 
on 24 September 2019 from www.europris.org/file/report-europris-expert-group-on-framework-de-
cision-909/?download=1, there are no common criteria or procedures for assessing the contribution 
of a transfer to the offender’s social rehabilitation. At the same time, the Framework Decision also 
fails to offer clear guidance on how to interpret ‘the living place’ of a person, which is, therefore, 
determined differently depending on the interpretation of the Member State concerned. 
37 According to the European Organization of Prison and Correctional Services 2013, p. 13, “The 
participating experts concluded that the link between the EAW and the Framework Decision can 
give rise to problems, due to the fact that both systems are not fully compatible and that differences in 
national legislation could hinder the effectiveness of its combined application. The experts point to the 
importance of involving and informing the prisoner in this regard”. An in-depth study on the overlapping 
between cross-border transfers and the EAW can be found in Rosanò’s chapter of this book (Framework 
Decision 2008/909/JHA in Context: Interplay with the European Arrest Warrant and (EU) 
Extradition Law, pp. 79-95). 
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of 27November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition 
to judgments and probation decisions with a view to the supervision of proba-
tion measures and alternative sanctions (OJ L 337, 16.12.2008, pp. 102-122, 
hereinafter, the ‘FD 2008/947/JHA’). 38 
A relevant case of connection between the instrument analysed here and 
the EAW occurs when Spain denies the detention and surrender of a Spanish 
national for the purpose of executing a prison sentence in another Member 
State, in which case, as prescribed by law, the penalty imposed by the foreign 
authority must be served in Spain (Article 48(2) b) LRM). 39 This provision es-
tablishes that, once the EAW has been refused by the Central Investigating 
Court, the executing competent authority for cross-border transfers, that is, the 
Central Criminal Court, shall apply the specific provisions for regulating the 
recognition in Spain of custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation 
of liberty in order to prevent the impunity of the offender (Article 91 LRM). 
In the aforementioned case, beyond the material obstacles that may exist to 
the forwarding of the custodial judgment due to the different requirements of 
both instruments (for example, their partially different purposes and aims, the 
divergent requirements for issuing and executing both instruments, the different 
approach to the sentenced person’s consent, the different penalty thresholds and 
so on), there is a problem of coordination between the judicial authorities in-
volved. 
According to Article 91 LRM, the authority entitled to request the forward-
ing of the judgment involving custodial penalties to Spain is the Central Crim-
inal Court. However, the authority in charge of deciding on the denial of the 
EAW is the Central Investigating Court, which is the authority ordinarily com-
petent for recognising and executing this instrument (Article 35(2) LRM). It 
seems clear that, in a case such as this, the communication between the Cen-
tral Investigating Court which denies the surrender of the offender and the 
Central Criminal Court, competent to request the transmission of the custodial 
 
 
38 This complementary link is clearly set out in European Commission, Report from the Commission 
to the European Parliament and the Council on the Implementation by the Member States of the 
Framework Decisions 2008/909/JHA, 2008/947/JHA and 2009/829/JHA on the Mutual Recognition 
of Judicial Decisions on Custodial Sentences or Measures Involving Deprivation of Liberty, on 
Probation Decisions and Alternative Sanctions and on Supervision Measures as an Alternative to 
Provisional Detention, COM(2014)57 final, 2014, retrieved on 9 August 2019 from htpp://eur-
lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/1041647, according to which these Framework Decisions must be seen 
as a package of coherent and complementary legislation addressing the issue of detention of EU 
citizens in other Member States. 
39 The described case is based on Article 25 of the Framework Decision, which envisages a link to 
the EAW. This provision, in conjunction with Articles 4(6) and 5(3) of the EAW Act, allows a 
Member State to refuse to surrender its nationals or residents or persons staying in its territory 
provided that such State undertakes to enforce the prison sentence in accordance with the Frame-
work Decision. 
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sentence to Spain as a direct consequence of that refusal, is essential. Howev-
er, Spanish law gives no direction in this regard. 40  
Hence, it is rightly stated that the different competent authorities designat-
ed in the LRM for the issuance, recognition and execution of each instrument, 
and even in relation to the same instrument, without identifying a central reg-
istration system for the different European orders, 41 or the need for communi-
cation between the different authorities involved, requires a voluntary and 
spontaneous coordination task that does not always work as desired. 42 
Likewise, coordination between the authorities responsible for recognising 
and executing an EAW and the authorities responsible for transmitting a cus-
todial sentence is required in cases where, pending a sentence of imprisonment 
imposed in Spain, the offender is claimed, through an EAW, by the State of 
nationality or residence, either for the exercise of criminal actions or for the 
enforcement of a final sentence. In such a case, the Central Investigating Court 
that receives the EAW, instead of denying the surrender of the arrested person 
or suspending it until the complete execution of the sentence in Spain, may 
choose to promote the forwarding of the Spanish judgment to the issuing State 
of the EAW where the offender has certain family, social or professional ties. 
However, since the Central Investigating Court is not competent for initiating 
the transfer procedure, or entitled to forward the judgment, it must act through 
the proper authorities, either via informal communication with the Spanish is-
suing authority (prison supervision judge or sentencing court, depending on 
whether or not the offender is in prison), or by suggesting this to the foreign 
executing state, which is entitled to request the transmission of the custodial 
sentence imposed in Spain. 43 
Another interesting case of connection between different instruments of 
mutual recognition arises when a custodial sentence is to be transmitted along 
with a probation measure which must be served after the deprivation of liber-
ty. Thus, when issuing or recognising a custodial sentence, the competent au-
thorities must also communicate and coordinate with those other judicial au-
 
 
40 According to González Álvarez & Nistal Burón 2015, p. 8, footnote 22, despite the legislative 
silence, once the EAW is denied, the file must be transmitted to the Central Investigating Judge 
competent to initiate the transfer procedure. 
41 In view of the interconnection that, in practice, exists between the various instruments of mutual 
recognition, it would be very useful to create a European registry of probation orders, custodial sentences, 
and supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention and protection orders similar to the 
Schengen Information System essential for the proper functioning of the EAW. Cf. C. Rodríguez-Medel 
Nieto, ‘Cuestiones prácticas relativas al reconocimiento de resoluciones de libertad vigilada’, in C. 
Arangüena Fanego, M. de Hoyos Sancho & C. Rodríguez-Medel Nieto (Eds), Reconocimiento mutuo de 
resoluciones penales en la Unión Europea, Aranzadi, Navarra, 2015, pp. 181-182. 
42 Sanz Álvarez 2017, p. 12. 
43 Sanz Álvarez 2017, p. 8. 
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thorities competent to issue or recognise the probation measures envisaged by 
Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA. 44 
According to Article 66(2) LRM, the concurrence of the custodial sentence 
with other financial penalties or confiscation orders pending execution will not 
prevent the transfer. 45 From this legal provision it can be inferred, conversely, 
that when penalties or measures pending execution are non-pecuniary, for in-
stance, in the case of post-penitentiary probation measures consisting of the pro-
hibition of approaching the victim for a certain period of time once the prison sen-
tence has been served, 46 the impossibility of transmitting this latter measure may 
become an obstacle to the transmission of the prison sentence, preventing the of-
fender’s transfer to a prison in the country of his/her nationality or residence. 
In the described case, the various interests at stake must be assessed – es-
sentially the social rehabilitation of the offender and the safety of the victim –
in order to decide which instrument or combination of instruments of mutual 
recognition should be applied. When both penalties – the custodial sentence 
and the measure restrictive of other rights – have been adopted in the same 
procedure and by the same judge, the assessment is possible. However, prob-
lems arise when sentences of different nature are imposed on the same indi-
vidual in different proceedings held before different courts. In this case, as a 
result of the lack of coordination between the judicial authorities competent to 
issue the various mutual recognition instruments, together with the absence of 
a register of non-final convictions, 47 the prisoner may be improperly trans-
 
 
44 Rodríguez-Medel Nieto 2015, p. 189. 
45 According to B. Mapelli Caffarena & M.I. González Cano, El traslado de personas condenadas 
entre países, McGraw Hill, Madrid, 2001, p. 89, the refusal of the transfer to ensure compliance 
with a fine or other financial penalties, frustrating the purpose of social rehabilitation, would be 
contrary to the principle of proportionality. 
46 According to de Marcos Madruga 2019, p. 16, the post-penitentiary probation measure is not 
transferable under Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA, since it is characterised by the absence of 
concreteness until a few months before the termination of the custodial sentence (Article 106(2) of 
the Spanish Penal Code), whereas, according to the aforementioned Framework Decision and the 
LRM, what is transmitted are concrete measures of probation. In this context, it should be conside-
red that instruments that have been developed through regulations without direct effect on the 
national legal systems of the Member States, such as Framework Decisions or Directives, have often 
not been transposed with sufficient faithfulness or correspondence, which causes difficulties in 
practical application when creating non-homogeneous systems or referring to non-comparable 
measures. In this regard, in relation to Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA, the determination of the 
contents of its objective scope is not seen homogenously in the different Member States. In relation 
to the Spanish legislation, this controversy has been addressed in P. Faraldo-Cabana, ‘¿Cuáles son 
las resoluciones de “libertad vigilada” a efectos del reconocimiento mutuo? Sobre las dificultades de 
trasposición de la Decisión Marco 2008/947/JAI al derecho español’, Revista de Derecho Comuni-
tario Europeo, Year 23, No. 63, 2019, pp. 575-597. 
47 Although the LRM states that, before deciding on the transmission of a custodial sentence, the 
competent judicial authority must check that there are no other non-final convictions pending against 
the offender (Article 66(3)), the truth is that such verification, which is carried out by consulting the 
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ferred, thereby frustrating the execution and effective enforcement of those 
other penalties or measures not transferrable to the executing State and un-
dermining the national jurisdiction. 48 
5. Involvement of Other Spanish Authorities in the Transfer Proce-
dure 
5.1. The Intervention of the Ministry of Justice 
In accordance with the spirit of European acts implementing the principle 
of mutual recognition, aimed at eliminating the decision-making power of the 
executive branch, the Spanish legal system has chosen to establish a purely ju-
risdictional procedure for cross-border transfers within the EU territory. Con-
sequently, all communications that occur within the transfer procedure will be 
established directly between the competent authorities involved, thus respect-
ing the mandate of Article 5(1) of the Framework Decision. 
Despite this, according to Article 6 LRM, the Spanish Ministry of Justice 
will be the central authority in charge of assisting judicial authorities compe-
tent to issue and execute the various instruments of mutual recognition on crim-
inal matters. This provision does not seem to make much sense in a fully juris-
dictional procedure. Moreover, such characterisation does not correspond to the 
function effectively performed by this executive body, which is limited to de-
veloping a task of mere receipt and centralisation of certain documentation. 
To facilitate this documentary undertaking entrusted to the Ministry of Jus-
tice, the judicial authorities are mandated to forward to the Ministry the certif-
icates issued or recognised by the Spanish courts (Article 6 LRM). This provi-
sion is supplemented by that contained in Article 64(3) LRM, inserted in Sec-
tion III LRM, specifically devoted to the forwarding of custodial sentences or 
measures involving deprivation of liberty, which establishes the mandate to 
forward to the Ministry the certificates issued or recognised by Spanish courts 
within three days from the issuance or recognition of the corresponding in-
strument. 49 
 
 
system of administrative registers to support the Administration of Justice, is not always possible. 
This is because, according to Article 2(3) b) of Royal Decree No. 95/2009 of 6 February, which 
regulates this registration system, the register only reflects non-final judgments when, in the pro-
cedure, protective or precautionary measures have been taken. 
48 De Marcos Madruga 2019, pp. 14-15, points out that, in this case, it will be necessary to enforce, 
prior to the transfer, those penalties or measures not subject to transmission, since a conflict would 
otherwise arise with the judicial authority competent to execute the non-transferable measure, which 
would be entitled to oppose an act, such as the transfer, rendering its pronouncement ineffective. 
49 According to the Office for International Relations of the Spanish General Council of the 
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This documentary receipt assignment entrusted to the Ministry of Justice 
could be useful for statistical purposes. However, in practice, there are two 
main problems affecting the reliability of this source of information. The first 
reason concerns judges’ systematic failure to send the files. Secondly, the type 
of documents that must be sent do not provide information on requests denied 
by the Spanish courts, on the results of transfer requests issued by Spanish judg-
es, on the ongoing procedures or on their duration, amongst other details that are 
extremely relevant for evaluating the effectiveness of the instrument at issue. 
5.2. The Intervention of the Public Prosecution Service 
The Public Prosecutor intervenes at various times in the procedure for both 
the issuance and execution of this mutual recognition instrument, as will be 
detailed below. However, when the Spanish legal order is carefully analysed, 
it can be seen that the Public Prosecutor’s intervention is reduced, in most cas-
es, to challenging those court decisions forwarded to it and to issuing its tech-
nical opinion at the request of the judge when the file is sent to it by the com-
petent judicial authority. 
Faced with this reactive position of the Public Prosecutor, it seems possi-
ble, and very convenient, for reasons that will be explained later, for this body 
to adopt a more active role in the initiation and management of transfer proce-
dures. This change in the prosecutor’s role would allow, among other things, 
greater possibilities of specialisation due to the broader powers of self-
organisation of prosecutors, compared to the legal predetermination of judges 
in the assignment of cases. 
Although the current Spanish legal regulation does not assign a leading role 
to the Prosecutor’s Office in cross-border transfer procedures, the fact is that, 
sometimes by express legal provision, sometimes through a systematic inter-
pretation of the law, there are various procedural acts in which the interven-
tion of the Prosecutor’s Office appears to be necessary or, at least, convenient.  
Firstly, when Spain is the executing state, it is stated that the Public Prose-
cutor, together with the competent judicial authority and the offender, is enti-
tled to request the forwarding to Spain of the custodial sentence handed down 
in another Member State (Article 79 LRM). In addition, when the initiative 
originates from the judicial authority or the sentenced individual, the compe-
tent judicial body shall decide on the recognition or refusal of the transfer only 
after hearing the Public Prosecutor’s opinion (Article 79 LRM). 
 
 
Judiciary, expressed in the Guide on the recognition to judgments imposing custodial sentences or 
measures involving deprivation of liberty, published on 27 February 2015, although the law does not 
state it, together with the copy of the certificate, judgments should also be forwarded and, where 
appropriate, the resolution of accumulation of judgments on which the certificate is based. 
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Likewise, the Public Prosecutor’s opinion must be heard in relation to the 
possibilities of reintegrating the offender into society, not only, as established 
by law, when the foreign issuing authority consults the executing authority re-
questing information in this regard (Article 78(2) LRM), but also when, in the 
absence of prior consultations, the executing authority receives the judgment 
and the certificate, and decides to issue an opinion on the possible contribution 
of the transfer to the offender’s social rehabilitation (Article 78(3) LRM). In 
this regard, it is important to point out that the primary objective of the Frame-
work Decision is to enhance the offender’s prospects of social rehabilitation 
but, nonetheless, the Framework Decision does not provide any criteria or pro-
cedures for assessing the compliance with this aim. Therefore, the assessment 
procedure depends on each Member State and the effectiveness of such evalu-
ation depends on the effort and resources that each Member State decides to 
invest in it. 
On the other hand, as provided in Article 22(2) LRM, the judicial decision 
regarding the recognition or denial of this instrument must be forwarded without 
delay, not only to the sentenced person, but also to the Public Prosecutor, which 
will be entitled to challenge the judicial decision. In this way, the Prosecutor 
develops one of its essential functions, consisting of supervising the judicial ac-
tion, ensuring that it is exercised in accordance with the applicable law. 
The Public Prosecutor also intervenes in taking precautionary measures 
that must be imposed on the offender found in the Spanish territory in order to 
prevent his or her escape. In this regard, even if the issuing authority has not 
requested the adoption of precautionary measures restricting the offender’s 
freedom, the Public Prosecutor may do so when deemed necessary (Article 
87(1) LRM). Moreover, even if the request for personal precautionary 
measures originates from the foreign issuing authority, the Public Prosecutor 
must be heard before taking the measure, as that is the procedure provided in 
the Spanish Criminal Procedure Act to which the LRM refers. 
Thus far, the intervention of the Prosecutor’s Office when Spain is the exe-
cuting State has been addressed. Its intervention in the cross-border transfer 
procedure when Spain is the issuing State will now be discussed. 
The initial point of interest is that the Public Prosecutor is not entitled to 
request the inception of the transfer procedure when Spain is the issuing State, 
as the judicial authorities, both issuing and executing, are the only ones enti-
tled to do so, either acting ex officio or at the request of the sentenced individ-
ual (Article 65 LRM). 
The Public Prosecutor’s Office also appears to be somewhat forgotten with 
regard to the notification of the resolution by which the competent Spanish ju-
dicial authority decides to forward the judgment. The law is concerned with 
guaranteeing the communication of this decision to the offender, whether s/he 
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is in Spain or in the executing State, to allow him/her to challenge such a cru-
cial pronouncement (Articles 70 and 13 LRM). However, surprisingly, it does 
not require it to be notified to the Prosecutor, which would prevent this public 
body from challenging such a judicial decision that may even have been taken 
ex officio and against the opinion of the offender. 50 
In our opinion, despite the legal loophole, the judicial decision to forward 
the judgment must be notified to the Public Prosecutor 51 in order to allow 
prosecutors to check its legality and, notably, its adequacy in terms of the 
aim of social rehabilitation which justifies the transfer, challenging the deci-
sion through the resources system when appropriate. Moreover, I also be-
lieve that it would be convenient to give the Prosecutor a hearing prior to the 
adoption of the judicial decision, 52 so as to consider its technical opinion in 
issuing this instrument. In this way, the Prosecutor’s Office could give its 
opinion, amongst other things, on the compliance of the judicial decision 
with the legal requirements for issuing this instrument, on the existence of 
other pending cases in Spain, on the advisability of conducting prior consul-
tations with the executing authority, on the offender’s prospects of social re-
habilitation, on the need to request the adoption of personal precautionary 
measures involving deprivation of liberty from the executing state or, where 
appropriate, on the possibility of issuing alternative or complementary instru-
ments of mutual recognition, such as EAW or probation measures. 
Although the decision-making power in relation to the issuance, recogni-
tion and execution of this instrument is attributed to the judiciary, which can 
be seen as positive in guaranteeing the independence of the decision, the in-
tervention of the Prosecutor’s Office in this procedure would certainly be use-
ful. Beyond the work carried out by the Public Prosecutor, in controlling the 
legality of the judicial action, especially through filing resources, its interven-
tion in these procedures would be convenient for various reasons, such as its 
greater flexibility in terms of self-organisation, which implies greater possibil-
ities of specialisation, and the principles of unity and hierarchical dependence 
which inform its performance in accordance with its organic statute and its 
constitutional set-up. 
Thus, primarily, it is worth mentioning the possibility for the State Attor-
ney General’s Office to issue instructions establishing the priority criteria for 
deciding between the various mutual recognition instruments applicable to a 
 
 
50  On the possibilities of appealing this crucial decision, see Montaldo’s chapter of this same 
book (Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA and Fundamental Rights Concerns: In Search of 
Appropriate Remedies, pp. 37-60, p. 56) 
51 In the same vein, V.J. González Mota, ‘Resolución por la que se impone una pena o medida privativa 
de libertad’, p. 6, 2015, retrieved on 23 September 2019 from https://es.scribd.com/document/370353522/ 
Ponencia-Sr-Gonzalez-Mota. 
52 Fernández Prado 2015, p. 137. 
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given case, 53 as well as to establish a unique procedure for assessing the of-
fender’s prospects of social rehabilitation. These unitary criteria would be dif-
ficult to impose on members of the judiciary, on the one hand, due to the high 
degree of decentralisation in the assignment of responsibilities between the 
various judicial competent bodies and, above all, due to the independence that 
governs their actions, which prohibits the imposition upon them of binding in-
structions on the interpretation of laws. 
Secondly, it is important to note that the possibilities of specialisation of 
the Prosecutor’s Office are much broader, whereas the principle according to 
which a judicial body must be pre-determined by the law does not allow mat-
ters to be deferred to those courts having more experience in international ju-
dicial cooperation issues and in mutual recognition procedures. At this point, 
it must be borne in mind that, in such a specific, complex and evolving matter, 
specialisation undoubtedly provides a huge advantage for improving the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of these proceedings. 
5.3. The Intervention of the Prison Administration 
Finally, we must mention the role that should be played by the Prison Ad-
ministration in cross-border transfer procedures of offenders, despite the fact 
that the LMR, surprisingly, does not refer to it at all. Here, it should be noted 
that prison treatment consists, precisely, of the set of activities aimed directly 
at achieving the re-education and social rehabilitation of prisoners (Article 59 
LOGP) and that qualified teams of specialists working within the Prison Ad-
ministration are responsible for its design, implementation and monitoring 
(Articles 69 and 70 LOGP).  
Therefore, these professionals, who are responsible for carrying out a per-
sonalised assessment of the prisoner’s re-socialisation needs, as well as for de-
signing his or her treatment plan are, undoubtedly, those who are in the best 
position to detect cases susceptible to transfer, at least if it is seriously accept-
ed that the purpose of the transfer procedure is the prisoner’s social rehabilita-
tion. 54 In fact, at national level, the Prison Administration is responsible for 
assigning inmates to a specific prison, as well as for deciding upon transfers be-
tween national prisons. In order to do so, comprehensive and integrating con-
cepts of prison treatment must be borne in mind, taking into due consideration 
 
 
53 According to Sanz Álvarez, 2017, p. 16, the Prosecutor is in the best position to assess all the 
concurrent circumstances and to propose the most appropriate measure in each case, as evidenced in 
some real cases that the author reflects in her article. 
54 The Netherlands, for instance, makes use of probation officers. These volunteers visit prisoners 
abroad, provide support and begin the process by assessing the prisoners. Their information is then 
used to assess whether rehabilitation in the Netherlands or another country is appropriate. See 
European Organization of Prison and Correctional Services 2013, p. 7. 
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the social, family, economic or other ties held by the inmate in a given territo-
ry. In spite of this, according to the LRM, professionals from the Prison Ad-
ministration are not even entitled to request the inception of cross border pro-
cedures.  
In addition to the role that the Prison Administration would naturally be 
called upon to play in identifying sentences susceptible to transfer, as it is the 
Administration that is best informed of the social rehabilitation needs of its in-
mates, it should also be responsible for informing potentially transferable pris-
oners of the relevant information on the transfer procedure and its consequenc-
es, as it is the public authority closest to the prisoner. 55 In this regard, according 
to Recommendation (2012) 12 of the Committee of Ministers to States concern-
ing foreign prisoners, as soon as possible after entering the prison, the foreign 
prisoner should be informed, in a language s/he understands, verbally and in 
writing, of the possibilities of being transferred. 56  
However, despite the aforementioned recommendation and the absolute 
alignment of purposes that exists, at least in theory, between prison treatment 
and transfer procedures, according to a study published in 2017, in which 83 
foreign prisoners were interviewed in different Spanish prisons, only 61.4 per-
cent of them knew about the possibility of being transferred, of which only 
half had received relevant information from the prison staff. 57 This clearly re-
veals, on one hand, the lack of adequate information protocols for foreign pri-
soners, and, on the other, the lack of attention given by the Prison Administra-
tion to this type of procedures. 58 
Some of the conclusions of the above recalled study, based on the sugges-
tions put forward by the interviewed prisoners, refer specifically to the need 
for the prison authorities to provide prisoners with clear, understandable and 
 
 
55 It is noteworthy that there is no penitentiary rule in Spanish legislation that expressly obliges the 
Prison Administration to inform foreign prisoners of the transfer possibilities, the procedure for 
requesting it and its consequences. 
56 Provision 15(3) of the Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)12 of the Committee of Ministers to 
member States concerning foreign prisoners (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 October 
2012 at the 1152nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). 
57 I. Durnescu, E. Montero Pérez de Tudela & L. Ravagnani, ‘Prisoner transfer and the importance 
of the ‘release effect’’, Criminology & Criminal Justice, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2017, p. 459. 
58 It is discouraging to note how little progress has been made in this matter compared to the 
situation prior to the approval and implementation of the Framework Decision. Thus, in a study 
published in 2001, the neglect of penitentiary issues in the treaties and conventions on cross-border 
prison transfers, despite having a profound impact on this area, was harshly criticised. Specifically, 
criticism was aimed at the lack of a clear legislative mandate to inform the offender about the centre 
to which he/she is to be sent as a result of the transfer, about the prison system, prison labour op-
portunities or exit permits, among other relevant elements to allow the prisoner to make a free and 
informed decision. Cf. Mapelli Caffarena & González Cano 2001, p. 111. Therefore, it cannot be said, 
in Spain at least, that this situation has improved with the implementation of the Framework Decision. 
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accessible information, about the conditions and regime applied in the destina-
tion prison (in Romania, in the studied case), as well as the duration of the 
procedure and its purpose, among other things, enabling the prisoners to make 
a free and informed decision on the transfer. 59 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions tends to minimise 
the decision-making power of the executive branch, giving prominence to the 
judiciary. However, when the CJEU case law on the autonomous concept of 
‘judicial authority’ is analysed together with the wording of the Framework De-
cision, it is doubtful that such a term is transferable to cross-border transfer pro-
cedures. In this sense, it can be said that Union law does not require the judicial 
intervention to decide on cross-border transfers, as the decision-making power 
can be attributed to the prosecutor or even to the Prison Administration, provid-
ed that such a decision can subsequently be challenged before a judicial body. 
In the case of Spain, the trend to eliminate the decision-making power of 
the executive branch has been taken to its most extreme consequences, opting 
for a purely jurisdictional cross-border transfer procedure, in which the inter-
vention of other public authorities is reduced to a minimum or even sometimes 
completely excluded. 
Problems arise when the absolute exclusion of certain administrative au-
thorities and, notably, of the Prison Administration, from certain activities, 
such as the identification of potential transmissible cases or the assessment of 
the convenience of the transfer request from the perspective of social rehabili-
tation, erodes the principle of equivalence and effectiveness of Union law, as a 
consequence of the inadequate institutional context. 
In Spain, by constitutional mandate, the jurisdictional function consists not 
only of judging, but also of enforcing judgments. Therefore, in accordance 
with this constitutional framework, an independent judicial authority must au-
thorise the transfer outside the national territory, at least if it is considered to 
entail a surrender of national jurisdiction. However, to guarantee the effec-
tiveness of the Framework Decision, the Prison Administration should be enti-
tled to take the initiative, since it is the authority which ordinarily performs the 
activities and makes the decisions on the re-education and social rehabilitation 
of the sentenced individuals. 
On the other hand, the distribution of authority between the Spanish judi-
cial bodies established in the LRM is not straightforward. The competency 
 
 
59 Durnescu, Montero Pérez de Tudela & Ravagnani 2017, p. 463. 
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system suffers from a strong degree of decentralisation, especially when Spain 
is the issuing State, which may hinder not only the existence of homogenous 
and predictable criteria for actions and decisions, but also the coordination be-
tween the different judicial authorities involved in the processing of one or 
more of these instruments.  
The lack of coordination that may arise as a result of the decentralisation of 
authority is accentuated by the absence of regulated communication between 
the judicial bodies asked to apply the various instruments of mutual recogni-
tion, as well as by the lack of intervention by other, non-judicial authorities, 
notably the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Prison Administration. In addi-
tion, the problems of this lack of coordination are aggravated by the incom-
prehensible non-existence of a register in which the different European orders, 
issued and received, are centralised in relation to a given individual. 
Faced with this scenario, the best remedy for enhancing the Spanish system 
seems to be greater cooperation and better inter-institutional communication 
between the competent judicial authorities, the Public Prosecutor’s Office and 
the Prison Administration, which could enhance the use of this instrument, 
helping to improve the efficiency of the procedures and the effectiveness of 
the instrument, as a mechanism aimed at improving the social rehabilitation of 
EU prisoners. In this regard, it would be ideal for the Public Prosecutor’s Of-
fice, whose actions are governed by principles of unity and hierarchical de-
pendence, to have unitary criteria for applying this instrument, both for identi-
fying potentially transferable cases, and also for providing the relevant infor-
mation on the transfer procedure to its potential beneficiaries throughout the 
offender’s different procedural and prison phases.  
The sentencing judge, when sentencing the offender, may state his or her 
opinion for or against the transfer, ideally after a hearing with the prosecutor. 
Once the inmates have entered prison, the Prison Administration, through bod-
ies specialising in prison classification and treatment, should apply specific 
protocols to identify and evaluate cases with potentially transferable sentenc-
es, and provide information pamphlets, in a language understandable to the 
prisoners, about the possibility, procedure and consequences of a transfer, so 
that inmates can make a free and informed decision on the matter.  
All these adjustments would be possible without undermining the principle 
of mutual recognition, which leads to independent and impartial judicial au-
thorities ultimately controlling whether or not the issuance and recognition of 
the instrument at hand was decided in light of the specific purposes for which 
it is intended and which justify its existence, preventing undue deviations of 
power. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the late 1990s, the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition 
have acquired increasing importance in the EU legal order and have ultimately 
become the ‘cornerstone of judicial cooperation’ across the Union. According-
ly, the Treaty on the European Union (hereinafter, the ‘TEU’) acknowledges 
the key role of these principles in both civil and criminal matters and leaves 
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their specific legal regime to an ever expanding and far-reaching body of EU 
secondary legislation. 
As is known, mutual trust and mutual recognition develop traditional mu-
tual legal assistance mechanisms towards advanced and purely technical co-
operation procedures, which increase the role of the political branch and task 
the national judicial authorities with recognising and enforcing foreign deci-
sions. The golden rule ‘recognise and execute’ seeks to facilitate judicial co-
operation despite and beyond normative differences at domestic level. In fact, 
the application of a given domestic rule must be accepted even if the legal 
framework of the executing Member State would have led to a different (pro-
cedural or substantive) outcome. More importantly, mutual trust presumes that 
the foreign judicial decision to be recognised complies with fundamental 
rights standards, as the legal order from which it stems does. 
However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter, the 
‘CJEU’) has clarified that this presumption is not absolute, but can be rebutted 
on a case-by-case basis, in the event of exceptional situations resulting in (the 
risk of) plain violations of fundamental rights standards. In fact, individual 
guarantees point out the path to be taken by a judicial cooperation procedure, 
but can also amount to binding a judicial authority to reject a request for coop-
eration, since their paramount role is to restrict the exercise of public coercive 
powers. In this respect, as the practice of the last decade shows, the clash be-
tween the effectiveness of EU law and the need to model the European judi-
cial space on respect for the rights of the individual is a recurring concern, 
cross-sectional to all national judicial decisions covered by EU rules imple-
menting the principle of mutual recognition. 
Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the applica-
tion of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters 
imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for 
the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union (OJ L 327, 5.12.2008, 
pp. 27-46, hereinafter, the ‘Framework Decision’) is not immune from this 
scenario, although, surprisingly enough, the fundamental rights challenges it 
poses have generally been neglected so far, particularly in comparison with 
the extensive studies on the European Arrest Warrant (hereinafter, ‘EAW’). 
Still, the forced cross-border transfer of a prisoner involves delicate assess-
ments of the inmate’s family ties and of the situation he or she is likely to face 
in the executing State, thereby requiring the judicial authorities involved to 
take these aspects seriously.  
Building on this background, this chapter aims to address the outlined 
structural effectiveness/fundamental rights dilemma in relation to cross-border 
transfers of prisoners within the European Union.  
Section 2 considers this topic from a normative perspective, analysing how 
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the EU legislature usually addresses this dilemma by way of secondary legis-
lation concerning the application of the mutual recognition principle to judi-
cial decisions in criminal matters. The chapter then discusses the contribution 
of the CJEU in striking a balance between effective cooperation mechanisms 
and appropriate protection of fundamental rights. The chapter provides an out-
line of the recent and developing case law, mostly focusing on landmark cases 
concerning the EAW system. 
Sections 4 and 5 apply this background to cross-border transfers of prison-
ers under the Framework Decision. In particular, the former addresses the 
normative scenario, by pointing out the main fundamental rights challenges 
posed by this judicial cooperation mechanism, in light of the rehabilitation 
goal it pursues. It is argued that, even though the prisoner’s social rehabilita-
tion cannot be considered to be a fundamental right as such, this elusive notion 
is an umbrella concept encompassing the right to family life, the prohibition 
on inhumane and degrading treatment, and the right to liberty. The fifth sec-
tion discusses whether or not the Framework Decision and the case law of the 
CJEU establish an adequate set of normative and judicial tools and remedies 
to prevent or resist an illegitimate forced transfer. As confirmed by current 
domestic practices on cross-border transfers, the analysis stresses that the pe-
culiar design of this judicial cooperation mechanism risks endorsing a gap in 
protection, particularly in terms of available effective judicial remedies. 
Moreover, it is argued that the Framework Decision offers leeway to the issu-
ing judicial authority as regards the decision to commence the cross-border 
transfer procedure, without counterbalancing this discretionary power through 
appropriate remedies. 1 
2. Mutual Trust between Effectiveness and Fundamental Rights Pro-
tection: The Normative Approach … 
The EU legislature has only partially taken responsibility for the dilemma 
between effectiveness and limits to judicial cooperation mechanisms. In order 
to facilitate and accelerate judicial cooperation, all Directives and Framework 
Decisions implementing the principle of mutual recognition list the grounds 
 
 
1  Of course, this does not mean that all domestic authorities necessarily abuse their powers. On this 
aspect see I. Wieczorek, ‘EU Constitutional Limits to the Europeanization of Punishment: A Case 
Study on Offenders’ Rehabilitation’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Vol. 
25, Issue 6, 2018, p. 655. Still, the law is a powerful means for safeguarding those in need of 
protection and the availability of remedies to address any illegitimate uses of coercive powers is a 
key aspect in this regard. Some of the best practices identified in the framework of the RePers 
project are presented in the last chapter of this collection. 
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for refusing enforcement of a foreign judicial decision. Such limits to coopera-
tion mechanisms are usually optional, 2 whereas only Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surren-
der procedures between Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, pp. 1-20) also 
envisages compulsory ones. 3 
The CJEU has provided some general guidelines on the actual scope of 
these exceptions to the almost absolute duty of recognition. Firstly, it took the 
stance that they should be interpreted narrowly and in compliance with the 
general principles of EU law. 4 Secondly, it clarified that the national legisla-
ture is entitled to restrict the scope of application of the optional grounds for 
refusal in the implementing laws, thereby further curtailing the limits to coop-
eration. 5 Lastly, and most importantly, the Court underlined that the prede-
termined lists of grounds for refusal are exhaustive. This implies that Member 
States are prevented from identifying new limits to mutual recognition when 
implementing EU law. Moreover, the national judicial authorities are not enti-
tled to reject a cooperation request on the basis of either an extensive interpre-
tation of existing exceptions or of an entirely new one, since this departure 
from the centrally-steered EU pattern would hamper judicial cooperation and 
foster mutual distrust. 6 
The ope legis predetermination of the grounds for refusal has sparked heat-
ed debates between practitioners and scholars. 7 As is widely acknowledged, 
this approach is understandable, as it secures coherence throughout the EU and 
avoids the risk of a rush to unilateral and uncoordinated initiatives at domestic 
level, which would affect the European judicial space. Nonetheless, some au-
thors point out that, despite preserving the effectiveness of judicial coopera-
tion procedures and enhancing legal certainty, this normative choice deprives 
the system of flexibility, as it prevents national judicial authorities from con-
sidering different expectations of protection. 8 More specifically, the question 
 
 
2  The Court clarified that the optional nature of these clauses does refer to the implementation of EU 
law and therefore does not allow national legislators to decide whether or not to transpose them. It is 
up to the executing judicial authority to decide on their application. Judgment of 21 October 2010 in 
Case C-306/09, B., [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:626, para. 52. 
3  Article 3 of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA. 
4 Judgment of 5 September 2012 in Case C-42/11, Lopes da Silva Jorge, [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:517. 
5  Judgment of 6 October 2009 in Case C-123/08, Dominic Wolzenburg, [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:616. 
6 Judgment of 26 February 2013 in Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni c. Ministerio Fiscal, [2013] ECLI: 
EU:C:2013:107, para. 44.  
7 In general, see M. Möstl, ‘Preconditions and limits of mutual recognition’, Common Market Law 
Review, Vol. 47, Issue 2, 2010, p. 405; S. Montaldo, I limiti della cooperazione in materia penale 
nell’Unione europea, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2015, pp. 334-429. 
8 On the shift of approach from overreliance on mutual trust to the increasing role of the effectiveness 
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arises as to whether the exhaustive lists of grounds for refusal fit the purpose 
of appropriately protecting individual rights. 
An overview of the relevant EU legislation demonstrates that most of rele-
vant EU secondary acts do not envisage a general limit to mutual recognition 
on fundamental rights grounds. Existing provisions touch upon certain select-
ed procedural guarantees and individual rights, such as the right to take part in 
criminal proceedings or the right to family life, but do not address this topic 
from an overall perspective. Instead, the opening articles of the Framework 
Decisions and Directives on mutual recognition usually state that “the obliga-
tion to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as en-
shrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union” cannot be affected. This 
recurring clause merely reflects the inherent hierarchy of the sources of EU 
law. The Court of Justice has consistently contended that judicial cooperation 
mechanisms must not result in a violation of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, but no clear consequences have ever been at-
tached to the fundamental rights clause under consideration. 
The absence of a specific and binding fundamental rights ground for refusal 
has led some commentators to consider that, at least in the context of the EAW, 
“hardly any fundamental guarantees of the accused person are ensured”. 9 This 
critical remark perhaps overestimates the legal concept at issue, but highlights a 
traditional gap in European secondary law in this domain. 10 
The crucial point is that, regardless of the wording of EU secondary law, 
EU institutions are subject to review regarding their conformity with Treaties 
and general principles of law, just like Member States when they implement 
the law of the Union. 11 However, resolving the clash between the quest for ef-
fectiveness and human rights protection cannot be left to uncoordinated and, 
in all likelihood, extremely diversified solutions developed by national judicial 
 
 
paradigm, E. Herlin-Karnell, ‘From Mutual Trust to Full Effectiveness of EU law: The Years of the 
European Arrest Warrant’, European Law Review, 2013, Vol. 38, Issue 1, p. 79. 
9 N.M. Schallmoser, ‘The European Arrest Warrant and Fundamental Rights’, European Journal of 
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 22, Issue 2, 2014, p. 135. 
10 None of the acts adopted in this domain qualifies the protection of fundamental rights as a reason for 
rejecting a request for cooperation, with the exceptions of Article 11 of Directive 2014/41/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in 
criminal matters (OJ L 130, 1.5.2014, pp. 1-36), and Article 19, let. h) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the mutual recognition of 
freezing orders and confiscation orders (OJ L 303, 28.11.2018, pp. 1-38).  
11 Judgment of 3 May 2007 in Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld, [2007] 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:261, para. 45. On the post-Lisbon approach of the Court, see K. Lenaerts & J.A. 
Gutiérrez Fons, ‘The European Court of Justice and Fundamental Rights in the Field of Criminal 
Law’, in V. Mitsilegas, M. Bergström & T. Konstadinides (Eds), Research Handbook on EU Crimi-
nal Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2016, p. 15. 
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authorities. Therefore, the Court of Justice has been called upon to provide 
common interpretative guidance, with a view to striking a clearer balance be-
tween these opposing driving forces. 
3. … And the Case Law of the Court of Justice 
The CJEU has contributed to bridging the gap of fundamental rights pro-
tection in a series of preliminary rulings on the EAW system. Admittedly, due 
to the varied peculiarities of the judicial decisions covered by EU rules im-
plementing the principle of mutual recognition, such case law cannot be un-
critically replicated for any branch of judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
in its entirety. Nonetheless, the success of the EAW – and the ensuing signifi-
cant body of jurisprudence, by now much more considerable and meaningful 
compared to any other mutual recognition instrument – has triggered interpre-
tative solutions and clarifications worthy of attention in any branch of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. This section provides an essential overview of 
some key stages of the evolution of the Court’s approach, to pave the way for 
a closer analysis of the case of cross-border transfers. 
At the outset of a developing line of cases on Framework Decision 2002/ 
584/JHA, the CJEU clearly considered the effective conduct of judicial coopera-
tion mechanisms to be the overarching priority of its legal reasoning. 12 In Mel-
loni, it emphasised that the exhaustive nature of the list of grounds for refusal 
prevents States from opposing judicial cooperation by invoking higher stand-
ards of protection of an individual right than the levels set by the Charter. 13 In 
such cases, more extensive protection equates to an undue restriction of the pri-
macy of EU law and the functioning of judicial cooperation. In addition, in 
Radu, the Court contended that the executing judicial authorities could not re-
fuse to give effect to an EAW on grounds that the requested person had not been 
heard before that EAW was issued. A similar situation does not feature among 
the grounds for non-execution and cannot be derived from the wording of Arti-
cles 47 and 48 of the Charter. 14 On the other hand, an obligation for judicial au-
thorities to hear the requested person before an EAW was issued would “inevi-
tably lead to the failure of the very system of surrender”. 15 This would under-
mine the “certain element of surprise” of the procedure, which is essential for 
 
 
12 S. Rodin, ‘Useful Effect of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant’, Il Diritto 
dell’Unione europea, Vol. 32, Issue 1, 2016, p. 1. 
13 Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni c. Ministerio Fiscal, para. 103. 
14 Judgment of 29 January 2013 in case C-396/11, Ciprian Vasile Radu, [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:39. 
15 Case C-396/11, Ciprian Vasile Radu, para. 39. 
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stopping the person concerned from taking flight, as a side effect of the freedom 
of movement. 16 
Legal scholars have critically appraised this approach. The Court has been 
considered evidently less concerned with protecting the fundamental rights of 
individuals granted by primary law than with safeguarding the intention of 
governments, when they passed the secondary legislation. 17 Moreover, undis-
puted reliance on effectiveness would hamper more strategic objectives, such 
as strengthening the chances of the offenders’ future rehabilitation, as an inte-
gral part of human dignity. 18 Other scholars have highlighted a lack of institu-
tional empathy on the part of the Court of Justice. 19 
This scenario began to change in the aftermath of the NS case, 20 where the 
Court underlined that EU law precludes the application of a conclusive pre-
sumption that the Member State responsible for an asylum application com-
plies with fundamental rights. Even though the (then) Council Regulation (EC) 
no. 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national (OJ L 50, 
25.2.2003, pp. 1-10) established automatic criteria for determining the Member 
State responsible for an asylum application, the Court rejected the idea of an en-
tirely blind application of such requirements. In fact, the duty to interpret sec-
ondary law in light of the Charter binds the national authorities to perform a 
preliminary check on whether the Member State of destination ensures an ap-
propriate level of protection of fundamental rights. Consequently, an asylum 
seeker cannot be transferred to the formally competent Member State if sys-
temic deficiencies affecting the management of the asylum procedure and re-
ception conditions amount to substantial grounds for believing that the person 
involved would face a real risk of being subjected to inhumane or degrading 
treatment. 21 
By analogy, questions arose as to whether or not and to what extent the 
 
 
16 Judgment of 27 May 2014 in Case C-129/14 PPU, Zoran Spasic, [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:586, para. 
63-65. 
17 L. Besselink, ‘The parameters of constitutional conflict after Melloni’, European Law Review, 
Vol. 39, Issue 4, 2014, p. 551. 
18 P. Mengozzi, ‘La cooperazione giudiziaria europea e il principio fondamentale di tutela della 
dignità umana’, Studi sull’integrazione europea, Vol. 9, Issue 2, 2014, p. 225. 
19 P. Martín Rodríguez, ‘Crónica de una muerte anunciada: comentario a la sentencia del Tribunal de 
Justicia (Gran Sala), de 26 de febrero dl 2013, Stefano Melloni’, Revista general de derecho 
europeo, Vol. 30, 2013, p. 34. 
20 Judgment of 21 December 2011 in Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, NS, [2011], ECLI:EU: 
C:2011:865. 
21 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, para. 94-100. 
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Charter imposes similar obligations in the field of judicial cooperation, where 
mutual recognition of the foreign decision would lead to a manifest breach of 
fundamental rights. 
The Court was soon challenged with these concerns in Lanigan, 22 a case 
concerning the failure on the part of an Irish executing authority to respect the 
time limits for the adoption of a decision on the execution of an EAW (Article 
17 of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA). The referring Court asked whether 
such a situation could prevent the holding of the requested person in custody 
and eventually neutralise the duty to execute the EAW, by virtue of the right 
to liberty (Article 6 of the Charter). The Court considered that keeping a sus-
pect in custody is precluded only insofar as the duration of the procedure is 
excessive in relation to the characteristics of the case and the procedure itself 
has been carried out in a sufficiently diligent manner. However, the duty to 
enforce the foreign judicial decision persists. 23 If the national authority de-
cides to bring the requested person’s custody to an end, it is consequently re-
quired to attach any measures it deems necessary to the provisional release so 
as to prevent him from absconding and to ensure that the material conditions 
for his effective surrender remain fulfilled for as long as no final decision on 
the execution has been taken. 24 The Court’s findings set a clear dividing line: 
fundamental rights significantly influence the management of the procedure in 
the executing Member State, but they do not mark a plain departure from the 
golden rule ‘recognise and execute’, leading to a mere postponement of en-
forcement of a cooperation request. 
In developing these premises, the Court made a step forward in its sem-
inal judgments Aranyosi and Căldăraru and Celmer. 25 The first case dealt 
with the EAW system and the risk for the requested person of facing inhu-
mane or degrading detention treatment in a detention facility in the issuing 
State. The Court followed on opinion 2/13 and NS, 26 to confirm that mutu-
al trust does not mean blind trust, 27 as the duty to recognise and execute a 
 
 
22 Judgment of 16 July 2015 in Case C-237/15 PPU, Lanigan, [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:474. 
23 Case C-237/15 PPU, Lanigan, para. 37 and 40. 
24 Case C-237/15 PPU, Lanigan, para. 59 and 63. 
25 Judgment of 5 April 2016 in Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Pál Aranyosi and 
Robert Căldăraru, [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2016:198; judgment of 25 July 2018 in Case C-216/18 
PPU, LM (deficiencies in the system of justice), also known as Celmer, [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018: 
586.  
26 Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 191; Joined 
Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, NS, para. 78-80 and para. 94. 
27 K. Lenaerts, ‘La vie après l’avis: Exploring the Principle of Mutual (Yet Not Blind) Trust’, Common 
Market Law Review, Vol. 54, Issue 4, 2017, p. 805. 
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foreign judgment cannot always justify the overruling of fundamental 
rights. 28 More precisely, 29 the executing judicial authorities must take into 
due consideration the presence of reliable and up to date evidence demon-
strating a structural deficiency of the penitentiary system in the issuing 
State, amounting to a widespread and real risk of violation of the prohibi-
tion on inhumane and degrading treatment enshrined in Article 4 of the 
Charter. If such a systemic flaw is detected, the executing judicial authority 
must make a second, more specific and individual assessment, as it has a 
duty to verify whether the person concerned would personally face such a 
risk of violation upon surrender to the requesting State. If so, the authority 
involved should request reassurances on the compatibility of the peniten-
tiary regime and of the personal situation to be faced by the person con-
cerned, in the event of surrender, with fundamental rights standards. In 
fact, the Court stressed that priority should be given to the remedies pro-
vided by the EAW system itself. Namely, the possibility of prior consulta-
tions between the judicial authorities involved (Article 15(2) and (3) of 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA) is a preliminary way of seeking a so-
lution to secure both the enforcement of the foreign decision and the rights 
of the person concerned. In any event, should the reassurances be inade-
quate and/or body of information collected be conclusive regarding the se-
rious and actual risks for the person involved, the executing judicial au-
thority is compelled to postpone the surrender. As a last resort, if the situa-
tion ultimately does not improve and no alternatives are found, the execu-
tion of the EAW must be abandoned. 30 
In its subsequent case law, the Court of Justice further clarified the scope 
of this individual assessment. 31 Firstly, if a systemic deficiency exists, the 
mere availability of a judicial remedy for challenging the detention conditions 
does not rule out the real risk of inhumane and degrading treatment. 32 Second-
 
 
28 S. Montaldo, ‘On a Collision Course! Mutual Recognition. Mutual Trust and the Protection of 
Fundamental Rights in the Recent Case Law of the Court of Justice’, European Papers, Vol. 1, 
Issue 3, 2016, p. 984. 
29 The test is explained in Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Pál Aranyosi and Robert 
Căldăraru, para. 88-104. 
30 For a commentary on the test and on its possible developments see, inter alia, S. Gáspár-Szilágy, 
‘Joined Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru. Converging Human Rights Standards, Mutual Trust and New 
Grounds for Postponing a European Arrest Warrant’, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice, Vol. 24, Issue 2, 2016, p. 197. 
31 Judgment of 25 July 2018, in Case C-220/18 PPU, ML (detention conditions in Hungary), [2018] 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:589. 
32 Ibidem, para. 74 and 75. This has been more recently confirmed by judgment of 15 October 2019, 
in Case C-128/18, Dorobantu, [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:857, para. 81. The same applies in case of 
adoption in the issuing Member State of measures, such as the establishment of an ombudsman 
46 Stefano Montaldo 
ly, the executing judicial authority is required to assess only the detention 
conditions in prisons in which, according to the available information, it is 
likely that that person will be detained, including on a temporary or transition-
al basis. 33 Moreover, this evaluation must be confined to the actual and pre-
cise detention conditions which are relevant for determining a breach of the 
Charter in the specific case at issue, for instance, in view of the inmate’s phys-
ical and mental condition. 34 
Elaborating on this background, the Celmer case offered the Court of Jus-
tice the opportunity to expand the scope of this two-layered test to the (serious 
risk of a) plain violation of a pillar of the rule of law, namely the independ-
ence and impartiality of the judiciary in the issuing Member State, ultimately 
affecting the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 47(2) of the Charter. On 
that occasion, the Court was confronted with the recent reforms of the Polish 
judiciary and reiterated mutatis mutandis the subsequent and intertwined 
phases of this assessment. Firstly, as far as the identification of a systemic de-
ficiency is concerned, it acknowledged that the executing authority can be sat-
isfied with the issue of a reasoned proposal of the European Commission 
adopted pursuant to Article 7(1) TFEU, detecting a real risk of breach of the 
right to a fair trial, on account of structural or generalised flaws with regard to 
the independence of the judiciary. Secondly, it stated that the executing au-
thority must determine, specifically and precisely, whether the situation of the 
person concerned, the nature of the offence for which he or she is being prose-
cuted, and the factual context that forms the basis of the EAW converge to 
demonstrate that there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she will 
run the outlined serious risk. 
While further clarifications are likely to be provided by the Court – for in-
stance in relation to the possibility of extending the Aranyosi and Căldăraru 
test to other violations involving non-absolute fundamental rights – this devel-
oping case law has shed some light on possibly resolving the dilemma on ef-
fectiveness/fundamental rights protection. For the purposes of this chapter, the 
crucial point is whether the stance taken by the CJEU could contribute to 
some extent to addressing the fundamental rights challenges posed by the 
Framework Decision. 
 
 
system or establishment of courts of enforcement of penalties, which are intended to reinforce the 
monitoring of detention conditions in that Member State. 
33 Case C-220/18 PPU, ML (detention conditions in Hungary), para. 84-87. 
34 Ibidem, para. 94. See also Case C-128/18, Dorobantu, where the Court has clarified that, in the 
absence of comon EU standards on dignified detention, the minimum requirements laid down by the 
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4. The Case of Cross-Border Transfers of Prisoners: Social Rehabilita-
tion and Human Rights Challenges 
From a normative perspective, Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA does not 
differ from the scenario outlined above. In fact, it reiterates most of the optional 
grounds for refusal envisaged in other Directives and Framework Decisions and 
makes some general references to the obligation to protect fundamental rights, 
whereas the violation of the Charter does not formally amount to preventing 
mutual recognition of a foreign sentence. In particular, Article 3(4) reiterates the 
generic and introductory human rights clause which can be found in all EU sec-
ondary law instruments implementing the principle of mutual trust in criminal 
matters. In particular, this paragraph states that the Framework Decision “shall 
not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights 
and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 TEU”. The Preamble 
of the Framework Decision complements this provision. Recital 13 confirms 
that cross-border transfers must comply with the Charter, and more specifically 
with its Chapter VI. In addition, Recitals 5 and 14 refer to procedural guarantees 
and due process rights, as key components of the principle of mutual confidence 
between national judicial authorities, whereas Recital 15 states that the Frame-
work Decision should affect the right of EU citizens to move freely in the Euro-
pean territory. The second part of Recital 13 clarifies that the Framework Deci-
sion should be interpreted as allowing  
refusal to execute a decision when there are objective reasons to believe that the 
sentence was imposed for the purpose of punishing a person on the grounds of his 
or her sex, race, religion, ethnic origin, nationality, language, political opinions or 
sexual orientation, or that that person’s position may be prejudiced on any one of 
those grounds. 
Lastly, compared to Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, Framework Deci-
sion 2008/909/JHA does not provide any clear remedy in the event of exceptional 
situations affecting the person concerned. For instance, Article 23(4) of Frame-
work Decision 2002/584/JHA allows for the postponement of surrender “for seri-
ous humanitarian reasons”, particularly where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that it would clearly endanger the requested person’s life or health. 
Moreover, the Preamble, at Recital 10, emphasises that the whole mechanism of 
the EAW may be (exceptionally) suspended only in the event of a serious and 
persistent breach of the founding European values and principles set out in Article 
2 TEU, determined by the Council pursuant to Article 7(2) TEU. 35 
 
 
35 This limit to judicial cooperation is in any case dependent upon the outcomes of the political 
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Still, the act under consideration encroaches upon the key provisions of the 
Charter, and the increasing number of cross-border transfers requires further 
reflection on compliance with fundamental rights standards. 
From this point of view, it must be borne in mind that the system estab-
lished by the Framework Decision is intended to enhance the social rehabilita-
tion opportunities of the prisoners concerned (Article 3(1)). In an EU-wide ju-
dicial space where people move freely, prisoner transfers contribute to pre-
venting loopholes stemming from the territoriality of criminal law and its en-
forcement. In fact, the identification of the family/social/cultural centre of 
gravity of a given offender and the possibility of allocating enforcement ac-
cordingly, in principle, provides increased opportunities for choosing the best 
place for serving a deprivation of liberty, with a view to enhancing the post-
release reinsertion into society and preventing reoffending. Admittedly, a 
closer look at the practice of the Member States reveals a divide between the 
law on paper and domestic approaches in this domain. An increasing body of 
scholarly analyses highlights that Member States are often more concerned 
with disposing of undesired EU citizens rather than pursuing the primary goal 
of this judicial cooperation mechanism. 36 The alternative drivers to cross-
border transfers range from deflating prison overcrowding to minimising the 
budgetary burden of prison systems to general public order concerns, but in 
the end they all elude de facto the rationale of the Framework Decision. 
The Court of Justice has not yet had the opportunity of taking a clear stance 
on this trend. In a handful of cases regarding other judicial cooperation in-
struments, free movement of persons, EU citizenship and extradition law, the 
CJEU has acknowledged that the offender’s rehabilitation “in the State in 
which [the person is or] has become genuinely integrated is not only in his in-
terest but also in that of the European Union in general”. 37 However, this EU-
wide interest needs to be balanced with competing policy objectives, and the 
consequences of a frustration of the rehabilitation goal are still unclear from 
an EU law perspective. At the same time, the stance taken by the Court infers 
that social rehabilitation as such, for the purposes of the European legal order, 
 
 
remedy under Article 7 TEU, whose effectiveness is a matter of debate, in light of the recent 
practice of EU institutions. 
36 See, for instance, V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Third Wave of Third Pillar Law’, European Law Review, 
Vol. 34, Issue 3, 2009, p. 523, and A. Martufi, ‘Assessing the Resilience of ‘Social Rehabilitation’ 
as a Rationale for Transfer: A Commentary on the Aims of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA’, 
New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol. 9, Issue 1, 2018, p. 49. 
37 Inter alia, Judgment of 17 April 2018 in Joined Cases C-316/16 and C-424/16, IB and Vomero, 
[2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:256, para. 75, judgment of 23 November 2010 in Case C-145/09, Pa-
nagiotis Tsakouridis, [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:708, para. 50. Also S. Montaldo, ‘Offenders’ Reha-
bilitation: Towards a New Paradigm for European Criminal Law’, European Criminal Law Review, 
Vol. 8, Issue 2, 2018, p. 223. 
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does not amount to an autonomous fundamental right deserving protection in 
court. Consequently, two key points arise in relation to cross-border transfers, 
namely which rights are actually at stake and which normative and judicial 
remedies could achieve the aim of the Framework Decision and the individual 
guarantees underpinning it. 
These questions are actually in line with the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights (hereinafter, the ‘ECtHR’), which rejects the idea of a 
fundamental right to be – or not to be – transferred. The Strasbourg Court has 
consistently contended that a forced transfer serving other purposes than social 
rehabilitation does not amount per se to a violation of the Convention. 38 In-
stead, the main concern is whether a violation of a fundamental right occurs 
during the transfer or as a result of it. In fact, the ECtHR describes social re-
habilitation as an ongoing progression from the early days of the sentence to 
the preparation for release or, in general, to life after punishment. 39 As such, 
the Strasbourg Court conceptualises offenders’ rehabilitation as an obligation 
of means incumbent upon the national authorities. The latter have the duty to 
take all reasonable measures to enhance an inmate’s re-socialisation path. 
Still, the ECtHR has consistently held that this obligation “is to be interpreted 
in such a way as not to impose an excessive burden on national authorities” 
and that the domestic authorities enjoy significant discretion as to the actual 
choice of such means. 40 
Therefore, social rehabilitation calls for an appropriate normative, adminis-
trative and judicial environment, especially in a cross-border scenario, but, ac-
cording to its interpretation by the ECtHR, it does not seem to be, as such, a 
conclusive argument for placing constraints on mutual recognition. 
At the same time, social rehabilitation is an umbrella concept, which implies 
codified fundamental rights. Besides the procedural guarantees inherent to the 
enforcement of a sentence in the framework of the criminal execution phase, the 
right to family life, the ban on inhumane and degrading treatment, and the right 
to liberty play a prominent role in this domain. 41 These rights are enshrined 
both in the Charter and in the ECHR. Moreover, they all meet the conditions for 
being considered equivalent for the purposes of Article 52(3) of the Charter it-
self. This means that, in principle, the case law of the ECtHR is of particular 
 
 
38 C. Grabenwater, The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms: A Commentary, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2014, p. 60, and case law referred to therein.  
39 Dickson v. United Kingdom, ECHR (2007), ECLI:CE:ECHR:2007:1204JUD004436204. 
40 Murray v. The Netherlands, ECHR (2016), ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0426JUD001051110. 
41 A. Martufi, ‘The Paths of Offender Rehabilitation and the European Dimension of Punishment: New 
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significance in defining the scope of the relevant provisions of the Charter, 
which must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Convention. 
In this respect, regardless of the conceptual essence of the notion of offend-
ers’ rehabilitation, the analysis of the practice developed during the RePers pro-
ject demonstrates that the formal link established by the Framework Decision 
between this concept and prisoner transfers often conceals the managerial ambi-
tions of Member States on intra-EU mobility for hidden public order and bud-
getary purposes. The absence of effective limits within the Framework De-
cision on the risk of abusive practices calls for more stringent remedies against 
the (risk of) a violation of prisoners’ rights, and, in particular, of the provi-
sions of the Charter contributing to defining the scope of the notion of offend-
ers’ social rehabilitation. The next section discusses the tools and remedies 
available to the judicial authorities involved and the person concerned for 
avoiding or tackling cross-border transfers resulting in a (risk of) violation of 
these rights. 
5. Resisting Mutual Recognition: Remedies against Transfers Result-
ing in Violations of Fundamental Rights 
5.1. The Normative Layer: Preventing Illegitimate Transfers through the 
Judicial Cooperation Mechanism Designed by Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA 
The horizontal cooperation mechanism designed by the Framework Deci-
sion maximises the role of the judicial authorities involved, whereas it restricts 
the prisoner’s intervention to a minimum, basically through the possibility of 
providing a personal opinion and, in limited cases, of conditioning the transfer 
upon his or her consent. Accordingly, the only tools for avoiding an undue 
transfer before a decision on recognition is taken refer to the bilateral relation-
ship between the judicial authorities involved. 
Article 4(2) of the Framework Decision clarifies that the issuing authority 
is entitled to forward a certificate and the related judgment only insofar as it 
“is satisfied that the enforcement of the sentence by the executing Member 
State would serve the purpose of facilitating the social rehabilitation of the 
sentenced person”. Appropriate preliminary consultations between the compe-
tent domestic authorities should take place for this purpose. Furthermore, from 
the other side of the cooperation mechanisms, Article 4(4) allows the execut-
ing judicial authority to provide the issuing one with a “reasoned opinion” 
pointing out that enforcement in the Member State of destination would not 
facilitate the successful reintegration of the sentenced person into society. 
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Therefore, the Framework Decision, in principle, urges the Member 
States to adopt appropriate measures to form the basis on which their na-
tional judicial authorities will decide on the forwarding of a transfer re-
quest. However, it does not provide any additional guidance on the precise 
scope and significance of the rationale underpinning the judicial coopera-
tion mechanism at stake, thereby leaving leeway for transposition and judi-
cial practices at national level. Some useful hints can be taken from Recital 
9, which indicates a non-binding list of possible criteria to be considered 
by the competent authorities, namely “the person’s attachment to the exe-
cuting State, whether he or she considers it the place of family, linguistic, 
cultural, social or economic and other links to the executing State”. More 
substantial reference points could also be derived from the case law of the 
ECtHR and of the Court of Justice concerning the rights covered by the 
umbrella concept of social rehabilitation, namely the right to family life, 
the right to liberty, and the ban on inhumane and degrading treatment, 
briefly recalled in the previous paragraph. In fact, the content – and the en-
suing need for protection – of these rights offer to the issuing authority a 
reliable parameter through which the preliminary assessment urged by Ar-
ticle 4(2) could be legitimised.  
With regard to the right to family life, as confirmed by the relevant litera-
ture and the RePers project activities, 42 family links, in practice, feature high-
ly among the drivers for a cross-border transfer. Even though no conclusive 
presumptions can be upheld, the existence of personal connections – even in-
formal, such as a non-registered partnership – in the executing State and, con-
versely, the absence of such a familial environment in the issuing State are 
generally considered a sound justification for a forced removal. Accordingly, 
the ECtHR has repeatedly underlined the importance of preserving contacts 
with the outside world and family ties for the purposes of the prisoner’s en-
gagement in an empowerment process in view of his or her release. 43 None-
theless, a closer look at the practice of the judicial authorities reveals that the 
analysis of this aspect is quite poor, both in terms of the collection of appro-
priate evidence and of the assessment of the overall situation of the prisoner 
involved. 
It should also be considered that the CJEU has interpreted the right to fami-
ly life narrowly in other areas of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
Again, the case of the EAW system is particularly illustrative. Article 4(6) of 
 
 
42 See the national reports included in T. Marguery, Mutual Trust Under Pressure, the Transferring 
of Sentenced Persons in the EU: Transfer of Judgments of Conviction in the European Union and 
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Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA envisages an optional ground for refusal 
of surrender “where the requested person is staying in, or is a national or a res-
ident of the executing Member State”. Consistent case law of the Court of Jus-
tice upholds that this statement aims to safeguard the requested person’s socie-
tal environment, which any execution of an EAW would be likely to disrupt. 
The rationale is that the person concerned could have settled in the executing 
Member State, where he or she might work on a stable basis and might have 
established a solid network of personal relations, including family links. On 
the one hand, the Court has accepted that this environment facilitates rehabili-
tation from an individual perspective and also contributes to preventing 
reoffending, to the benefit of the hosting society as a whole. On the other 
hand, however, the CJEU itself has interpreted this provision narrowly, there-
by further favouring mutual recognition and the principle of effectiveness in 
comparison to the right to family life. The Wolzemburg case is particularly in-
sightful in this regard, as, on that occasion, a Dutch law conditioning the pos-
sibility of invoking Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on a 
prior and continuous period of presence in the territory of the host Member 
State of no less than 5 years was deemed to introduce a proportionate limit to 
the right at issue, due to the need to enhance the advanced system of surrender 
established by the EAW. 44 
Detention conditions – in particular those to which the prisoner will be sub-
ject in the Member State of destination – pose further challenges to the 
achievement of the purpose of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA. Again, 
the law on paper and the law in action do not entirely tally. In principle, ap-
propriate treatment in prison, covering both adequate detention conditions and 
the possibility of engaging in a varied set of rehabilitation activities and pro-
grammes, is considered a key component of the gradual preparation for post-
release return to society. Poor – where not degrading – detention conditions 
raise particular criticisms in a cross-border scenario. Firstly, the prisoner usu-
ally has very limited information on the treatment he or she will receive in the 
executing State. Secondly, he or she might be forced to interrupt an ongoing 
rehabilitation programme in the issuing State abruptly, having no access to 
equivalent or appropriate measures after the transfer has been performed. 
Nonetheless, a prisoner could be willing to face such a scenario, if – for in-
stance – he or she may benefit from a reduced sentence pursuant to the law of 
the executing Member State. The same applies to the choice between deten-
tion conditions and proximity to family. 
In this context, additional concerns derive from the right to liberty, under 
Article 6 of the Charter, in relation to which the case law of the ECtHR and of 
 
 
44 Case C-123/08, Dominic Wolzenburg. 
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the CJEU converge to identify emerging protection requirements. The ECtHR 
has developed a test to verify whether domestic law and practices in the field 
of extradition and pre-removal detention lead to an arbitrary restriction of this 
right. 45 Some elements of this test are particularly significant for cross-border 
transfers pursuant to the Framework Decision and can be further developed in 
light of the recent case law of the Court of Justice. 46 More specifically, the 
ECtHR attaches importance to the appropriateness of the locations and materi-
al conditions of detention. In Al Chodor, 47 a recent case concerning the depri-
vation of liberty of asylum seekers, the Court of Justice complemented this 
approach, by pointing out that the protection against arbitrary restrictions of 
personal liberty also requires the detention to be based on a clear, predictable 
and accessible legal basis. Even before considering the material detention 
conditions, both the grounds and the procedures for deprivation of liberty 
should therefore be accessible and foreseeable, to avoid undue departures 
from Article 6 of the Charter. To provide an example, Al Chodor referred to 
domestic laws allowing for varied forms of detention of asylum seekers on 
generic grounds, such as the undetermined risk of absconding. Article 6 of the 
Charter requires this risk to be further clarified and defined through norms of 
general application outlining the criteria for believing that the person involved 
is likely to abscond. Otherwise, the relevant national law would blur the 
boundaries of a legitimate and proportionate deprivation of liberty, eventually 
offering leeway to the competent authorities for broadening the scope of their 
coercive powers. 
This case law reinforces the importance of detention conditions – and of 
the related legal frameworks and institutional practices – in the framework 
of cross-border transfers of prisoners across the EU. In the execution State, a 
prisoner could face a twofold scenario: material detention conditions failing to 
reach appropriate legal standards established by national law, or national rules 
either failing to define – entirely or partially – such standards or being too 
vague to meet the necessary requirements of accessibility and foreseeability. 
It follows that the assessment made by the issuing authority pursuant to 
Article 4(2) of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA should encompass all 
relevant circumstances regarding the prison treatment the sentenced person 
will receive, ranging from – in particular – the availability of rehabilitation 
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programmes and of adequate contacts with family members, to the material 
conditions of detention in light of the situation of the person concerned (men-
tal and physical health, age, etc.). For this purpose, the issuing authority is en-
titled – and in principle should be expected – to solicit information from the 
executing one. Should the latter fail to provide appropriate indications on the 
post-transfer situation of the transferee – including updated information on 
personal ties, the facility to which he or she will be sent, the rehabilitation 
programmes available therein, and the material detention conditions – the 
issuing authority should carefully consider prioritising the protection of the 
individual and the intentio legis.  
Nonetheless, as the research conducted in the framework of the RePers 
project demonstrates, the judicial authorities face many difficulties in seri-
ously addressing these preliminary assessments, due to workload and the 
lack of time and resources, to such an extent that on many occasions not a 
single piece of information is requested and subsequently made available. 
Often, in the three Member States involved in the project, requests for trans-
fers are issued regardless of the absence of any indications as to the post-
transfer regime to be faced by the person concerned. This unsatisfactory ap-
proach to the elusive notion of offenders’ rehabilitation and to its assessment 
by the judicial authorities blurs the scope and content of the cooperation du-
ties incumbent upon the issuing and executing Member States, as well as the 
purpose they should primarily pursue. 48 Even though they are crucial to the 
whole mechanism, the actual effectiveness of these preliminary instruments 
is highly questionable. Firstly, they rely entirely upon the (unilateral and 
generally very poor) commitment of the judicial authorities involved to pri-
oritising social rehabilitation purposes. Secondly, the prisoner has very lim-
ited opportunities to contact the competent authorities, to support his or her 
position. Thirdly, as will be discussed in the next section, there are loopholes 
in effectively challenging a failure to perform the preliminary assessment 
pursuant to Article 4(2) before a domestic court, as it is just an interim stage 
of a more complex procedure, the formal outcome of which is the decision 
on recognition and execution issued abroad by the judicial authority of the 
executing Member State. 
 
 
48 Moreover, as discussed elsewhere, the clear dividing line between the complementary 
enforcement phases in the issuing and executing Member States – established by the Framework 
Decision and confirmed by the Court of Justice – further endangers the rationale of the transfer 
mechanism, as it disrupts ongoing rehabilitation programmes in which the prisoner might be invol-
ved in the issuing State. See S. Montaldo, ‘Judicial Cooperation, Transfer of Prisoners and Offen-
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5.2. Judicial Remedies, between National Procedural Autonomy and the 
Role of the Court of Justice 
In comparison to other judicial cooperation mechanisms, the way in which 
the Framework Decision implements the principle of mutual recognition is 
characterised by distinctive structural features. These differences are particu-
larly striking in relation to the EAW, where the executing authority is ex-
pected to surrender the person concerned. In fact, the scope of the Framework 
Decision necessarily reverses the roles of the issuing and executing States: it is 
for the former to transfer the prisoner to the executing State, where he or she 
will serve the sentence. The Framework Decision connects the notion of exe-
cuting authority to the material enforcement of the sentence abroad. 
This paradigm shift has remarkable implications in terms of remedies to 
possible violations of fundamental rights and ensuing limits to the principle of 
mutual recognition. 
A preliminary aspect must be highlighted in this respect. The Framework 
Decision provides no judicial remedies for resisting a forced transfer. More 
specifically, it does not introduce minimum common rules concerning the 
general features of an individual complaint against the cross-border enforce-
ment of a sentence. Still, it might be the case that the recognition of a foreign 
decision results in a (risk of) violation of one of the rights outlined in the pre-
vious section, or that it does not serve the purpose of facilitating the prisoner’s 
social rehabilitation. The absence of clear indications from the EU legislature 
is understandable, since it stems from both the vertical division of competence 
between the EU and the Member States and the principle of national proce-
dural autonomy. Moreover, the Framework Decision covers a branch of crim-
inal law in which the fragmentation of national legal orders reaches its peak, 
since ius puniendi – and the actual exercise of it – have always been consid-
ered a key component of core sovereign powers. In addition, as the Frame-
work Decision is a former Third Pillar instrument entrusted solely to the deci-
sion-making power of the Council, one could hardly have expected more in-
trusive decisions to the detriment of the domestic reserved domains. 
In this context, the structure of the cooperation mechanism at stake makes 
it rather difficult for the prisoner concerned to challenge a forced cross-border 
transfer. In fact, the decision on recognition and execution is entrusted to the 
State of destination, whereas the inmate is usually held in a prison facility in 
the issuing State. That decision formally closes the horizontal cooperation 
procedure and affects the prisoner’s situation and legal regime. Therefore, an 
effective judicial complaint against a transfer should, in principle, challenge 
that domestic judicial decision, as occurs in relation to the EAW. However, in 
the latter case, the requested person is in the executing State and is necessarily 
assisted by a lawyer therein. This does not happen in cross-border transfers, 
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where, in most cases, the geographic divide and the ongoing detention of the 
person concerned converge and affect the possibility of resisting the decision 
on recognition easily and effectively.  
Additional concerns stem from the opposite side of the horizontal coopera-
tion procedure. In fact, the Framework Decision does not impose specific 
formalities for a transfer request submitted by the issuing authority. Therefore, 
it is the responsibility of the national legal orders and practices to better clarify 
this aspect of the procedure, which – nevertheless – has remarkable substantial 
implications on the person involved. The same applies to decisions denying a 
request for a transfer submitted by a prisoner. It follows that the transfer re-
quest (or the decision to reject a transfer) may take many different shapes and 
is in most cases issued by a public prosecutor without the intermediation or 
any sort of prior exequatur of a domestic court. The question, then, is whether 
the prisoner can challenge an intermediate judicial act barring or initiating a 
more complex cross-border procedure, which is closed by a final decision on 
recognition and enforcement issued in another Member State by the executing 
authority. Evidently, the question is particularly compelling in the event of ex 
officio requests issued in spite of the prisoner’s dissent or rejected notwith-
standing his or her consent to the transfer. Moreover, as discussed in the pre-
vious sections, the analysis of the practice shows that the preliminary check 
under Article 4(2) of the Framework Decision on whether the transfer would 
actually contribute to enhancing the prisoner’s social rehabilitation often 
proves to be materially very difficult to implement for the authority involved. 
However, the broad discretion with which the issuing authorities are endowed 
is not apparently counterbalanced by clear remedies. The absence of indica-
tions in the Framework Decision and the aforementioned principle of proce-
dural autonomy lead to the allocation of this aspect to the specific features of 
the domestic systems of judicial remedies and maximises the risk of loop-
holes. In fact, domestic legislations provide an extremely varied panorama. 
For instance, Spanish Law no. 23/2014 of 20 November, on mutual recogni-
tion of criminal decisions in the EU expressly envisages a judicial remedy 
against any decision to forward a request for cooperation to the judicial authorities 
of another Member State (Article 13). In other countries, such as Italy, The Neth-
erlands and France, no such provisions are found. The possibility of challenging 
the request made by the public prosecutor is a disputed and – still not settled – 
practice, which can raise concerns as to the actual availability of this remedy. 
Another key question is whether the case law developed by the Court of 
Justice (mainly) in the framework of the EAW can be extended to this sepa-
rate area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. In principle, as far as the 
interpretation of the grounds for refusal listed in EU legislation is concerned, 
there is no reason why a different regime should be reserved to cross-border 
transfers. 
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The answer is much more complex in relation to the Aranyosi and 
Căldăraru test, which covers all cases in which an exceptional situation may 
result in a serious and actual risk of violation of fundamental rights not envis-
aged in the list of pre-determined grounds for refusal. 49 In principle, the 
aforementioned twofold test could hardly be reiterated as such in cross-border 
transfers, since it would require the executing judicial authority to refuse 
recognition on the grounds of a negative self-assessment of the standards of 
protection of core fundamental rights in its own Member State. Even if a judi-
cial authority were willing to perform such a self-assessment, the test would in 
any event be entirely modified: it would be confined to the realm of the exe-
cuting State and no cross-border exchange of information and provision of as-
surances would logically apply. Crucially, we would then be dealing with a 
profoundly different test, the rationale of which would not be the establish-
ment of exceptional limits to mutual trust and mutual recognition between the 
Member States but, rather, the empowerment of the domestic constitutional 
system for ensuring the compatibility of the national legal order with the 
standards set by the Charter. There would also be inevitable constitutional im-
plications at domestic level, in terms of checks and balances between the judi-
ciary and the executive and legislative branches of a Member State. 50 
In a nutshell, the Aranyosi and Căldăraru test – or what remains of it – 
would in any event forcefully undergo a genetic paradigm shift. It would be 
transformed from a horizontal inter-State dynamic of mutual warning on the 
protection of fundamental rights 51 to a purely domestic and unilateral scrutiny 
of the suitability of the national legal framework to respect this qualified EU 
acquis and the primacy and effectiveness of Union law. Nonetheless, from a 
 
 
49 This is a cross-sectional issue which also applies to other judicial cooperation instruments, in 
particular those which are described as being complementary to Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, 
namely Framework Decisions 2008/947/JHA of 27November 2008 on the application of the principle 
of mutual recognition to judgments and probation decisions with a view to the supervision of probation 
measures and alternative sanctions (OJ L 337, 16.12.2008, pp. 102-122) and 2009/829/JHA of 23 
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dans le cadre du transfert des personnes condamnées au sein de l’Union européenne’, Eucrim, Vol. 13, 
Issue 4, 2018, p. 185. 
50 From this point of view, it would be quite difficult to perform this check, as the executing judicial 
authority would have to acknowledge the existence of widespread challenges to fundamental rights 
within its own jurisdiction. Even though this would be precisely the role that one would expect an 
independent judicial scrutiny to play over public authorities, it must not be taken for granted that any 
judicial authority would be concretely willing and fully equipped to take on such a responsibility. 
51 I. Canor, ‘My brother’s keeper? Horizontal Solange: An Ever Closer Distrust Among the Peoples of 
Europe’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 50, Issue 2, 2013, p. 383. 
58 Stefano Montaldo 
substantive point of view, the judicial authority in the Member State of transfer 
could not obliterate the duty to protect fundamental rights when implementing 
EU law, set forth by Article 51(1) of the Charter and reiterated in the fundamen-
tal rights clause of Article 3(4) of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, which 
the Court of Justice used as a legal basis in Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA 
to establish the Aranyosi and Căldăraru test. 
From this point of view, the Strasbourg case law and the evidentiary thresh-
old proposed by the Court of Justice in its case law could be reliable reference 
points for this self-assessment, also because any diverging and stricter constitu-
tional requirement would have to be considered through the lens of the Melloni 
doctrine. 52 This would also be in line with the urgent need for EU-wide coher-
ence of the general approach to the limits on cross-border judicial cooperation 
mechanisms, irrespective of the solutions developed on an individual basis. 
At the same time, from a political point of view, this assessment appears to 
be hardly conceivable, as the executing judicial authority would have to 
acknowledge the existence of widespread challenges to fundamental rights 
within its own jurisdiction. Firstly, even though this would be precisely the 
role that one would expect to be played by an independent judicial scrutiny 
over the risk of abuses on the part of the public authorities, it must not be tak-
en for granted that any judicial authority would be concretely willing and fully 
equipped to take on such a responsibility. Secondly, this check would be likely 
to facilitate the lodging of (several) successful applications to the ECtHR 
against the Member State concerned. 53 These concerns could partially be 
overcome by resorting to the preliminary ruling procedure, as a way of de fac-
to self-limiting the duty of mutual recognition through interpretative guidance 
centrally steered from Luxembourg. Again, however, the empowerment of Ar-
ticle 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as a tool for 
handling serious human rights concerns in the executing State reiterates the 
thorny issue of political feasibility outlined above. It should not be ruled out 
that the domestic judicial authorities might be prevented from referring to the 
CJEU, especially in those Member States where threats to the independence of 
the judiciary are fuelling the crisis of the rule of law. These hurdles might not 
affect all the Member States, but would still generate loopholes in the Europe-
an system of protection of fundamental rights. 
Be that as it may, any elaboration on the Aranyosi and Căldăraru test would 
have to address a third and final concern. It might be the case that a prisoner 
 
 
52 Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal. 
53 A. Rosanò, ‘Clash of Titans: The Fight Against Impunity vs Social Rehabilitation and the 
Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Framework of the Transfer of Prisoners in the EU’, in S. 
Montaldo & L. Marin (Eds), The Fight Against Impunity in EU Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
forthcoming (May 2020). 
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faces the threat of unlawful detention conditions – either poor material standards 
or vague/absent legal standards resulting in arbitrary detention – which does not 
reach the threshold of the exceptional circumstances rebutting the presumption 
of mutual trust and allowing for a deviation from the duty of recognising and 
enforcing a foreign judicial decision, in light of the current developments of 
CJEU case law. The CJEU, in LM, although referring to exceptional situations 
justifying a fundamental rights limit to mutual recognition, contended that the 
availability of a remedy for challenging detention conditions does not suffice 
to rule out the risk of inhumane and degrading treatment. In fact, the crucial 
point is that no judicial cooperation mechanism should lead to a manifest vio-
lation of a fundamental right, a fortiori in the event of ones that cannot be der-
ogated, as is the case for Article 4 of the Charter. This is even more compel-
ling for cross-border transfers, which are inherently connected to the enforce-
ment of sentences and custodial measures. However, neither the Framework 
Decision nor the Court of Justice have developed clear alternatives to existing 
remedies and tests, such that criticism has been raised with regard to a gap in 
protection within the mechanism of cross-border transfers and in the EU sys-
tem of protection of fundamental rights as a whole. 54 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA is not immune from the recurring di-
lemma of effectiveness versus fundamental rights protection, which character-
ises judicial cooperation mechanisms. On the one hand, this instrument facili-
tates the enforcement of a sentence or a custodial measure abroad, by mini-
mising the formalities and providing for an expedited and purely judicial pro-
cedure. On the other hand, it raises several fundamental rights challenges, 
which are at the core of the rehabilitation goal pursued by this instrument. 
While cross-border transfers should be used to facilitate social reinsertion in a 
post-release era, thereby also preventing recidivism, the current practice re-
veals recurring attempts to use this judicial cooperation tool to dispose of un-
desired EU citizens or to deflate national prison systems and to lower budget-
ary burdens accordingly. 
This trend is likely to result in illegitimate forced transfers that could under-
mine prisoners’ rights, such as the right to family life, the right to liberty, and 
the prohibition on inhumane and degrading treatment. The Framework Decision 
maximises the role of the judicial authorities involved, which are both expected 
to perform a preliminary check on the implications of a cross-border transfer on 
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the sentenced person. In principle, if these assessments reveal that the removal 
would not be beneficial to the inmate’s progression towards social rehabilita-
tion, the judicial cooperation mechanism should be set aside. 
In this context, as is the case for any judicial cooperation instrument involv-
ing the exercise of public coercive powers, the set of remedies for resisting a 
forced transfer are revealed to be a much-needed pillar of the mechanism at is-
sue. However, the current state of the art regarding available judicial remedies for 
fundamental rights violations resulting from forced cross-border transfers is a 
matter of concern. Generally speaking, the Framework Decision does not adopt 
minimum common standards in its domain. Judicial protection at domestic level 
broadly depends on national criminal procedural law and appears to be under-
mined by the lack of remedies in the issuing State and the need to challenge the 
decision on recognition from abroad. Moreover, even from the perspective of 
the executing State, the recent advances made by the Court of Justice fall short 
of securing appropriate protection, even in the case of exceptional situations 
stemming from systemic deficiencies. The Aranyosi and Căldăraru test does 
not apply, as such, to Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA transfers, and a spe-
cific test not yet been developed in relation to the risk of transferring prisoners 
to a facility where detention conditions are poor. 
Two factors emerge from this context. Firstly, the magnitude of the compe-
tent judicial authorities’ role and tasks is further amplified, since the presence 
of loopholes in the system of judicial remedies calls for appropriate ex ante 
safeguards with a view to preventing the risk of fundamental rights violations. 
Secondly, in a sort of inextricable circle, it highlights the need to strengthen 
the web of judicial protection pursuant to national law, as well as the need for 
clearer interpretative guidance from the CJEU. 
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Abstract: Offenders’ rehabilitation is the declared objective of the transfer of foreign prison-
ers to their country of nationality, origin or permanent residence. The rationale behind this is 
that allowing prisoners to serve their sentence close to home can be a significant instrument in 
improving their chances of social rehabilitation. In Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, the 
previous right of veto held by sentenced persons in the 1983 Council of Europe Convention 
when they are transferred to their country of nationality or residence was abolished. This 
change has a major negative impact on the position of the sentenced person. It also raises 
questions as to the coherence between the transfer of non-consenting prisoners and the re-
habilitation perspective, given that social rehabilitation intrinsically requires the coopera-
tion of the person involved. By discussing the compatibility, the reader is given a deeper and 
contextualised insight into the fact that not every policy measure actually serves the purpose 
for which it was intended. In fact, the abolition of the prisoner’s right of veto makes the Eu-
ropean instrument appear more concerned with the needs of the issuing states than with 
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1. Introduction 
The explanatory reports, preambles and contents of the instruments and 
agreements adopted in Europe since the 1960s that allowed foreign offenders 
to be transferred to their country of nationality, origin or permanent resi-
dence have consistently referred to their rehabilitation as an important objec-
tive of such transfers. 1 It is commonly accepted that, on the whole, enforc-
 
 
1 See Preamble and Article 1 of the European Convention on the Supervision of Conditionally 
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ing a prison sentence in surroundings familiar to the prisoner is more likely 
to facilitate his or her social rehabilitation. Therefore, social ties, particularly 
employment and family relations, should be given sufficient attention during 
and after punishment. 2 It is also widely assumed that a transfer to the home 
country is in a foreign prisoner’s interest as the problems offenders experi-
ence in prison are generally exacerbated when they are foreign, even though 
the principle of non-discrimination is a basic principle in penitentiary law. 
Difficulties in communication due to language barriers, lack of information 
about the legal system, alienation from local culture and customs, and the ab-
sence of contacts with relatives may have detrimental effects on foreign prison-
ers, making it likelier that they will relapse into crime. 3 In many cases, they are 
not offered the range of penitentiary and post-release treatments and welfare-
oriented services that may otherwise be an integral part of imprisonment. 4 As a 
 
 
Sentenced or Conditionally Released Offenders (Strasbourg, 30 November 1964); Explanatory 
Report and Preamble to the European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal 
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etc. In general, recommendations of the Council of Europe on the matter always mention the impor-
tance of the social rehabilitation of sentenced persons and to that end the transfer of such persons to 
the country of their own society. See Preamble of Recommendation R (92) 18, concerning the 
practical application of the Convention on the Transfer of Prisoners (adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 19 October 1992).  
2 F. McNeill, ‘A desistance paradigm for offender management’, Criminology and Criminal Justice, 
Vol. 6, No. 1, 2006, pp. 39-62. 
3 See A. Tarzi & J. Hedges, A Prison Within a Prison, Inner London Probation Service, London, 1990; 
P. Green, Drug Couriers, Howard League for Penal Reform, London, 1991; A. Tarzi. & J. Hedges, A 
Prison Within a Prison - Two Years On: An Overview, Inner London Probation Service, London, 1993; 
R. Ellis, Asylum-Seekers and Immigration Act Prisoners - The Practice of Detention, Prison Reform 
Trust, London, 1998; P. Green, Drugs, Trafficking and Criminal Policy - the Scapegoat Policy, 
Waterside Press, Winchester, 1998; C. Pourgourides, S.P. Sashidharan & P.J. Bracken, A Second 
Exile: the Mental Health Implications of Detention of Asylum Seekers in the UK, North Birmingham 
Mental Health Trust, Birmingham, 1996; H.S. Bhui, Going the distance: Developing effective policy and 
practice with foreign national prisoners, Prison Reform Trust, London, 2004; H.S. Bhui, ‘Foreign 
National Prisoners: Issues and Debates’, in H.S. Bhui (Ed), Race and Criminal Justice, Sage, London, 
2009, pp. 154-169; M. Knapen, ‘Implementation of Framework Decisions on the Enforcement of Foreign 
Criminal Judgments: (How) Can the Aim of Resocialisation be Achieved?’, in M. Groenhuijsen, T. 
Kooijmans & T. de Roos (Eds), Fervet Opus. Liber Amicorum Anton van Kalmthout, Maklu, Apeldoorn-
Antwerp-Portland, 2010, pp. 118-120; T. Ugelvik, ‘The Incarceration of Foreigners in European 
Prisons’, in S. Pickering & J. Ham (Eds), The Routledge Handbook on Crime and International 
Migration, Routledge, London and New York, 2014, pp. 107-120. 
4 See T. Ugelvik, ‘Seeing Like a Welfare State: Immigration Control, Statecraft, and a Prison with Double 
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consequence, foreign prisoners are often not able to exercise their formally 
equal rights. 5 It seems reasonable to conclude that a transfer to their home 
country would reduce the harm caused by their deprivation of liberty and 
promote social rehabilitation. This policy is also rooted in humanitarian con-
siderations. 6 
The ad hoc legal instrument for the transfer of prisoners across the Europe-
an Union is Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal 
matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of li-
berty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union (OJ L 327, 
5.12.2008, pp. 27-46, hereinafter, the ‘Framework Decision’). Its declared pur-
pose is also to facilitate the social rehabilitation of the sentenced person (Article 
3(1)). Again, the driving rationale behind this declaration is that allowing for-
eign prisoners to serve their sentence close to home improves their chances of 
social rehabilitation, since its objective is to transfer them to the society to 
which they will return after punishment.  
Under the provisions of the Framework Decision, the consent of the sen-
tenced person to the transfer will not be required when the transfer takes place 
to further the social rehabilitation of the person involved (Article 6). In partic-
ular, the consent of the sentenced person is not required when: (1) the person 
is a national of the executing state and also lives there; (2) the person is to be 
deported to the executing state on completing their sentence; and (3) the per-
son has fled or otherwise returned there in response to the criminal proceed-
ings. His or her opinion will be obtained when deciding the issue of forward-
ing the judgment together with the certificate, but it can be dismissed if the is-
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suing state has satisfied itself that such a transfer furthers the social rehabilita-
tion of the prisoner involved. No position is taken on if and how the issuing 
state must assess this. More importantly, the Framework Decision does not 
provide the sentenced person whose consent is unnecessary with a remedy 
against the decision to forward the judgment.  
Compared with the previous situation under the 1983 Council of Europe 
Convention, this is quite a novelty, 7 even more relevant because the Frame-
work Decision has a significant negative impact on the position of the sen-
tenced person. The change merits a more detailed explanation than has been 
given so far, because it raises questions with respect to the coherence between 
the transfer of non-consenting prisoners and the rehabilitation perspective, 8 
given that social rehabilitation intrinsically requires the cooperation of the per-
son involved. Therefore, transferring a prisoner without his or her consent 
could be counter-productive in terms of rehabilitation. Does the decision-
making process in the Framework Decision fit the purpose of increasing the 
prospects of the prisoner’s rehabilitation? Is abolishing the requirement of 
consent consistent with the central position awarded to furthering social reha-
bilitation? Does it highlight a shift towards an instrumentalisation of the trans-
fer of prisoners to deal with unwanted foreign prisoners who the issuing states 
want to remove from their territory? Answering these questions requires an 
analysis that combines three aspects, namely 1) the grounds for abolishing the 
requirement of consent; 2) the rehabilitation perspective; and 3) the compati-
bility between transferring non-consenting prisoners and the declared purpose 
of their transfer being that of social rehabilitation. The following sections will 
introduce these topics. 
 
 
7 As such, it has been stressed in all related official documents. See the report from the Commission 
to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation by the Member States of 
Framework Decisions 2008/909/JHA, 2008/947/JHA and 2009/829/JHA on the mutual recognition of 
judicial decisions on custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty, on probation 
decisions and alternative sanctions and on supervision measures as an alternative to provisional 
detention. COM (2014) 57 final of 5.2.2014, 12, p. 7, where reference is made to the member states’ 
declarations. It has also been underlined in literature. See Knapen 2010, p. 113; W. de Bondt & A. 
Suominen, ‘State Responsibility When Transferring Non-consenting Prisoners to Further their Social 
Rehabilitation – Lessons Learnt from Asylum Case Law’, European Criminal Law Review, Vol. 5, 
No. 3, 2015, p. 347. 
8 See Knapen 2010, pp. 118 and 123; G. Vermeulen et al., Material detention conditions, execution of 
custodial sentences and prisoner transfer in the EU member states, Maklu, Antwerp, 2011, p. 15; G. 
Conway, ‘Prospects and Problems for European Legal Cooperation Concerning Prisoners’, European 
Journal of Probation, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2018, p. 154; A. Martufi, ‘Assessing the resilience of ‘social re-
habilitation’ as a rationale for transfer: A commentary on the aims of Framework Decision 2008/909/ 
JHA’, New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2018, pp. 43-61. 
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2. The Grounds for Abolishing the Requirement of Consent 
None of the multilateral agreements on the enforcement of foreign penal 
judgments in the nineteenth century has ever mentioned the offender’s consent, 
with only a minority sector in literature defending that transfer without consent 
by stating that it could be counterproductive to the declared purpose of rehabili-
tation. 9 From the 1960s onwards, when the tendency towards transferring for-
eign prisoners to their home countries strengthened and widened, this position 
was still very common in international instruments. 10 In the vast majority of 
multilateral conventions and uniform legislation adopted at that time, the con-
sent of the sentenced person was not required in order to proceed with such a 
transfer. Nevertheless, the works in international congresses during the second 
half of the twentieth century reflected a slow but unstoppable change of opinion 
in the matter. While the Ninth International Congress on Penal Law (The 
Hague, 1964) only criticised the offender’s restricted role in the context of ex-
tradition, 11 two decades later, the Thirteenth Congress (Cairo, 1984) empha-
sised that as long as the offender is imprisoned in the sentencing state, the trans-
fer should only be authorised with his or her consent. 12 This consensus began to 
accelerate in the 1980s. For example, the Sixth UN Congress on the Prevention 
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Caracas, 1980) allowed the transfer to 
take place “either with the prisoner’s consent or in his interest”, 13 whereas the 
Model Agreement on the Transfer of Foreign Prisoners adopted just five years 
later at the Seventh Congress already considered the prisoner’s consent indis-
pensable to any transfer (Milan, 1985). As a consequence of this change of 
mind, the Riyadh Arab Agreement on Judicial Cooperation (Riyadh, 6 April 
 
 
9 See, for example, E. Brusa, ‘Report’, in AA.VV., Actes du Congrès pénitentiaire international de 
Rome, novembre 1885. Publiés par les soins du Comité exécutif. Tome premier, Mantellate, Rome, 
1887, p. 467, and H. Lammasch, Auslieferungspflicht und Asylrecht, Duncker & Humblot, Leipzig, 
1887, p. 823. 
10 See, for example, the Treaty of Co-operation between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden (Helsinki, 23 March 1962), the Law on Cooperation with Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden Relating to Enforcement of Penal Sentences (3 May 1963), the Treaty between Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg on the Enforcement of Judgments in Criminal Matters (26 
September 1968, which never came into force), the 1970 Validity Convention or the Convention on 
the Transfer of Persons Sentenced to Imprisonment to Their Home Countries to Serve Their 
Sentence (19 May 1978). 
11 Resolution III.B of Section 4 adopted at the IX AIDP Congress, retrieved on 15 September 2019 
from http://www.penal.org/en/resolutions-aidp-iapl-congresses, p. 301. 
12 Resolution 11 of Section 4 adopted at the XIII AIDP Congress, retrieved on 15 September 2019 
from http://www.penal.org/en/resolutions-aidp-iapl-congresses, p. 349.  
13 Retrieved on 20 September 2019 from https://www.unodc.org/congress/en/previous/previous-06.html, 
resolution 13(1). 
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1983), the Commonwealth Scheme for the Transfer of Convicted Offenders of 
1986 and the 1983 Council of Europe Convention introduced the requirement of 
the offender’s consent.  
In the 1983 Council of Europe Convention, the consent requirement was 
explicitly rooted in the understanding that transferring a prisoner without his 
or her consent would be counter-productive in terms of rehabilitation, which it 
declared to be its primary purpose (according to para. 23 of the Explanatory 
Report, although just in passing). Even so, it was still difficult to speak of a 
wide acknowledgement of the offender’s consent as an integral part of the 
transfer of prisoners in international multilateral instruments of transfer. 14 In 
fact, many possible exceptions to the rule of consent were considered reasona-
ble: 15 That the offender’s veto might be detrimental to the public interest in-
volved in this international instrument, for example, in cases where it would 
inevitably lead to impunity; 16 and that consent might be considered unneces-
sary where the offender is only a visitor who has been in the country for a very 
short time, with no ties to it, or where a deportation order has been made 
against the prisoner, so that he or she will be compulsorily returned to the exe-
cuting country at the end of the sentence. In fact, the most influencing entry 
point of a new state of opinion was the increase in migration flows from the 
mid-1980s, with a large percentage of migrants coming from former Eastern 
bloc states and underdeveloped African, American and Asian countries. In 
such an international and European context in which it was increasingly com-
mon for many foreign prisoners to have no links with the country in which 
they were sentenced, being compulsorily removed at the end of their sentence, 
it was only natural that prisoner transfer agreements moved away from the 
idea that prisoners should consent to the transfer and therefore have the power 
to exercise an effective veto over the procedure.  
 
 
14 The requirement of consent was severely criticised from the perspective that it was not only a strange 
body in the legal system governing international legal assistance, but also undesirable from a practical 
viewpoint and detrimental to the whole prisoner transfer scheme. This reasoning was widespread in 
German literature. See T. Vogler, ‘Zur Rechtshilfe durch Vollstreckung ausländischer Strafurteile’, in 
T. Vogler (Ed), Festschrift für H.-H. Jescheck zum 70. Geburtstag. Band II, Duncker & Humblot, 
Berlin, 1985, p. 1383; F.-Ch. Schroeder, ‘Übertragung der Strafvollstreckung’, Zeitschrift für die 
gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, Vol. 98, No. 2, 1986, p. 460; E. Müller-Rappard, ‘The Transfer of 
Sentenced Persons – Comments on the Relevant Council of Europe Legal Instrument’, Pace Interna-
tional Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1991, pp. 160-161. 
15 Pɫachta 1993, pp. 358-362. 
16 For example, the 1990 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 
between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, 
established that the transfer of enforcement of a penalty involving deprivation of liberty would not 
require the consent of the sentenced person whenever this person has avoided the enforcement by 
escaping to his or her own country (Article 69). 
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Consequently, the requirement of consent in the 1983 Council of Europe 
Convention was significantly diluted by the Additional Protocol to the Con-
vention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (18 December 1997), which sig-
nalled a turning point. It allowed for non-consented transfers in particular cir-
cumstances. In order to prevent convicted persons who have fled to their state 
of nationality evading justice due to the prohibition on the extradition of na-
tionals in some domestic legal systems, the Additional Protocol allows these 
persons to be tried in the administering state without their consent (Article 2). 
Moreover, acknowledging that the Convention operated on the basis of a 
three-fold consent – i.e. the sentencing state, the administering state and the 
sentenced person –, the Committee considered that the Convention could op-
erate on the basis of a twofold consent – namely, the consent of both the sen-
tencing state and the administering state – where the person concerned as a 
consequence of the sentence passed is subject to deportation or expulsion from 
the sentencing state (Article 3(1)). The need for the offender’s consent was 
substituted by the offender’s right to be heard by the administering state be-
fore the decision on transfer was taken and the requirement of an agreement 
between both states involved to dispense with the consent of the sentenced 
person (Article 3(2)). This exception was considered reasonable in terms of 
rehabilitation as it related to circumstances in which the offender could not 
start a new life in the sentencing state after punishment. 17 However, the Addi-
tional Protocol recognised that there was a significant difference between 
transferring a sentence to the state to which a prisoner has fled for enforce-
ment purposes, and the involuntary transfer of a prisoner to another state to 
serve his or her sentence. It therefore enabled the contracting states to opt out 
of the latter mechanism (Article 3(6)). Non-consented transfers under the Ad-
ditional Protocol would have to comply with the requirements of Protocol No. 
7 to the European Convention on Human Rights (according to para. 30 of the 
Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol), which means that prisoners 
must be given an opportunity to submit reasons against their transfer and to 
have their cases reviewed with the benefit of representation. 
The Framework Decision follows the path of the Additional Protocol and 
takes the exclusion of the requirement of consent further, while at the same 
time imposing a duty on the executing state to take charge of sentenced per-
sons. 18 In addition, in much the same way as in the Additional Protocol, the 
 
 
17 See De Wree, Vander Beken & Vermeulen 2009, p. 119. Expressing some doubts, Conway 2018, 
p. 145. For critical considerations on this aspect, see V. Mitsilegas, ‘The third wave of third pillar 
law: which direction for EU criminal justice?’, European Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2009, p. 541 
et seq. 
18 This compulsory system was also included in the proposed 2017 Second Additional Protocol to 
the 1983 Council of Europe Convention (Article 2.1), not currently in force. 
68 Patricia Faraldo-Cabana 
consent of sentenced persons is not required when they flee or stand to be 
deported or expelled, but it is also not required when they are to be returned 
to a state party of which they are nationals and in which they live. The change 
is not limited to Europe in terms of its influence or effect. The Framework 
Decision states that existing and future bilateral and multilateral agreements 
entered into by EU member states may only be relied upon insofar as they al-
low the objectives of the EU Framework Decision to be extended or en-
larged and help to simplify or facilitate further the procedures for enforcing 
sentences (Article 26). Although it is unclear how this provision will be in-
terpreted in practice, it is implied that it requires the EU member states to 
pursue ‘no consent’ transfer mechanisms in their agreements with non-EU 
States. 19 At national level, some countries are increasingly seeking to nego-
tiate bilateral agreements that enable transfers without the offender’s con-
sent. 20 The explicit purpose of this policy is to reduce significantly the for-
eign prisoner population and thus the burden on the national prison sys-
tem. 21 Is it possible to pursue this purpose while at the same time furthering 
the rehabilitation of the transferred foreign offenders? To answer this ques-
tion, we must first explain how social rehabilitation is to be seen in the con-
text of the Framework Decision. 
3. The Rehabilitation Perspective 
‘Social rehabilitation’ is the term historically used in international transfer 
conventions and now in the Framework Decision. This concept is perceived in 
various ways in different European countries. Furthermore, it is not defined at 
European level, with only its contours having gradually been defined in the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 22 It is clear that a uniformly 
interpreted, European-wide notion of social rehabilitation could only contrib-
ute to a more widespread achievement of the EU objective to become an area 
 
 
19 Cf. Mulgrew 2011, p. 114. 
20 See, for example, the UK and Rwandan Agreement on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (Kigali, 
11 February 2010), para. 9. This agreement also introduces a new condition for transfer, not 
contained in the UK’s previous bilateral prison transfer agreements, namely the sentenced person 
must be subject to an order for deportation or removal from the sentencing state. 
21 For the UK, see Hansard Debates HC col 410W, 1 March 2011, parliamentary answer of the 
Secretary of State for Justice.  
22 S. Meijer, ‘Rehabilitation as a Positive Obligation’, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law 
and Criminal Justice, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2017, p. 146. For a definition of rehabilitation according to the 
sources of international and EU law, see S. Montaldo, ‘Offenders’ Rehabilitation: Towards a New 
Paradigm for EU Criminal Law?’, European Criminal Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2018, pp. 223-
243. 
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of freedom, security and justice. As we will see, providing such an interpreta-
tion may prove challenging, given the great diversity of legal and penological 
traditions. 23 
In EU law, the meaning of social rehabilitation corresponds today more 
closely to ‘reintegration’, seen as the offender’s re-entry into society following 
imprisonment, than to the classical understanding of ‘rehabilitation’ as a pro-
cess of internal change. 24 Recital 9 of the Preamble to the Framework Deci-
sion offers some guidance on which aspects need to be considered, even 
though it does not explicate the concept:  
the competent authority of the issuing State should take into account such elemen-
ts as, for example, the person’s attachment to the executing State, whether he or 
she considers it the place of family, linguistic, cultural, social or economic and 
other links to the executing State.  
This understanding is coherent with both Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member states on the 
European Prison Rules 25 and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for 
the Treatment of Prisoners (hereinafter, the ‘Mandela Rules’), 26 according to 
which prisoners should be allocated “to the extent possible, to prisons close to 
their homes or their places of social rehabilitation” (Rule 17(1) of the Europe-
an Prison Rules and Rule 59 of the Mandela Rules), and allowed “to com-
municate as often as possible by letter, telephone or other forms of communi-
cation with their families, other persons and representatives of outside organi-
sations and to receive visits from these persons” (Rule 24(1) both of the Euro-
pean Prison Rules and of the Mandela Rules). Case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights repeatedly stresses that states’ authorities should assist pris-
oners in maintaining effective contact with close family members as an im-
 
 
23 See Knapen 2010, p. 123, and A. Martufi, ‘The paths of offender rehabilitation and the European 
dimension of punishment: New challenges for an old ideal?’, Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law, Vol. 25, No. 6, 2018, p. 673. 
24 De Wree, Vander Beken & Vermeulen 2009, p. 112; Meijer 2017, pp. 160-161. In the European in-
struments, ‘rehabilitation’ is an all-encompassing term, often used interchangeably with ‘reintegration’. 
We will do the same, although we are aware that there are differences between the two. 
25 Adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 11 January 2006 at the 952nd 
meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies. The emphasis placed on managing detention “so as to facilitate 
the reintegration into free society of persons who have been deprived of their liberty” (Rule 6) has 
strongly influenced the interpretation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
26 Adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, held in Geneva in 1955, approved by the Economic and Social Council by its resolutions 
663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977, and revised by the United Nations 
General Assembly on 17 December 2015 after a five-year process.  
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portant means to facilitate re-entry after release. 27 According to this under-
standing, pursuing social rehabilitation with regard to the transfer of foreign 
prisoners means that such transfers should help to establish or restore offend-
ers’ societal and family bonds in their home country, which improve the like-
lihood of successful re-entry. 28 
However, social rehabilitation also refers to assisting with the moral, voca-
tional and educational development of the imprisoned individual via working 
practices and educational, cultural and recreational activities. It includes ad-
dressing the special needs of offenders with programmes covering a range of 
problems, such as substance addiction, mental or psychological conditions, 
anger and aggression, amongst others, which may lead to re-offending behav-
iour. In this sense, the Mandela Rules mention that prisoners should be offered 
education, vocational training and work, as well as other forms of assistance 
that are appropriate and available, including those of a remedial, moral, spir-
itual, social and health and sports-based nature (Rule 4(2)). The European 
Prison Rules also pay attention to social work, medical and psychological care 
and education of sentenced prisoners (Rules 103 to 106). Similarly, Recom-
mendation Rec(2000)22 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Eu-
rope to member states on improving the implementation of the European rules 
on community sanctions and measures highlights that special attention should 
be given to basic skills (e.g. basic literacy and numeracy, general problem 
solving, dealing with personal and family relationships, pro-social behaviour), 
educational or employment situation, possible addiction to drugs, alcohol, 
medication and community-oriented adjustment when designing programmes 
and interventions in the context of community sanctions and measures. The 
idea that providing prisoners with a real opportunity for rehabilitation requires 
them to be allowed to engage in work or education is also present in the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights, which consistently demands that 
contacts with the outside world be supported by a comprehensive set of pro-
 
 
27 Cases Messina v. Italy (no. 2), Judgment of the Court (Second Section) of 28 September 2000, para. 
61-62; Lavents v. Latvia, Judgment of the Court (First Section) of 28 November 2002, para. 139. 
28 D. MacKenzie, ‘The impact of formal and informal social controls on the criminal activities of 
probationers’, Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2002, pp. 243-376; S. 
De Li & D. Layton MacKenzie, ‘The gendered effects of adult social bonds on the criminal activities 
of probationers’, Criminal Justice Review, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2003, pp. 278-298; J. Hepburn & M. Griffin, 
‘The effect of social bonds on successful adjustment to probation: An event history analysis’, Criminal 
Justice Review, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2004, pp. 46-75; van Zyl Smit 2005; M. Maguire & P. Raynor, ‘How 
the resettlement of prisoners promotes desistance from crime: Or does it?’, Criminology and Criminal 
Justice, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2006, pp. 19-38; De Wree, Vander Beken & Vermeulen 2009, p. 122. 
Explaining that family background and social capital in the home state may better serve relapse into 
crime than rehabilitation, which calls for a case-by-case analysis instead of generalisation, see I. 
Wieczorek, ‘EU constitutional limits to the Europeanization of punishment: A case study on offenders’ 
rehabilitation’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Vol. 25, No. 6, 2018, p. 659. 
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grammes aimed positively at rehabilitating the offender. 29 It appears, howev-
er, that this criterion has not been considered in the Framework Decision, even 
though literature consistently underlines its importance, 30 maintaining that the 
transfer should improve foreign prisoners’ access to treatment and assis-
tance, 31 particularly if there are language barriers 32 or major cultural differ-
ences. 33 The Framework Decision simply assumes that possibilities of train-
ing, education and work are usually greater in the prisoner’s own country. 
A similar situation occurs with post-release services and supervision. Fol-
lowing their release, offenders face a range of social, economic and personal 
challenges that may become obstacles to a crime-free lifestyle, such as secur-
ing suitable accommodation with very limited means, surviving financially 
with little or no savings until they begin to earn wages and access services and 
support for their specific needs. Research on the variables that influence suc-
cessful reintegration has revealed the interdependence of employment, hous-
ing, addiction treatment and social network support. 34 In the absence of mate-
rial, psychological and social support during this transitional period, many of-
fenders are likely to become trapped in a vicious cycle of release and re-arrest. 
The Mandela Rules contain a strong reminder that “the duty of society does 
not end with a prisoner’s release” (Rule 90) and emphasise the need for effi-
cient aftercare to be delivered by both governmental and non-governmental 
entities (Rule 108). The European Prison Rules also recommend close cooper-
ation between prison authorities, services, and agencies that supervise and as-
sist released prisoners to enable them to re-establish themselves in the com-
 
 
29 Cases James, Wells and Lee v. United Kingdom, Judgment of the Court (Four Section) of 8 
September 2012, para. 218; Khoroshenko v. Russia, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 30 June 
2015, para. 122 and 144; and Harakchiev and Tolumov v. Bulgaria, Judgment of the Court (Four 
Chamber) of 8 July 2014, para. 265. 
30 E. Rotman, ‘Beyond punishment’, in A. Duff & D. Garland (Eds), A Reader on Punishment, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 281-305; G. Robinson, ‘Late-modern rehabilitation: The 
evolution of a penal strategy’, Punishment and Society, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2008, pp. 429-445; R. 
Canton, Why punish? An Introduction to the Philosophy of Punishment, Palgrave McMillan, 
London, 2018. 
31 See van Kalmthout, Hofstee-van der Meulen & Dünkel 2007; De Wree, Vander Beken & 
Vermeulen 2009, pp. 121-122. 
32 See Bhui 2004, p. 10; Ugelvik 2014, pp. 114-115. 
33 De Wree, Vander Beken & Vermeulen 2009, p. 122. 
34 See D. Banks & D.C. Gottfredson, ‘The Effects of Drug Treatment and Supervision on Time to 
Rearrest among Drug Treatment Court Participants’, Journal of Drug Issues, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2003, pp. 
385-412; C.A. Visher, L. Winterfield & M.B. Coggeshall, ‘Ex-offender Employment Programs and 
Recidivism: A Meta-analysis’, Journal of Experimental Criminology, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2005, pp. 295-315; 
S.J. Bahr et al., ‘Successful reentry: what differentiates successful and unsuccessful parolees?’, 
International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, Vol. 54, No. 5, 2010, pp. 
667-692. 
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munity (Rule 107(4)). In this sense, the issuing state might have better struc-
tures and resources to finance post-release services. However, again, this crite-
rion has not been considered in the Framework Decision, which does not even 
mention post-sentencing alternatives for assisting offenders in their reintegra-
tion into society. 
In summary, it is commonly accepted that using a rehabilitation perspective 
implies that the prisoners’ societal and family bonds must be established, 
maintained or restored in order to increase their chances of reintegration, but 
also that prison-based treatment and assistance and post-release services pro-
vided to former prisoners are considered important to diminish the risk of re-
cidivism. “The chosen interventions when focusing on rehabilitation are, 
therefore, treatment, assistance and the stimulation of societal bonds”. 35 How-
ever, the Framework Decision only focuses on facilitating the social circum-
stances required for the full re-entry of sentenced persons into the community 
to which they belong. It fails to guarantee offenders’ access to prison-based 
rehabilitation programmes and re-entry assistance. It also fails to consider that 
reintegration not only concerns societal and family ties, but also employment, 
education, mental healthcare, drug abuse treatment, and so on.  
Last but not least, the Framework Decision does not take into account that 
the offenders’ active and meaningful engagement with the requirements of an 
order and its prescribed purposes is the more direct link between effective en-
forcement, long-term compliance and reduced recidivism. 36 Given that social 
rehabilitation intrinsically requires the cooperation of the person involved, 
whenever a transfer is decided upon without the offender’s consent, even to 
the country of origin, nationality or residence, there are reasons to doubt that 
the chances of rehabilitation can really be enhanced. 37 After all, although the 
 
 
35 De Wree, Vander Beken & Vermeulen 2009, p. 115. See another conceptualisation of 
rehabilitation, from the perspective that a sentence served in the community against which the 
offence was committed is more rehabilitative, in Conway 2018, p. 154. 
36 T.R. Tyler, ‘Procedural justice, legitimacy, and the effective rule of law’, in M. Tonry (Ed), Crime 
and justice. A review of research. Volume 30, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 431-505; F. 
McNeill & G. Robinson, ‘Liquid legitimacy and community sanctions’, in A. Crawford & A. 
Hucklesby (Eds), Legitimacy and Compliance in Criminal Justice, Routledge, London, 2013, pp. 
116-137; T. McCulloch, ‘Beyond compliance: Participation, co-production and change in justice 
sanctions’, European Journal of Probation, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2015, pp. 40-57. 
37 De Wree, Vander Beken & Vermeulen 2009, pp. 118 and 124; Mitsilegas 2009, p. 541; Knapen 
2010, p. 123; G. Vermeulen et al., Cross-border execution of judgments involving deprivation of 
liberty in the EU. Overcoming legal and practical problems through flanking measures, Maklu, 
Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland, 2011, p. 15; G. Vermeulen, ‘Material Detention Conditions and Cross- 
border Execution of Custodial Sentences in the EU’, in European Commission, Framework 
Decisions on the Transfer of Prisoners and on Probation, Abstracts, European Commission, 2012, 
pp. 111-112; L. Mancano, ‘The Right to Liberty in European Union Law and Mutual Recognition in 
Criminal Matters’, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Vol. 18, 2016, pp. 231-232; 
Martufi 2018a, p. 43. 
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expression of consent should not be overvalued, it is usually “taken to be an 
indication of a willingness to comply and indeed to cooperate actively”. 38 A 
lack of consent may create frustration and disappointment within offenders, 
which may in turn negatively reflect in their behaviour. This is particularly true 
in the context of supervisory measures applied to community sanctions, proba-
tion, parole, conditional release and suspended sentences, as some degree of co-
operation on the part of the offender is essential to their meaningfulness and ef-
fectiveness. Is it possible to further social rehabilitation whilst imposing a trans-
fer upon a non-consenting offender? Or are there other aims at stake? 
4. Social Rehabilitation through Non-Consented Transfers? 
As seen in the previous section, the Framework Decision uses a very lim-
ited notion of rehabilitation as the goal of transferring foreign prisoners, strict-
ly related to the maintenance of societal and family bonds to facilitate re-entry 
into the society to which they belong. Even within this strict concept, “the ev-
idence for this is not clear”. 39 In fact, the Framework Decision gives the im-
pression that the focus has shifted from the perspective of offenders’ rehabili-
tation to that of the issuing states wanting to remove foreigners from their 
prisons. 40 They needed an instrument that was not rigid, slow and bureaucrat-
ic in its practical application, unlike the previous 1983 Council of Europe 
Convention. 41 Therefore, the Framework Decision “provides for a faster and 
more streamlined procedure than the Council of Europe instruments”. 42 The 
Framework Decision is based on the principle of mutual trust, founded on the 
presumption that member states respect fundamental rights throughout the Un-
ion. 43 Such a presumption calls for a high degree of automaticity, which, in 
 
 
38 Canton 2018, p. 220. 
39 Conway 2018, p. 154. 
40 See G. Vermeulen, ‘Mutual instrumentalization of criminal and migration law from an EU 
perspective’, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2007, p. 353; De Wree, 
Vander Beken & Vermeulen 2009, p. 117; Mitsilegas 2009, p, 541 et seq.; Knapen 2010, p. 122; V. 
Mitsilegas, EU after Lisbon. Rights, Trust and the Transformation of Justice in Europe, Hart, 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2016, p. 222; S. Neveu, Le transfert de l’exécution des peines priva-
tives et restrictives de liberté en droit européen. À la recherche d’un équilibre entre intérêts 
individuels et collectifs, Anthemis, Limal, 2016, p. 440. 
41 J.C. Froment, ‘Les avatars de la Convention sur le transfèrement des détenus en Europe’, in J. 
Céré (Ed), Panorama européen de la prison, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2002, pp. 131-132. 
42 European Agency for Fundamental Rights, Criminal detention and alternatives: fundamental rights 
in EU cross-border transfers, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2016, p. 28. 
43 This presumption has been highly contested over recent years. See V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Limits of 
Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: From Automatic Inter-State 
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turn, grants discretion to the issuing state when deciding on the transfer and 
the dispensation of the offender’s consent in some cases, as well as narrows 
the grounds upon which the executing state may decline to enforce a sentence.  
Of course, one could say that dispensing with the offender’s consent may 
merely be related to the fact that the greater the similarity between the crimi-
nal systems, traditions and policies of the concerned states, the less reason 
there may be to afford the sentenced person an enforceable right to challenge a 
decision to transfer him or her. 44 The offender’s veto might be considered det-
rimental to the interests of the EU and, perhaps more importantly, those of the 
issuing states. The EU’s interests can be encapsulated in the need to enhance 
the effectiveness of the activity of law enforcement agencies and judicial au-
thorities across Europe to compensate the absence of a genuine European area 
of criminal law, as both substantive and procedural criminal law largely re-
mains national, and to reduce the risk of impunity that may result as a conse-
quence of the increased mobility of EU citizens across borders. 45 The interests 
of the issuing states are centred around reducing prison costs and protecting 
victims and the general public. 46 The problem is that these interests are not 
seen as something that can be achieved through rehabilitation – which reduces 
prison costs and protects victims and the public by reducing reoffending – but 
as distinct objectives that may be contradictory with the social rehabilitation 
of offenders. 47 
From the viewpoint of social rehabilitation, the prisoner’s consent before a 
transfer can take place is a positive requirement. We should not forget that the 
underlying but central thrust of the transfer of prisoners is a humanitarian at-
tempt to assist them in readapting to society. Individuals are the primary bene-
ficiaries – not states. The fact that the repatriation of sentenced persons may 
 
 
Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the Individual’, Yearbook of European Law, Vol. 31, Issue 1, 
2012, pp. 319-372; T.P. Marguery, ‘Towards the end of mutual trust? Prison conditions in the context 
of the European Arrest Warrant and the transfer of prisoners framework decisions’, Maastricht Jour-
nal of European and Comparative Law, Vol. 25, No. 6, 2019; and the case law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, especially on the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision (see 
Montaldo’s chapter in this book). 
44 The increased automaticity of the transfer procedure is “premised on the presumption that 
fundamental rights are respected fully across the European Union”, according to Mitsilegas 2016, p. 
126. It is also associated with international comity to non-inquiry, since legality and legitimacy are 
presupposed to exist ipso iure and are thereby removed from judicial testing.  
45 See van Zyl Smit & Spencer 2010, pp. 36-37; Martufi 2018a, p. 48. 
46 The Framework Decision does not mention the purpose of protecting the victims and the general 
public, but other mutual recognition instruments contain explicit reference to it. See Recital 24 of 
Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition to judgments and probation decisions with a view to the supervision of probation 
measures and alternative sanctions (OJ L 337, 16.12.2008, pp. 102-122). 
47 See Vermeulen 2007, p. 353. 
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be in the best interests not only of them but also of the states concerned should 
not lead to a different prioritisation of interests. Whenever these interests col-
lide, offenders’ rehabilitation should come first. This does not happen in the 
Framework Decision. The procedure has been designed to serve the interests 
of the issuing state rather than those of the individuals affected by the trans-
fer, 48 or even those of the executing state. It is up to the issuing state to decide 
whether the transfer is in the best interest of the sentenced person. In addition, 
the executing state has to recognise and enforce the judgment if the sentencing 
state forwards it – except when there are formal grounds for refusal (Article 
9), and the consent of the home country can be dispensed with in cases of en-
forcement of a sentence imposed on a national residing in the state of national-
ity or awaiting expulsion or deportation towards it. The fact that the transfer 
may take place, inter alia, when the executing state is that in which the sen-
tenced person lives (Article 6(2)) is based upon the presumption that social re-
habilitation will be more successful in the executing state. Within the EU, 
however, which is based on the principle of free movement of persons, it is 
perfectly conceivable that an offender will want to return to a foreign society 
because he or she wants to settle there with a view to work, a relationship, 
etc., 49 as the offender has lived there for most of his or her life, or simply be-
cause his or her family is entitled to remain there. For this reason, it is reason-
able to listen to the sentenced person. A transfer without the offender’s con-
sent may violate Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(hereinafter, the ‘European Convention’), which protects the right to private 
and family life. Certainly, such interference with family life may be justified if 
the decision is made in accordance with the law and is necessary in a demo-
cratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the econom-
ic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and free-
doms of others (Article 8(2) of the European Convention). Nevertheless, states 
should consider a large number of factors already outlined by the European 
Court: the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the prisoner; 
the length of time the prisoner has spent in the country; the prisoner’s conduct 
in prison; the nationalities and situation of the prisoner’s family; the length of 
any marriage and whether it has produced children, and if so, their ages; whe-
ther the couple lead a real and genuine family life; and the difficulties a spouse 
 
 
48 This can be seen not only in the regulation of consent. For example, the system’s cost-effecti-
veness is an important factor. The transfer of a prisoner is costly, and the considerable expenses 
incurred by the states concerned must therefore be proportionate to the purpose to be achieved, 
which excludes recourse to a transfer where the person concerned only has a short sentence to serve, 
even if this could further his or her social rehabilitation. 
49 Knapen 2010, p. 117.  
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would face in the prisoner’s country of origin. 50 The Framework Decision 
does not guarantee that all these aspects will be considered by the issuing and 
the executing state when making their decision. 
Furthermore, prison conditions may pose a challenge to the possibilities of 
social rehabilitation. 51 The lack of rehabilitative prospects due to deficiencies 
in detention conditions should constitute grounds for non-transfer under the 
Framework Decision, 52 which includes general respect of the fundamental 
rights clause (Article 3(4)). It does not. The problem here is that the issuing 
state may not be interested in undertaking such a ‘specific and precise’ analy-
sis as required by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the context of 
the European Arrest Warrant, 53 particularly if it has problems with prison 
overcrowding or is concerned with financial costs linked to maintaining for-
eign citizens in prison. The Framework Decision does not impose this check, 
clearly relying on the assessment made by the issuing state. Perhaps consider-
ing that the executing state would not want to address the inadequate condi-
tions of its prison system, the intervention of the executing state in this as-
sessment is not required, as there is no need for an exchange of information 
between judicial authorities, even though the possibility of pre-transfer consul-
tations provides some room for an informal exchange of views on this aspect. 
Nevertheless, the prominent role given to the issuing state can not only consti-
tute a threat to mutual trust, 54 but also nurtures the fear that the transfer can be 
easily used as a political instrument to expel undesired aliens from the coun-
try, already clearly perceptible in the literature. 55  
Finally, where consent is not a requirement, the protection of the human 
rights of persons who may be transferred against their will becomes particular-
ly important. The Framework Decision does not consider that the chances of 
 
 
50 See Boultif v. Switzerland App. No. 54273/00 (2 August 2001), para. 48, and Amrollahi v. Denmark 
App. No. 56811/00 (11 July 2002), para. 35. 
51 See Vermeulen et al. 2011, p. 15; Martufi 2018a, p. 43; M. Pleić, ‘Challenges in cross-border 
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52 De Wree, Vander Beken & Vermeulen 2009, p. 119. At least, whenever detention conditions are 
so appalling that they result in inhuman and degrading treatment, prohibited by Article 4 of the 
European Convention.  
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Căldăraru, [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2016:198. 
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55 See Vermeulen 2007, p. 353; De Wree, Vander Beken & Vermeulen 2009, p. 117; Knapen, 2010, pp. 
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social rehabilitation in the state to which the prisoner is transferred may not be 
as good as those in the issuing state. Certainly, the judicial cooperation mech-
anism should not be initiated if the offender’s prospects of social rehabilitation 
are better in the issuing state. A transfer should be promoted only if the issu-
ing state is satisfied that enforcing the sentence in the executing state will en-
hance the offender’s chances of social rehabilitation. 56 However, prisoners 
whose consent is not necessary do not have the opportunity to file a complaint 
in this regard, given that the Framework Decision does not envisage a right to 
appeal the forwarding decision in the issuing state, which not all member 
states grant. 57 Even if they had such a right, prisoners may not challenge a de-
cision to transfer them to a member state with poorer detention conditions if 
they perceive that the transfer could contribute to the reduction of the time 
spent behind bars. 58 Moreover, the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights has ruled out that offenders should enjoy a right to be transferred for 
rehabilitation purposes, or even a right not to be transferred. 59  
5. Concluding Remarks 
By abolishing the offender’s right to veto, the EU expects to maximise the 
offenders’ chances of social rehabilitation while ensuring the cross-border en-
forcement of custodial sentences and measures involving deprivation of liber-
ty. However, as De Wree et al. have correctly pointed out, 60  
[t]he fact that consent is considered to be an obstacle may indicate that offenders 
do not feel that transfer is of benefit to their reintegration, or that it is in any way a 
favour.  
 
 
56 See Montaldo 2017, p. 716. 
57 European Agency for Fundamental Rights 2016, p. 96. 
58 See I. Durnescu, E. Montero Pérez de Tudela & L. Ravagnani, ‘Prisoner transfer and the importance 
of the “release effect”’, Criminology & Criminal Justice, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2017, pp. 462 ff. 
59 J.D. Mujuzi, ‘Legal Pluralism and the convention on the transfer of sentenced person in practice: 
Highlighting the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the transfer of sentenced 
persons within and to Europe’, The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, Vol. 47, No. 2, 
2015, p. 324; Martufi 2018a, p. 43. For critical considerations regarding the compatibility of this opi-
nion with the priority attributed in some national constitutions, such as that of Spain, to the aim of 
offenders’ social rehabilitation, see, for instance, M. Baras González, ‘La necesaria autorización judi-
cial para el traslado de personas físicas condenadas a penas de prisión entre estados miembros de la 
Unión Europea’, Revista de derecho UNED, Vol. 9, 2011, pp. 40-41. 
60 De Wree, Vander Beken & Vermeulen 2009, p. 124. 
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Further research should be conducted to find out why foreign offenders ob-
ject to transfers. This was not the aim of our analysis. Our intention was in-
stead to evaluate critically the intended main goal of the Framework Decision 
and its compatibility with the abolition of consent. It becomes clear from this 
analysis that the abolition of consent is not completely in line with improving 
offenders’ rehabilitation prospects, nor with the primarily humanitarian – not 
administrative – aim that should be pursued by the European instrument. Mo-
reover, there is potential for other traditional criminal justice concerns (apart 
from the social rehabilitation of offenders) to be displaced. In fact, the possi-
bility of transferring non-consenting prisoners is just one of the many loop-
holes that exist, 61 making it obvious that the EU transfer system is no longer 
viewed primarily as a legal tool for returning to their home country citizens 
imprisoned abroad in order to improve their possibilities of rehabilitation, but 
as an efficient means for removing undesired foreign prisoners from expensive 
and sometimes overcrowded national prisons. 
 
 
61 There are others. For example, Article 4(1) of the Framework Decision allows the transfer between 
member states other than the home member state in particular circumstances, which seem to bear no re-
lation to rehabilitation. See Conway 2018, p. 154. Article 9(1) k) includes a new optional ground for re-
fusal in cases where the sentence imposes a measure of psychiatric or health care or another involving 
deprivation of liberty which cannot be executed by the executing state under its legal or healthcare 
system, which demonstrates that concerns by member states with regard to the potential burdens that 
mutual recognition in the field would entail for their criminal justice systems prevail over 
rehabilitation. Cf. Mitsilegas 2009, p. 543. 
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Decision 2008/909/JHA and Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest 
Warrant in order to identify and to solve some coordination issues deriving from the overlap 
between these two acts. In this regard, an analysis of the Italian and Spanish transposing legis-
lation and the case law of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation is provided. Secondly, the 
Chapter provides an overview of a recently developed case law (Petruhhin, Peter Schotthöfer 
& Florian Steiner, Pisciotti) concerning the protection of fundamental rights belonging to per-
sons that should be or have been transferred towards third countries. Then, it takes into con-
sideration a very recent judgement (Raugevicius) where the Court held that where an extradi-
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tence, the requested Member State is required to ensure that an EU citizen permanently re-
siding in its territory, receives the same treatment as that accorded to its own nationals in 
relation to extradition. Finally, it is highlighted the role that social rehabilitation played in 
leading to the solution of both the coordination issues regarding Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA and Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA and the problems related to the 
transfer of sentenced persons outside the European Union. In this regard, it is argued that 
social rehabilitation should be finally acknowledged as a general principle of European 
Union law. 
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1. Introduction 
A problem that may arise when interpreting Framework Decision (FD) 
2008/909/JHA concerns its relationships with other law sources. In fact, several 
sources of international law seem to overlap in the field of transfers of sen-
tenced persons. As clarified under Article 26(1), from 5 December 2011 and as 
far as the relationships between the Member States are concerned, FD 2008/ 
909/JHA replaces the 1983 European Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced 
Persons and its 1997 Additional Protocol, 1 the 1970 European Convention on 
the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, 2 Title III, Chapter 5, of the 
1990 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, 3 and the 1991 
Convention between the Member States of the European Communities on the 
Enforcement of Foreign Criminal Sentences. 4 Subsequent paragraphs 2 and 3 
add that the Member States may choose to apply bilateral or multilateral 
agreements or arrangements in force after 27 November 2008 and to conclude 
bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements after 5 December 2008. 
The only limit to this choice is that those agreements and arrangements must 
allow the objectives and the provisions of the FD to be extended or enlarged 
and to help to simplify or facilitate further the procedures for the enforcement 
of sentences. 
Another significant issue concerns the material scope of FD 2008/909/JHA, 
as determined in light of the material scope of two other acts adopted in the 
context of the former third pillar, 5 namely FD 2008/947/JHA on the mutual 
recognition of judgments and probation decisions 6 and FD 2009/829/JHA on 
 
 
1 European Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Strasbourg, 21 March 1983, and Addition 
Protocol to the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Strasbourg, 18 December 1997, both 
stipulated in the framework of the Council of Europe. For a comment, see E. Muller-Rappard, ‘The 
Transfer of Sentenced Persons - Comments on the Relevant Council of Europe Legal Instruments’, Pace 
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1991, pp. 155-166 and J. Ddamulira Mujuzi, ‘Legal 
pluralism and the convention on the transfer of sentenced persons in practice: highlighting the jurispru-
dence of the European Court of Human Rights on the transfer of sentenced persons within and to Europe’, 
The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2015, pp. 324-346. 
2 European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, The Hague, 28 May 
1970, stipulated in the framework of the Council of Europe. 
3 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of 
the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French 
Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, OJ 2000 L 239/19. 
4 Convention between the Member States of the European Communities on the Enforcement of 
Foreign Criminal Sentences, Brussels, 13 November 1991. 
5 See V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Third Wave of Third Pillar Law: Which Direction for EU Criminal Justice?’, 
European Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2009, pp. 523-560. 
6 Council FD 2008/947/JHA, OJ 2008 L 337/102. See H. Kuczyńska, ‘Mutual Recognition of Judicial 
Decisions in Criminal Matters with Regard to Probation Measures and Alternative Sanctions’ 2009 
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the European Supervision Order. 7 It is no surprise that the European Commis-
sion defined those three instruments, considered as a whole, as ‘a package of 
coherent and complementary legislation that addresses the issue of detention 
of EU citizens in other Member States and has the potential to lead to a reduc-
tion in pre-trial detention or to facilitate social rehabilitation of prisoners in a 
cross border context’. 8 While FD 2008/909/JHA concerns detention measures, 
FD 2008/947/JHA applies to alternative sanctions, such as those imposing ob-
ligations or prohibitions to carry out certain activities, to enter certain places 
or to meet with certain persons. 9 Instead, FD 2009/829/JHA concerns the sur-
veillance of persons under trial; therefore, it applies to a stage prior to the exe-
cution of a judicial decision. 
Furthermore, an issue can be identified regarding FD 2002/584/JHA on the 
European Arrest Warrant (EAW). 10 In fact, an EAW may be issued to obtain 
the surrender of a person for the purpose not only of prosecuting him/her, but 
also for executing a sanction or a measure determining the deprivation of per-
sonal liberty (EAW in executivis). Thus, in this latter case, the scope of appli-
cation of the FD on the transfer of prisoners and that of the FD on the EAW 
overlap. 
Finally, extradition requests of EU citizens submitted by third States for the 
purpose of executing a custodial sentence must also be taken into account. 11 
Obviously, FD 2008/909/JHA does not apply to those States; therefore, any 
solutions provided by international agreements concluded with them should be 
considered. The 1983 European Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Per-
sons may play a role in this regard. However, in light of recent rulings of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), consideration must be given 
 
 
Eucrim, pp. 43-48 and S. Neveu, ‘Probation Measures and Alternative Sanctions in Europe: From the 
1964 Convention to the 2008 Framework Decision’, New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol. 4, 
No. 1-2, 2013, pp. 134-153. 
7 Council FD 2009/829/JHA, OJ 2009 L 294/20. See I. Durnescu, ‘Framework Decisions 2008/947 
and 2009/829: state of play and challenges’, ERA Forum, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2017, pp. 355-363. 
8 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation by 
the Member States of the Framework Decisions 2008/909/JHA, 2008/947/JHA and 2009/829/JHA on 
the mutual recognition of judicial decisions on custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation 
of liberty, on probation decisions and alternative sanctions and on supervision measures as an alterna-
tive to provisional detention, COM(2014) 57 final, 5 February 2014, p. 4. 
9 However, it may be that an alternative sanction is applied to the sentenced person after he/she has 
been convicted (for instance, as a consequence of his/her good behaviour). In that event, if a 
procedure based on Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA has already begun, the certificate should be 
withdrawn and a new procedure based on Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA should be started. 
10 Council FD 2002/584/JHA, OJ 2002 L 190/1. 
11 On the EU extradition law, in addition to the texts recalled infra, see M. Mackarel, S. Nash, 
‘Extradition and the European Union’, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 46, 
No. 4, 1997, pp. 948-957. 
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to the conditions that must be met in order for an extra-EU transfer to take 
place validly and if a “European” solution, as an alternative to that transfer, 
may be found. 
Thus, elaborating on this background, the purpose of this chapter is to ex-
plore the issues concerning the relationship between the FD on the transfer of 
prisoners and, respectively, the FD on the EAW and EU extradition law. In 
terms of the former, the relevant provisions of the two FDs are taken into ac-
count, with a focus on the Italian and Spanish transposing legislation and the 
case law of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation (paragraph 2). As regards 
the latter, the case law of the CJEU in the field of extradition law (paragraph 
3) and, in particular, the Raugevicius case concerning the transfer of a Europe-
an citizen to a third State for the execution of a custodial sentence (paragraph 
4) are considered. The concluding paragraph highlights the importance of the 
function of offenders’ social rehabilitation in solving the aforementioned over-
laps and the role that it may play in the future, if it were recognised as a gen-
eral principle of EU law. 
2. The Relationship between the Framework Decision on the Transfer 
of Sentenced Persons and the Framework Decision on the EAW in 
Light of Italian and Spanish Law 
Pursuant to Article 1(1) and Article 2(1) of FD 2002/584/JHA, an EAW is 
a judicial decision issued by a Member State with a view to the arrest and sur-
render by another Member State of a requested person, for the purpose of con-
ducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention 
order. It may be issued for acts punishable by the law of the issuing Member 
State by a custodial sentence or by a detention order for a maximum period of 
at least twelve months or, where a sentence has been passed or a detention or-
der has been made, for sentences of at least four months. 
Therefore, an EAW may be issued both before the beginning of criminal 
proceedings and once a decision has been passed, in order to facilitate the exe-
cution of a custodial sentence or a measure determining the deprivation of per-
sonal liberty (EAW in executivis). This raises an issue as both the FD on the 
transfer of sentenced persons and the FD on the EAW make it possible to 
achieve the same outcome: that is, to ensure that a subject is transferred from 
one Member State to another in order to be punished. 
The need to coordinate the two FDs is confirmed by what is stated by Arti-
cle 25 of FD 2008/909/JHA. Pursuant to that Article, “without prejudice to 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, provisions of this Framework Decision 
shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to the extent they are compatible with provi-
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sions under that Framework Decision, to enforcement of sentences in cases 
where a Member State undertakes to enforce the sentence in cases pursuant to 
Article 4(6) of that Framework Decision, or where, acting under Article 5(3) 
of that Framework Decision, it has imposed the condition that the person has 
to be returned to serve the sentence in the Member State concerned, so as to 
avoid impunity of the person concerned”. 12 
While Article 5(3) of the FD on the EAW relates to the guarantees to be 
given by the issuing Member State in particular cases, Article 4(6) concerns a 
ground for optional non-execution. For the purpose of this chapter, only the 
latter provision is relevant, as it states that “the executing judicial authority 
may refuse to execute the European arrest warrant if the European arrest war-
rant has been issued for the purposes of execution of a custodial sentence or 
detention order, where the requested person is staying in, or is a national or a 
resident of the executing Member State and that State undertakes to execute 
the sentence or detention order in accordance with its domestic law”. 13 
This provision was transposed into the Italian legal system by Article 
18(1)(r) of Law 69/2005. 14 Pursuant to that Law, the Court of Appeal compe-
tent to rule on the execution of the EAW may refuse its execution if the EAW 
was issued for the purpose of executing a custodial sentence or a measure de-
termining deprivation of personal liberty and the requested person is an Italian 
citizen. However, the Court of Appeal must rule that the sanction be applied in 
Italy, in a manner which is consistent with national law. 
In this regard, Article 24(1) of legislative decree 161/2010 15 should be con-
 
 
12 See also the Preamble at no. 12. 
13 In this regard, a recent ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union may be taken into 
account to clarify the meaning of this provision. In the Judgment of 29 June 2017 in Case 579/15, 
Popławski, para. 21-22, the Court held that where a Member State chose to transpose Article 4(6) 
into its domestic law, the executing judicial authority must take into account the objective of the 
ground for optional non-execution set out in that provision, which concerns the possibility of 
increasing the requested person’s chances of social rehabilitation when the sentence imposed on 
him/her expires. Therefore, the application of that ground for optional non-execution must be prece-
ded by an assessment regarding the execution of the sentence in the executing Member State. This 
line of reasoning was later confirmed in Judgment of 13 December 2018 in Case 514/17, Sut, para. 
35, where the Court held that “any refusal to execute a European arrest warrant presupposes an 
actual undertaking on the part of the executing Member State to enforce the custodial sentence 
imposed on the requested person.” 
14 See Law 22 April 2005, No. 69, “Disposizioni per conformare il diritto interno alla decisione quadro 
2002/584/GAI del Consiglio, del 13 giugno 2002, relativa al mandato d’arresto europeo e alle 
procedure di consegna tra Stati membri”, published in the Italian Official Journal of 29 April 2005, No. 
98. For a comment, see G. De Amicis, ‘La legge sul mandato europeo d’arresto tra inadeguatezze 
attuative e incertezze applicative’, Cassazione penale, Vol. 45, No. 6, 2005, pp. 1813-1823. 
15 See Legislative Decree 7 September 2010, No. 161, “Disposizioni per conformare il diritto interno 
alla Decisione quadro 2008/909/GAI relativa all’applicazione del principio del reciproco ricono-
scimento alle sentenze penali che irrogano pene detentive o misure privative della libertà personale, ai 
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sidered, under which the provisions of the decree apply also to the execution of 
a custodial sentence or a measure implying deprivation of personal liberty in the 
case considered under Article 18(1)(r) of Law 69/2005. 
Thus, it can be stated that FD 2008/909/JHA and the transposing legisla-
tion have sought to guarantee coordination between the two instruments of ju-
dicial cooperation in criminal matters. As far as this issue is concerned, the 
case law of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation may be taken into consid-
eration. In fact, over the last few years, the relationship between the two FDs 
and the two procedures has been a key issue in some cases regarding Article 
24(1) of Legislative Decree 161/2010. 
According to the Court, the FD on the transfer of sentenced persons aims to 
integrate the EAW surrender system with specific reference to cases of deliv-
ery in executivis. In light of Article 25 of the FD, in the event that an Italian 
citizen must be handed over to another Member State for the execution of a 
sentence or a measure involving deprivation of liberty, the Court of Appeal is 
entitled to refuse the surrender provided that the sentence or measure is ap-
plied in Italy. For this reason, the procedure for recognising the decision 
passed by the foreign judicial authority according to the provisions of Legisla-
tive Decree 161/2010 is necessary. 16 
Summarising the Supreme Court’s reasoning, the transfer of sentenced per-
sons and the EAW are alternative forms of recognition and execution of a ju-
dicial decision, characterised by the same rehabilitative purpose, and partly 
regulated by the same regulatory framework, but originating from a different 
act of procedural impulse which determines a different channelling and an au-
tonomous progression of the two procedures. 17 
An approach similar to the Italian one has been followed under Spanish law. 
 
 
fini della loro esecuzione nell’Unione europea”, published in the Italian Official Journal of 1 October 
2010, No. 230. For a comment, see V. Ferraris, ‘L’implementazione del d.lgs. 161/2010 sul reciproco 
riconoscimento delle sentenze di condanna a pena detentiva: un caso di doppio fallimento’, La 
legislazione penale, 5 April 2019, http://www.lalegislazionepenale.eu/limplementazione-del-d-lgs-161-
2010-sul-reciproco-riconoscimento-delle-sentenze-di-condanna-a-pena-detentiva-un-caso-di-doppio-
fallimento-valeria-ferraris/. 
16 Ex multis, Court of Cassation, judgment of 27 May 2014, No. 21912, judgment of 10 November 
2016, No. 48046 and judgment of 9 August 2018, No. 38592. 
17 Court of Cassation, judgment of 14 May 2014, No. 20527. The fact that the application of Article 
25 of FD 2008/909/JHA may prove difficult is confirmed by Article 29(4), pursuant to which “a 
Member State which has experienced repeated difficulties in the application of Article 25 of this 
FD, which have not been solved through bilateral consultations, shall inform the Council and the 
Commission of its difficulties. The Commission shall, on the basis of this information and any other 
information available to it, establish a report, accompanied by any initiatives it may deem 
appropriate, with a view to resolving these difficulties.” Under the subsequent paragraph 5, Article 
25 might be replaced by more specific provisions, should the Council deem it necessary on the basis 
of a report presented by the Commission. 
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Under Article 48(2)(b) of Spanish Law 23/2014, 18 the executing judicial author-
ity may deny the execution of an EAW when the EAW has been issued for the 
purpose of executing a custodial sentence or a measure determining the depriva-
tion of liberty, if the sentenced person is a Spanish national, unless he/she 
agrees to serve the sentence or the measure in the issuing Member State. Other-
wise, he/she will serve the sanction in Spain. In the event of non-execution of an 
EAW, the Central Criminal Court shall refer to the national provisions on the 
transfer of sentenced persons, to avoid impunity on the part of the convict. 
Another overlapping issue concerns those situations where the sentenced 
person has fled the State in which he/she was convicted, finding shelter in the 
territory of a State where the sanction might be executed following a transfer. 
The authorities of the sentencing State may resort to an EAW in order to ob-
tain his/her surrender or they might decide to proceed according to FD 
2008/909/JHA. This choice requires a careful assessment regarding the place 
of execution of the sentence and the chances of social rehabilitation in that lo-
cation. A negative evaluation regarding the State in which the convict has 
found shelter should lead to the issuance of an EAW, while a positive one 
should convince the authorities of the sentencing State to opt for a transfer un-
der FD 2008/909/JHA. Despite this, the main issue does not concern the 
choice of the EAW over the transfer of sentenced persons or vice versa, but 
the need to avoid the duplication of procedures, involving a waste of time and 
resources. In this regard, one may consider the case of a person surrendered by 
one Member State to another after an EAW has been issued, asking to be 
transferred back to the Member State in which he/she was located due to the 
particular relationships held by him/her with that Member State. 19 
3. An Overview on the Case Law of the CJEU in the Field of Extradi-
tion Law 
It is clear that FD 2008/909/JHA does not apply to those States that are not 
Members of the European Union. This raises the issue of what regulatory 
framework should be used for relationships between a Member State and a 
third State. Furthermore, it may be possible for a Member State to decide not 
 
 
18 Ley 23/2014, de 20 de noviembre, de reconocimiento mutuo de resoluciones penales en la Unión 
Europea, in BOE núm. 282, de 21 de noviembre de 2014, 95437-95593. 
19 See in this regard, Commission Notice - Handbook on how to issue and execute a European arrest 
warrant, OJ 2017 C 335/1, para. 2.5.2., where the Commission stated that “in certain situations, instead of 
issuing an EAW for surrender of the person to serve the sentence in the Member State where the sentence 
was handed down, Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA could be used to execute the sentence in the place 
where the convicted person resides and might have better chances of rehabilitation.” 
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to execute a transfer request of a sentenced person presented by the authorities 
of a third State on the ground that that person has some significant ties to the 
former State, meaning on the ground that his/her chances of social rehabilita-
tion are higher in the Member State. These problems were addressed by the 
CJEU in a recent judgment, Raugevicius; thus, the purpose of this second part 
of the chapter is to illustrate the solutions identified by the Court in this case. 
However, before considering the Court’s decisions, it is worth considering the 
interpretative path followed by the CJEU in other relevant precedents. 
As these cases concerned the EAW, it could be helpful to remember a cou-
ple of details regarding this instrument of judicial cooperation. The introduc-
tion of the EAW through FD 2002/584/JHA represented an innovation from 
many points of view. Firstly, it overcame the previous model of cooperation, 
based on extradition agreements. 20 This model, intergovernmental in nature, is 
based on the role played by national governments in handing over a subject 
who should have been tried or punished for a crime committed in another Sta-
te. Due to this, a wide margin of political discretion could be exercised by the 
authorities of the requested State, should they decide not to comply with the 
extradition request. 
Secondly, the mechanism established through the EAW predetermines ex-
haustively the grounds for refusing the execution of the EAW, the assessment 
of which is left to the judicial authorities of the executing Member State. 21 
Thirdly, the EAW makes it possible to surrender citizens of the executing 
Member State and thereby overcomes the ban on extradition of own nationals, 
well-rooted in domestic legislations. At the same time, the EAW endows the 
competent authorities of that State with the power to subordinate the surrender 
to the condition that the citizen, after being heard, is returned to the executing 
Member State in order to serve in that location the custodial sentence or the 
measure determining the deprivation of liberty in the issuing Member State 
(Article 5(3) of FD 2002/584/JHA). This exception applies not only to citi-
zens, but also to individuals residing in the executing Member State, in line 
with the non-discrimination principle. 22 
 
 
20 For an introduction, see E. Guild, L. Marin (Eds), Still not Resolved? Constitutional Issues of the 
European Arrest Warrant, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, N. Keijzer, E. van Sliedregt 
(Eds), The European Arrest Warrant in Practice, Asser Press, The Hague, 2009, M. Fichera, The 
implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in the European Union: law, policy and practice, 
Intersentia, Cambridge, 2011 and L. Klimek, European Arrest Warrant, Springer, Berlin, 2015. 
21 See, generally, L. Bachmaier, ‘Mutual Recognition Instruments and the Role of the CJEU: The Groun-
ds for Non-Execution’, New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2015, pp. 505-526.  
22 On the choice not to extradite one State’s own nationals, see Z. Deen-Racsmány, ‘The Decline of 
the Nationality Exception in European Extradition?’, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law 
and Criminal Justice, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2005, pp. 317-364. 
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In this regard, a problem has arisen in the case law of the CJEU, regarding 
extradition requests made by third States to EU Member States regarding in-
dividuals who are not citizens of the requested States, but are still European 
citizens. This raises a number of issues concerning the protection that may be 
provided to such individuals. 23 
In Petruhhin, the Court dealt with the case of an Estonian citizen who had 
been arrested in Latvia, in relation to whom an extradition request had been 
made by the Russian Federation for offences concerning illicit drug traffick-
ing. On the basis of a judicial assistance agreement concluded between the 
Baltic Republics, the Estonian citizen claimed that he enjoyed the same rights 
as a Latvian citizen and that, therefore, he should not have been extradited. 
The Latvian authorities claimed that this limitation only operated in favour of 
national citizens. Some preliminary questions were raised in order to establish 
whether extradition could take place and what relevance could be given in this 
regard to the protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU. 
For the first time, the CJEU recognised that national extradition rules which 
introduce a difference in treatment between nationals and citizens of other EU 
Member States constitute a restriction of the freedom of movement referred to 
under Article 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). However, this restriction may be justified in the event that it is based 
on objective considerations and is proportionate to the objective pursued, as in 
the case of the fight against impunity. 24  
This would make it possible to hand the individual over to the requesting 
State. Nevertheless, according to the Court, it must be verified whether there 
is an alternative measure, which may prove to be less harmful to the exercise 
of the rights conferred under Article 21 TFEU and which would make it pos-
sible to achieve the relevant purpose – namely, the fight against impunity – in 
an equally effective manner. In light of the principle of sincere cooperation, 
the Court emphasises that the solutions provided by EU law through the coop-
eration and mutual assistance mechanisms in criminal matters should be fa-
 
 
23 One can see the aut dedere aut judicare principle lingering in the background. On this topic, see 
Questions relating to the obligation to prosecute or extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Merits, 
Judgment of 20 July 2012, 2012 ICJ Rep. at 422 and International Law Commission, Final Report 
of the International Law Commission, The obligation to extradite or prosecute, 2014. As regards 
scholarly works, see M.C. Bassiouni, E.M. Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite 
or Prosecute in International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1995. 
24 Judgment of 6 September 2016 in Case C-182/15, Petruhhin, published in the electronic Reports of 
Cases, para. 32-35. For a comment, see M. Böse, ‘Mutual recognition, extradition to third countries 
and Union citizenship: Petruhhin’, in Common Market Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 6, 2017, pp. 1781-
1797 and S. Saluzzo, ‘EU Law and Extradition Agreements of Member States: The Petruhhin Case’, 
European Papers, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2017, pp. 435-447. On the fight against impunity in the EU, L. Marin, 
S. Montaldo (Eds), The Fight Against Impunity in EU Law, Hart, Oxford, forthcoming. 
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voured. In this regard, the choice should fall on the EAW. Therefore, the au-
thorities of the State of citizenship must be informed so as to verify whether 
they intend to issue an EAW and to prosecute the extraditing subject, if the in-
ternal legislation so allows for acts committed abroad. This should guarantee 
the correct balance between the need to protect European citizens and the fight 
against impunity. 25  
In the case in question, the Estonian citizen had exercised his freedom of 
movement, so his situation fell within the scope of application of EU law. 
Therefore, the Court reiterated its orientation, stating that the provisions of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights applied to the case. 26 Reasserting the reason-
ing already expressed in Aranyosi and Căldăraru, 27 the Court held that, when 
the competent authority of the requested Member State can rely on elements 
that confirm a real risk of inhumane or degrading treatment in the requesting 
State, it must assess that risk when deciding on the extradition. To this end, its 
assessment must be based on objective, reliable, specific and properly updated 
information. These elements may result in particular from international judi-
cial decisions, such as the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and judicial decisions of the requesting State, as well as from deci-
sions, reports and other documents prepared by Council of Europe bodies or 
those belonging to the United Nations system. Therefore, it is the responsibil-
ity of the requested Member State to verify that the extradition will not preju-
dice the rights of the individual, should he/she be extradited. 28  
Peter Schotthöfer & Florian Steiner concerned the case of an Austrian doc-
tor, sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment in the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). The doctor, living in Austria, was invited to talk about the working 
conditions and the proceedings brought against him in the United Arab Emir-
 
 
25 Petruhhin, para. 41-42, 47-49. 
26 Judgment of 7 May 2013 in Case 617/10 REC, Åkerberg Fransson. See N. Lazzerini, ‘Il 
contributo della sentenza Åkerberg Fransson alla determinazione dell’ambito di applicazione e degli 
effetti della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea’, Rivista di diritto internazionale, 
2013, pp. 883-912 and B. van Bockel, P. Wattel, ‘New Wine into Old Wineskins: The Scope of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU after Åkerberg Fransson’, European Law Review, Vol. 38, 
No. 6, 2013, pp. 866-883. 
27 Judgment of 5 April 2016 in Case C-404/15, Aranyosi e Căldăraru. See G. Anagnostaras, ‘Mutual 
confidence is not blind trust! Fundamental rights protection and the execution of the European arrest 
warrant: Aranyosi and Caldararu’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 6, 2016, pp. 1675-
1704. Generally speaking, on how the CJEU has changed its approach to this matter and the role 
played by the protection of fundamental rights in this regard, see K. Lenaerts, ‘La vie après l’avis: 
Exploring the principle of mutual (yet not blind) trust’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 
3, pp. 805-840 and E. Regan, ‘The role of the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition in 
EU Law’, Il Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2018, pp. 231- 247. 
28 Petruhhin, para. 52, 58-60. 
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ates at a conference organised by a German law firm. However, not having 
obtained any guarantee from the Federal Republic of Germany as to a possible 
handing over to the UAE authorities, he decided not to participate in the event, 
despite having signed a contract. In the context of the dispute that arose be-
tween the law firm and the doctor for breach of contract, some preliminary 
questions were referred to the CJEU. 
Reiterating the approach already taken in Petruhhin, the CJEU held that the 
decision of a Member State to extradite a citizen of the Union, in a situation 
where the citizen has used his right to move freely from the Member State of 
which he is a citizen to another Member State, falls within the scope of appli-
cation of EU law. Therefore, the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union apply to such a situation. The Member State 
must verify that the extradition does not prejudice the rights guaranteed in the 
EU. Therefore, if there are elements regarding a real risk of inhumane or de-
grading treatment in the requesting third State, the competent authority of the 
requested Member State must assess the existence of such risk when deciding 
on extradition using objective, reliable, precise and properly updated infor-
mation. 29 
Finally, the Pisciotti judgment concerned the incredible case of an Italian 
citizen, who was ultimately extradited to the United States of America due to 
some anti-competitive behaviours. 30 He was arrested in Germany while on 
his way to Italy from Nigeria. According to the CJEU, the case fell within 
the scope of EU law, given that the extradition request was presented in the 
context of the EU-US extradition agreement concluded on 25 June 2003 and 
since Mr Pisciotti had used the right to move freely in the EU. 31 Under Arti-
cle 17 of the agreement, the requested State maintains the right to provide 
grounds for refusal concerning a matter not governed by the agreement. Fur-
thermore, the requested State and the requesting State consult each other if 
the constitutional principles of the requested State may prevent the fulfil-
ment of the extradition obligation. Finally, the extradition treaty concluded 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America 
should be considered, which provides under Article 7(1), that the contracting 
 
 
29 Order of 6 September 2017 in Case C-473/15, Peter Schotthöfer & Florian Steiner. As regards the 
actual case, the Court held that this risk actually existed, given that the prosecutor had requested the 
application of the death penalty in the main proceedings brought against the Austrian doctor. 
30 On the so-called Pisciotti saga, see G. De Stefano, ‘Meet the First Extradited Businessman on Cartel 
Charges’, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 8, No. 5, 2017, pp. 281-282. 
31 Judgment of 10 April 2018 in Case C-191/16, Pisciotti, para. 32-33. See A. Rosanò, ‘Aut dedere 
aut iudicare, sed iudicare in Europa melius est: il caso Pisciotti e il rapporto tra il mandato d’arresto 
europeo e gli accordi di estradizione con Stati terzi’, Ordine internazionale e diritti umani, 2018, pp. 
583-595. 
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parties are not obliged to extradite their citizens. In light of this, according to 
the Luxembourg Court, a Member State may prohibit the extradition of its 
own nationals. However, such unequal treatment may be admitted only if it 
is based on objective considerations and is proportionate to the objective 
pursued, consisting – in the concrete case – of avoiding the risk of impunity. 
In this kind of situation, it would not have been possible to identify an alter-
native and less prejudicial measure than extradition. On one hand, the Ger-
man authorities could not have brought criminal proceedings against Mr Pis-
ciotti for acts committed abroad; on the other hand, Italy had been informed 
of the matter and had decided not to issue an EAW to obtain the surrender of 
its citizen, as it would have been difficult to prosecute and punish in Italy the 
offence committed in the United States. 32 
4. Raugevicius 
Raugevicius originates from an extradition request based on the European 
Convention on Extradition 33 submitted by the Russian Federation to Finland 
for executing a custodial sentence. The individual who was to be extradited, a 
Lithuanian and Russian national, objected to that request, claiming that he had 
lived in Finland for a long time and that he had two children, who were Finn-
ish citizens, living in that State. The questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
sought to establish whether the Petruhhin case law could apply even to the 
case of a person who had already been tried. 
As highlighted by Advocate General (AG) Yves Bot in his Opinion, the 
key to this case is the function of offenders’ social rehabilitation. In fact, en-
forcing the sentence in the Member State where the requested person resides 
with his/her family helps to bridge the gap between him and the community 
he/she is going to rejoin after serving his/her sentence. It seems necessary to 
preserve the social ties that he/she holds with that social environment, as they 
are likely to further his/her social rehabilitation chances after the custodial 
sentence has been served. A transfer making it possible for the requested per-
son to be close to that environment may prove helpful in this sense, as it 
would further the social rehabilitation of the sentenced person. 34 
 
 
32 Pisciotti, para. 46-50, 55. 
33 European Convention on extradition, Paris, 13 December 1957, stipulated in the framework of the 
Council of Europe. For a comment, see P. O’Higgins, ‘European Convention on Extradition’, The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1960, pp. 491-494. 
34 Advocate General Yves Bot in Case C-247/17, Raugevicius, published in the electronic Reports of 
Cases, para. 65-67. At para. 68, the AG underlines that “the weight attached by the EU legislature to 
the objective of social rehabilitation is expressly confirmed, in particular, by Council Framework De-
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In this regard, “nationals of other Member States who have a genuine, sta-
ble and lasting connection with the society of the requested Member State are 
in a situation comparable to that of nationals of the latter Member State”; 
therefore, they should not be treated differently, as this would amount to dis-
crimination on the grounds of nationality and would prevent the rehabilitation 
function of the sentence serving as “an equal treatment rule which, as such, is 
an integral part of the status of Union citizen”. 35 
Thus, according to the AG, the enforcement in Finland of a sentence im-
posed in Russia might be viable. Firstly, the 1983 Convention on the Transfer of 
Sentenced Persons allows this. Article 3(1)(a) of the Convention provides that 
the person to be transferred may be a national of the administering State, while 
pursuant to Article 3(4), any State may, at any time, by a declaration addressed to 
the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, define, as far as it is concerned, 
the term “national” for the purposes of this Convention. By a declaration filed on 
29 January 1987, Finland stated that it understood by that term nationals of the 
administering State or aliens having their residence in the administering State. 
Secondly, Finnish law on international cooperation for the enforcement of certain 
criminal law penalties provides that a sentence imposed by a court of a foreign 
State may be enforced in Finland if the judgment has become final and is en-
forceable in the State in which it was delivered, and if the State in which the 
sentence was imposed has requested or agreed to enforcement. 36 
In light of the Petruhhin case law, it should be assessed whether the Mem-
ber State of origin of the requested subject would be willing to issue an EAW 
(in this case, in executivis) in order to have the subject surrendered to it. How-
ever, in view of the connections that an individual might have with another 
Member State to which he/she has moved, it would make no sense to enforce 
the sentence in the Member State of origin. Thus, there would be no need to 
inform the Member State of origin and to issue an EAW. Furthermore, one 
should make good use of all relevant international cooperation mechanisms, in 
order to balance the need to fight against impunity against the purpose of the 
offender’s social rehabilitation. 37 
According to the CJEU, if an extradition request has been made by a third 
country for an EU citizen who has exercised his right to free movement for the 
purpose of enforcing a custodial sentence, “the requested Member State, whose 
 
 
cision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to 
judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of 
liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union, (34) Article 3(1) of which states 
that the FD’s aim is to ‘facilitat[e] the social rehabilitation of the sentenced person’.” 
35 Advocate General Yves Bot, cit., para. 71-72. 
36 Advocate General Yves Bot, cit., para. 74-77 and 80. 
37 Advocate General Yves Bot, cit., para. 81-82. 
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national law prohibits the extradition of its own nationals out of the European 
Union for the purpose of enforcing a sentence and makes provision for the pos-
sibility that such a sentence pronounced abroad may be served on its territory, is 
required to ensure that that EU citizen, provided that he resides permanently in 
its territory, receives the same treatment as that accorded to its own nationals in 
relation to extradition”. 38 
Although the principle of ne bis in idem may be an obstacle to the prosecu-
tion by a Member State of persons covered by an extradition request for the 
purpose of enforcing a sentence, there are mechanisms under national law 
and/or international law that may be exploited in order to avoid that person 
going unpunished and his/her chances of social rehabilitation not being dimin-
ished. This applies in particular to the Convention on the Transfer of Sen-
tenced Persons. 39 
Considering the aim of preventing the risk of impunity, Finnish nationals 
and nationals of other Member States who reside permanently in Finland and 
demonstrate a certain degree of integration into that State’s society are in a 
comparable situation. Thus, it is for the referring court to establish whether Mr 
Raugevicius falls within that category of nationals of other Member States. In 
that event, the same treatment must be afforded to the foreign national. 40 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, some issues concerning the relationships between FD 2008/ 
909/JHA and other aspects of EU law have been addressed. 
The first part concerned the intersections between FD 2008/909/JHA and 
FD 2002/584/JHA, with specific regard to the EAW in executivis. In consider-
ing the relevant provisions of the two FDs, Italian legislation and case law, it 
has been proven that in circumstances where an Italian citizen must be surren-
dered to another Member State for the execution of a custodial sentence or a 
measure involving the deprivation of personal liberty, the competent Court of 
Appeal may refuse the execution. In that event, the sanction must be carried 
out in Italy. For this reason, the procedure envisaged under Legislative Decree 
161/2010 to recognise the decision passed by the foreign judicial authority 
must be applied. Therefore, it could be said that the peculiar position deriving 
from being a citizen justifies the execution of the sentence in Italy, in order to 
promote the offender’s social rehabilitation. 
 
 
38 Case C-247/17, Raugevicius, published in the electronic Reports of Cases, para. 51. 
39 Raugevicius, cit., para. 35-39. 
40 Raugevicius, cit., para. 51. 
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Also in the Petruhhin case, which was considered in the second part of the 
chapter, the fact of being a citizen – in this case, a European citizen – plays a 
decisive role. Indeed, the EAW has been identified by the CJEU as a better so-
lution than the surrender of a European citizen to the authorities of a third State. 
Therefore, this favours the surrender of European citizens to the Member States 
of their citizenship. The Raugevicius ruling led to a further development. The 
enhancement of the function of the offender’s social reintegration makes it pos-
sible to resist the request for surrender made by a third State, provided that a pe-
culiar condition is met: the European citizen to be extradited must be a perma-
nent resident of a Member State different from that of citizenship. Such a solu-
tion has significant consequences not only on the practical level of extradition 
procedures, but also on a more theoretical – yet, no less important – one. 
Thus, in all cases considered in this chapter the solution was based on the 
very concept of social rehabilitation and on its application to the procedural 
issues summarised above. This confirms the importance played by this pur-
pose under EU law, although its nature is highly debated. 41 On one hand, 
there are elements that would allow for this feature to be recognised as a gen-
eral principle of EU law. On the other hand, one might acknowledge the exist-
ence of a fundamental right 42 and – consequently, given the peculiarities of 
the EU system of legal sources – of a general principle of EU law. 
Generally speaking, it could be said that, to date, the Court of Justice has 
not acknowledged the principle of social rehabilitation of offenders as a gen-
eral principle of EU law. The reason for this is not easy to identify, but it is 
quite probably a normative one. In fact, no specific reference to that principle 
can be found in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union or 
in most of the Member States’ constitutions. However, as noted by AG Bot, 
pursuant to Article 10(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the penitentiary system shall comprise the treatment of prisoners, the 
essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation. As 
is known, all EU Member States are parties to the Covenant. It could therefore 
 
 
41 For an introduction, see A. Martufi, ‘Assessing the resilience of ‘social rehabilitation’ as a ra-
tionale for transfer: A commentary on the aims of FD 2008/909/JHA’, New Journal of European Cri-
minal Law, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2018, pp. 43-61, S. Montaldo, ‘Offenders’ Rehabilitation: Towards a New 
Paradigm for EU Criminal Law?’, European Criminal Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2018, pp. 223-243 
and P. Faraldo-Cabana, ‘One step forward, two steps back? Social rehabilitation of foreign offenders 
under FDs 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA’, New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol. 10, 
No. 2, 2019, pp. 151-167. 
42 On this matter, see L. Mancano, ‘Storming the Bastille: Detention Conditions, the Right to Liberty 
and the Case for Approximation in EU Law’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2019, 
pp. 61-90 and S. Montaldo, ‘Offenders’ rehabilitation in the cross-border transfer of prisoners and 
persons subject to probation measures and alternative sanctions: a stress test for EU judicial coope-
ration in criminal matters’, Revista Brasileira de Direito Processual Penal, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2019, pp. 
925-960. 
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be said that the Covenant expresses some core values that are shared by these 
States. Therefore, the Court of Justice might recall the Covenant and conclude 
that social rehabilitation is a general principle of EU law, in that the Member 
States have agreed on the role it plays in shaping the treatment of prisoners. 43 
However, the Court has never commented in this regard. 
Some slight yet more significant openings may be found in the case law of 
the ECtHR. When interpreting Article 3 (prohibition of torture), Article 5(1) 
(right to liberty and security), and Article 8 (right to respect for private and 
family life) of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court has iden-
tified in these provisions some possible legal bases for imposing limits and ob-
ligations on national authorities in order to promote offenders’ social rehabili-
tation. In particular, the ECtHR has interpreted those provisions as requiring 
the Contracting Parties to ensure that their prison systems and penal policies 
provide prisoners with “proper opportunities” for resocialisation. 44 However, 
this duty is not absolute in nature, as national authorities enjoy a broad margin 
of discretion. As the ECtHR clarified, this duty “is to be interpreted in such a 
way as not to impose an excessive burden on national authorities”. 45  
Considering how the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation and especially the 
CJEU used the purpose of social rehabilitation to solve the above issues, it 
could be said that that purpose has been used to fill some interpretative gaps in a 
manner consistent with that of a general principle of EU law. 46 Focusing on 
Raugevicius, it should be noted that the CJEU held that the requested Member 
State must guarantee to the European citizen who is a permanent resident in its 
territory identical treatment to that given to its own nationals in terms of extradi-
tion. This means that the European citizen has the right to receive that treatment 
from that State. The justification for this solution lies in the social rehabilitation 
function as a guiding principle, obviously of hermeneutical nature, which makes 
it possible to fill the regulatory gap connected to the absence of a European extra-
dition rule towards third States. However, this is the typical way in which a gen-
eral principle of European Union law works as an interpretative tool for over-
coming a regulatory impasse. 
Therefore, the practice of both Courts seems not only to solve the overlap-
ping issues, but also to provide some significant elements for the recognition 
of the social reintegration function as a general principle of EU law. 
 
 
43 Judgment of 23 November 2010 in Case C-145/09, Tsakouridis, para. 48-50. 
44 See Harakchiev and Tomulov v. Bulgaria, Application No. 15018/11 and 61199/12, Judgment of 8 
July 2014, para. 26. 
45 Murray v. The Netherlands, Application No. 10511/10, Judgment of 26 April 2016, para. 110. 
46 However, as far as the Italian legal system is concerned, it should not be forgotten that social reha-
bilitation of offenders is a constitutional principle (see Article 27(3) of the Italian Constitution). 
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Abstract: A number of legal tools are aimed at returning convicted EU nationals serving their 
sentences abroad to their countries of origin. Initially, transfer procedures are based on prin-
ciples of rehabilitation and mutual trust. By contrast, forced return arrangements are dis-
connected from the framework of cooperation among EU member states and are geared to-
wards reducing the number of foreign prisoners. As is widely known, the provisions of Fra-
mework Decision 2008/909/JHA have fallen short of cementing EU-wide judicial coopera-
tion frameworks in criminal matters. This shortcoming should be examined against the back-
drop of a burgeoning apparatus of deportation that increasingly targets EU nationals, espe-
cially those with criminal convictions. This paper analyses if and to what extent the momentum 
recently gained by the deportation of EU nationals has contributed to hampering the expected 
consolidation of a Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA-based prisoner transfer system. 
Keywords: Deportation studies, EU citizens’ legal regime, deportation of EU nationals, EU 
enlargement, crimmigration. 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. The Deportation of EU Nationals: An Introduction. – 3. The 
Deportation of EU Nationals as an Exceptional Measure: Legal Framework. – 4. The 
Normalisation of the Deportation of EU Nationals. – 5. Deporting EU Nationals: Xeno-
Racism, ‘Criminal Aliens’ and the Management of Public Order. – 6. Conclusion: The 
Overlapping of Prisoner Transfer Procedures and Deportation Procedures. 
1. Introduction 
Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application 
of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing 
custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of 
their enforcement in the European Union (OJ L 327, 5.12.2008, pp. 27-46, here-
inafter, the ‘Framework Decision’) aims to promote the cooperation of EU mem-
ber states in the specific field of the transfer of EU national inmates. This is a 
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meaningful and sensible piece of legislation, since many EU jurisdictions con-
fine large contingents of foreign prisoners, a significant share of whom are ei-
ther EU citizens or EU residents. As can be seen in Table 1, in January 2018 no 
less than 32,266 EU citizens were imprisoned in other EU countries. These EU 
national inmates accounted for 5.9 per cent of the EU prison population and for 
29.9 per cent of the foreign prison population. 1 In relative terms, EU national 
prison populations are particularly significant in Austria, Cyprus, Germany, and 
Luxembourg, as well as in Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands. 
Table 1. – EU nationals imprisoned in other EU countries (including pre-trial detain-
ees), 2018 
EU member state Total EU national prisoners % Prison population 
% Foreign prison 
population 
Austria 1,601 17.9% 32.7% 
Belgium ---- ---- ---- 
Bulgaria 44 0.6% 23.7% 
Cyprus 108 16.8% 42.4% 
Denmark 336 9.2% 31.8% 
Germany 8,691 13.5% 35.5% 
Estonia 41 1.6% 17.8% 
Greece 749 7.5% 14.2% 
Spain 3,863 6.5% 23.3% 
Finland 244 8.7% 49.6% 
France 5,704 8.2% 37.1% 
Croatia 58 1.8% 20.5% 
Czech Republic 638 2.9% 35.2% 
Hungary ---- ---- ---- 
Ireland 355 9.2% 70.3% 
Italy 3,412 5.9% 17.2% 
Lithuania 33 0.5% 28.9% 
Luxembourg 270 39.5% 54.8% 
Latvia 36 1.0% 38.3% 
Malta ---- ---- ---- 
 
 
1 This implies a certain overrepresentation of EU nationals within European prisons, since the percen-
tage of non-national EU citizens living in EU countries was 3.4 in 2018. The percentage of EU natio-
nals within the EU foreign population, though, was 43.8 in 2018 (source: Eurostat. Population data. 
Retrieved on 9 August 2019 from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-
projections/data/database). 
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Netherlands 748 8.0% 41.3% 
Poland 230 9.3% 27.4% 
Portugal 383 2.8% 17.9% 
Romania 82 0.4% 30.1% 
Sweden 389 6.8% 32.9% 
Slovenia 59 4.4% 31.2% 
Slovakia 80 0.8% 36.5% 
United Kingdom 4,112 4.8% 43.4% 
TOTAL 32,266 5.9% 29.9% 
Source: M.F. Aebi & M.M. Tiago, SPACE I – 2018 – Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics: 
Prison Populations, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2018 
Given these significant contingents of EU national prisoners, the transfer 
of EU national and EU resident inmates (Article 4(7) of the Framework De-
cision) appears to be a particularly useful legal tool to enable the social re-
habilitation of the former prisoner either in the country of his/her nationality 
or in the country in which he or she lives, as stated by Article 3(1) of the 
Framework Decision. 2 Its potential meaningfulness is further reinforced by 
the fact that it follows a path already paved, decades ago, by both bilateral 
agreements and especially the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Trans-
fer of Sentenced Persons of 21 March 1983 (see Faraldo-Cabana, in this vol-
ume). 3  
In sharp contrast to this, some years after the transposition of the Frame-
work Decision’s provisions into (almost) all 28 national legal orders, this legal 
instrument appears to have failed to meet its expectations. 4 The utilisation of 
transfer procedures has had little impact on the management of EU national 
 
 
2 See R. Canton, N. Flynn & J. Woods, Social Rehabilitation Through the Prison Gate, 2016. Retrieved 
on 9 August 2019 from http://steps2.europris.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Annex-4.12.-Work 
stream-3-Social-Rehabilitation-Through-the-Prison-Gate.pdf; P. Faraldo-Cabana, ‘One Step Forward, 
Two Steps Back? Social Rehabilitation of Foreign Offenders Under Framework Decisions 2008/909/ 
JHA and 2008/947/JHA, New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2019, pp. 151-167; 
A. Martufi, ‘Assessing the Resilience of ‘Social Rehabilitation’ as a Rationale for Transfer: A Com-
mentary on the Aims of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA’, New Journal of European Criminal 
Law, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2018, pp. 43-61; A. Rosanò, ‘Beshkov, or the Long Road to the Principle of Social 
Rehabilitation of Offenders’, European Papers, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2018, pp. 433-444. 
3 See G. Vermeulen et al., Cross-Border Execution of Judgments Involving Deprivation of Liberty in 
the EU. Overcoming Legal and Practical Problems through Flanking Measures, Maklu, Apeldoorn, 
2011. 
4 See FRA, Criminal Detention and Alternatives: Fundamental Rights Aspects in Cross-border Transfers, 
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2016. Retrieved on 9 August 2019 from 
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2016-criminal-detention-and-alternatives_en.pdf. 
98 José A. Brandariz 
prison populations, to the detriment of rehabilitation purposes. In this sense, 
the Spanish case is particularly telling. In Spain, the number of EU national pri-
soners affected by transfer procedures has been insignificant in comparison 
with that of sentenced EU inmates (see Table 2).  
Table 2. – EU national sentenced prisoners and EU national prisoners transferred 
from Spain to other EU countries under Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA proce-
dures, 2008-2017 5 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Sentenced 
EU national 
prisoners 
2,829 3,337 3,142 3,121 3,127 3,083 2,968 2,847 2,631 2,489 
Transferred 
EU national 
prisoners 
182 228 220 164 205 172 138 137 96 100 
% of 
sentenced EU 
prisoners 
6.4% 6.8% 7.0% 5.3% 6.6% 5.6% 4.6% 4.8% 3.6% 4.0% 
Source: Spanish Prison Office 6 
A variety of reasons may explain why the Framework Decision has not 
been frequently utilised. Firstly, as explored by other chapters of this col-
lection, there are legal reasons stemming from the inadequate transposition 
of EU provisions into national legal orders, 7 which in some cases has esta-
 
 
5 These data refer to the Spanish prison administration and do not include, therefore, data of the 
Catalan prison administration. 
6 Retrieved on 5 August 2019 from www.institucionpenitenciaria.es/web/portal/documentos/publi 
caciones.html. According to the Spanish prison administration, FD 2008/909/JHA transfer procedu-
res began to be carried out in 2015. Previous transfer procedures were governed by bilateral agree-
ments and the Strasbourg Convention. 
7 See Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 
on the Application of the Principle of Mutual Recognition to Judgments in Criminal Matters Imposing 
Custodial Sentences or Measures Involving Deprivation of Liberty for the Purpose of their Enforcement 
in the European Union - Paper by the Presidency, 2018. Retrieved on 9 August 2019 from 
http://db.eurocrim.org/db/en/doc/2206.pdf; European Commission, Report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council on the Implementation by the Member States of the Framework 
Decisions 2008/909/JHA, 2008/947/JHA and 2009/829/JHA on the Mutual Recognition of Judicial 
Decisions on Custodial Sentences or Measures Involving Deprivation of Liberty, on Probation Decisions 
and Alternative Sanctions and on Supervision Measures as an Alternative to Provisional Detention, 
COM(2014) 57 final, 2014. Retrieved on 9 August 2019 from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/ 
1041647; Europris, The European Organisation of Prison and Correctional Services Expert Group on 
European Commission Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA - Transfer of Prisoners. Working Group Re-
port 2015, 2015. Retrieved on 9 August 2019 from www.europris.org/wp-content/uploads/FD-909-Final-
Report.pdf; FRA 2016; Vermeulen et al. 2011. 
 Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA and Deportation of EU Citizen 99 
blished onerous requirements for recognising the foreign judgment and en-
forcing the sentence. Secondly, other motives relate to professional cultu-
res and judicial routines. These reasons are associated with the habitus of 
European judges and magistrates, who essentially operate as sovereign-
state authorities that have not, traditionally, been very inclined towards en-
gaging in mutual trust-based international cooperation practices. In addi-
tion, EU judicial systems tend to be severely overloaded, and according to 
the fieldwork research we conducted, those involved in judicial matters 
view transfer procedures as an additional burden which increases the judi-
cial workload. 
Still, this chapter examines an additional aspect that is hampering the gen-
eralisation of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA procedures, namely the 
overlapping of this instrument with the deportation of EU citizens, a legal tool 
that is, at least in some member states, closely tied to the criminal justice sys-
tem and its reaction against crimes perpetrated by foreign nationals. For these 
purposes, after a brief introduction to this topic, the paper explores the legal 
framework of the deportation of EU nationals. Next, it examines the increas-
ing use of this migration law enforcement instrument, as well as the different 
meanings and contours that it has been adopting in various national jurisdic-
tions and its relationship with the criminal justice system. Finally, this article 
scrutinises the divergent consequences of repatriation and prisoner transfer 
procedures, before analysing the impact of the supranational and national de-
portation apparatuses on the operation of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA 
practices.  
2. The Deportation of EU Nationals: An Introduction 
As is widely known, Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 December 2008 (OJ 2008 L 348/98) on common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying 
third-country nationals (hereinafter, the ‘Return Directive’) has consolidated 
the critical role played by deportation orders in the management of migrations 
in the EU. However, the EU has a markedly unbalanced deportation system, in 
which a small number of countries enforce the vast majority of removal orders, 
while many EU nations play a much more insignificant part in enforcing de-
portation policies. In fact, only 5 (i.e., the United Kingdom, Greece, Germa-
ny, France and Spain) out of 28 EU member states carried out roughly two 
thirds (66.2 per cent) of the removals enforced in the EU from 2008 to 2018 
(see Table 3). 
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Table 3. – Deportations of third country nationals enforced in the EU, 2008-2018 
EU Member State Deportations (Total) Deportations (%) 
UK 551,360 22.7% 
Greece 327,655 13.5% 
Germany 319,630 13.2% 
France 203,675 8.4% 
Spain 202,100 8.3% 
Poland 133,380 5.5% 
Sweden 128,590 5.3% 
Netherlands 102,445 4.2% 
Italy 65,105 2.7% 
Belgium 63,360 2.6% 
Austria 62,680 2.6% 
Others 263,680 10.9% 
TOTAL 2,423,660 100.0% 
Source: Eurostat. Statistics on Asylum and Managed Migration 8 
These data only refer to the forced repatriation of so-called third country na-
tionals (hereinafter, ‘TCNs’), that is, non-EU citizens. In line with Regulation 
(EC) No. 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 (OJ L 199, 31.7.2007, pp. 23-29) on Community statistics on migration and 
international protection (hereinafter, ‘Regulation 862/2007’), Eurostat data on the 
enforcement of removal orders only focus on TCNs, excluding any reference to 
return procedures targeting EU citizens. This regulation unambiguously shows 
that the deportation of EU nationals has never been considered a crucial compo-
nent of the EU system of coercive management of human mobility, probably be-
cause it is a politically and legally controversial practice. In fact, EU policies and 
the most relevant EU law rules on repatriation measures, such as the Return Di-
rective (Article 2), are only applicable to the deportation of TCNs, not to that of 
EU citizens. By contrast, in line with the critical relevance of the freedom of 
movement rights of EU citizens, the forced return of EU nationals is merely regu-
lated as an exception to their freedom of movement within the so-called Citizens’ 
Rights Directive (Articles 14 and 27-33 of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Un-
ion and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 
 
 
8 Retrieved on 5 August 2019 from http//ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/ 
data/database. 
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64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 
90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, pp. 77-123, 
hereinafter ‘CRD’). 
This legal framework further demonstrates that the deportation of EU citi-
zens is an exceptional legal institution, a secondary component of the EU re-
patriation system. However, against the backdrop of the EU’s so-called border 
crisis, 9 the deportation of EU nationals has been gaining momentum in a num-
ber of EU jurisdictions over recent years. 10 This recent transformation of mi-
gration control practices is challenging one of the apparently consistent bi-
narisms upon which the classification powers of EU border regimes are based, 
i.e. the divide between EU citizens and TCNs. 
The following section analyses the legal regime of the deportation of EU 
nationals, before delving into why and how this legal device has been expand-
ing in the recent past, in sharp contrast to its conception as an apparently ex-
ceptional measure. This analysis will assist in exploring if, to what extent and 
why the consolidation of these deportation practices is impeding the normali-
sation of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA transfer procedures, at least in 
the top EU deporting countries. 
For these purposes, this chapter explores – essentially, albeit not exclusive-
ly – the Spanish case. Spain is a significant case, as it is one of the main de-
porting jurisdictions in Europe that has additionally stood out as a critical site 
for EU migration control innovations since the beginning of this century. 11 
Moreover, Spain is one the EU member states that has witnessed both the 
gradual consolidation of the deportation of EU citizens 12 and, as pointed out 
previously, the relative failure of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA transfer 
procedures in managing the EU national prison population. 
 
 
9 See N. Vaughan-Williams, Europe’s Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2017; see also N. de Genova, ‘Introduction: The Borders of “Europe” and 
the European Question’, in N. de Genova (Ed), The Borders of “Europe”: Autonomy of Migration, 
Tactics of Bordering, Duke University Press, Durham, 2017, pp. 1-35. 
10 See S. Maslowski, ‘The Expulsion of European Union Citizens from the Host Member State: Le-
gal Grounds and Practice’, Central and Eastern European Migration Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2015, 
pp. 61-85. 
11 See A. López-Sala & D. Godenau, ‘Introducción: el estudio del control migratorio en España’, in A. 
López-Sala & D. Godenau (Eds), Estados de contención, Estados de detención: el control de la 
inmigración irregular en España, Anthropos, Barcelona, 2017, pp. 5-28; D. Moffette, Governing 
Irregular Migration: Bordering Culture, Labour, and Security in Spain, UBC Press, Vancouver, 2018. 
12 See J.A. Brandariz & C. Fernández-Bessa, ‘La crimigracion en el contexto español: el creciente 
protagonismo de lo punitivo en el control migratorio’, in A. López-Sala & D. Godenau (Eds), Estados 
de contención, Estados de detención: el control de la inmigración irregular en España, Anthropos, Bar-
celona, 2017, pp. 119-143; J.A. Brandariz & C. Fernández-Bessa, ‘The Managerial Turn: The Transfor-
mation of Spanish Migration Control Policies since the Onset of the Economic Crisis’, The Howard 
Journal of Crime and Justice, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2017, pp. 198-219. 
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3. The Deportation of EU Nationals as an Exceptional Measure: Legal 
Framework 
As previously mentioned, EU citizenship law portrays the forced return of 
EU nationals as an exceptional restriction to their freedom of movement. Both 
Article 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and Article 20 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (hereinafter, ‘TFEU’) set forth the right of 
EU citizens to move freely and reside within the Union’s territory. This right is 
regulated by the CRD, which extends these prerogatives to designated EU na-
tionals’ family members, regardless of their citizenship. 
Chapter VI of the CRD provides the deportation of EU nationals and their 
kin, as a limitation to both the right of entry and the right of residence. Still, 
the CRD contains more requirements and safeguards than the general provi-
sions on return procedures. 13 When EU citizens are involved, deportation or-
ders can only be based upon reasons of public policy, public security, and pu-
blic health (Articles 28(1) and 29 CRD) 14 due to the personal conduct of an in-
dividual that “must represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat 
affecting one of the fundamental interests of society” (Article 27(2) CRD). 15 In 
addition, these deportation decisions can only be issued and enforced after hav-
ing taken into account “considerations such as how long the individual con-
cerned has resided on its territory, his/her age, state of health, family and eco-
nomic situation, social and cultural integration into the host Member State and 
the extent of his/her links with the country of origin” (Article 28(1) CRD). 16 
Likewise, the coercive removal of EU citizens who have the right of permanent 
residence can only be based “on serious grounds” of public policy or public 
security (Article 28(2) CRD). 17 Further, when the concerned EU citizen has 
either continuously resided in the host member state for the previous ten years 
or is underage, removal decisions can only be based on “imperative grounds” of 
public security (Article 28(3) CRD). 18 Moreover, these return orders “shall com-
 
 
13 See B. Menezes Queiroz, Illegally Staying in the EU: An Analysis of Illegality in EU Migration 
Law, Hart, Oxford, 2018. 
14 See E. Guild in S. Mantu (Ed), ‘Expulsion and EU Citizenship’, Nijmegen Migration Law Working 
Papers Series 2017/02, 2017. 
15 See on this the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter, the ‘CJEU’) judgment of 13 July 
2017 in Case C-193/16, E. [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:542. 
16 See the CJEU judgment of 2 May 2018 in Joined Cases C-331/16 and C-366/16, K. and H.F. 
[2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:296. 
17 See the CJEU judgment of 23 November 2010 in Case C-145/09, Tsakouridis [2010] ECLI:EU:C: 
2010:708, which ruled that this provision should be interpreted in line with the concept of ‘particularly 
serious crime’ referred to in Article 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
18 See the CJEU judgments in the following cases: Joined Cases C-316/16 and C-424/16, B. and Vo-
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ply with the principle of proportionality” (Article 27(2) CRD), which means that 
they must be suitable and proportionate to the objective pursued and necessary to 
achieve it.  
Interestingly, Article 33(1) CRD acknowledges that these deportation orders 
can be part of a criminal sentence, provided that all the aforementioned require-
ments are met. Nonetheless, Article 27(2) CRD establishes that “previous crimi-
nal convictions shall not in themselves constitute grounds for taking” such for-
ced return measures. 19  
In summary, in line with the critical importance of freedom of movement 
rights for the EU project, the forced removal of EU citizens has been regulated 
as a secondary part of the EU deportation system. The removal of these for-
eign nationals cannot be based on general migration law breaches, but on 
more serious motives of public policy and public security. The salience and 
severity of these motives is further laid bare by the fact that the perpetration of 
a criminal offence is not in itself enough to warrant the issuance and enforce-
ment of a deportation order. 
4. The Normalisation of the Deportation of EU Nationals 
In marked contrast to this legal framework, empirical data illustrate that the 
deportation of EU nationals is anything but a marginal phenomenon. As pre-
viously argued, Spain is a perfect national example for scrutinising the signifi-
cance of this migration law enforcement institution. In Spain, national legal 
provisions (Articles 15-18 of Royal Decree 240/2007 of 16 February 2007 on 
the entry, freedom of movement and residence in Spain of citizens of EU mem-
ber states and member states of the Agreement on the European Economic Ar-
ea, hereinafter, ‘RD 240/2007’) adopt essentially the same demanding requi-
rements and safeguards regulated by the EU law framework. 20 However, in 
contrast to this stringent regulation, the removal of EU nationals has been 
playing an increasingly salient role within the Spanish deportation apparatus. 
Indeed, as illustrated by Table 4, this type of deportation has been gaining sig-
nificant impetus over the last ten years. 
 
 
mero [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:256; Case C-400/12, M. G. [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:9; and Case C-
348/09, P.I. [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:300. 
19 On this, see the CJEU judgment of 11 June 2015 in Case C-554/13, Z. Zh. and I. O. [2015] 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:377. 
20 See, though, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Obstacles to the Right of Free Movement 
and Residence for EU Citizens and Their Families: Comparative Analysis, 2016. Retrieved on 28 
January 2019 from www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571375/IPOL_STU(2016)571 
375_EN.pdf. 
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Table 4. – Deportations of EU citizens enforced in Spain, 2008-2017 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
EU  
nationals 
deportations 
104 135 232 298 398 433 448 560 515 427 
Total  
deportations 10,616 13,278 11,454 11,358 10,130 8,984 7,696 6,869 5,051 4,054 
%  
of enforced 
deportations 
1.0% 1.0% 2.0% 2.6% 3.9% 4.8% 5.8% 8.1% 10.2% 10.5% 
EU nationals 
deportation 
rate 21 
5.1 6.6 11.3 14.4 19.2 21.4 22.8 28.9 26.7 22.3 
Source: Parliamentary question asked by Mr. Jon Iñárritu, MP in September 2018; 22 2017 Annu-
al Report of the Spanish National Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture; 23 Spanish National 
Statistics Office, Population data 24 
These official data unambiguously show that the number of enforced de-
portations of EU nationals has strikingly increased in Spain over the last dec-
ade. Whilst the significance of this type of removal was negligible at the turn 
of the decade, it constitutes more than ten per cent of all enforced repatriations 
in recent years. In contrast to its legal regulation, therefore, such forced return 
orders have become a pivotal component of the Spanish migration law en-
forcement system. 
If and to what extent this migration control shift has been mirrored in other 
EU member states remains partially unknown. 25 The lack of awareness of 
these procedures prevails in Spain. Despite the impetus gained by this type of 
deportation, the forced removal of EU nationals is fully absent from both pub-
lic and political conversations as well as from academic research. 
However, this public unawareness is not the rule elsewhere. In fact, in the 
United Kingdom, which is a crucial national case in this field, the increasing en-
 
 
21 Reflecting an indicator widely used in the prison field, i.e. the incarceration rate, this deportation 
rate estimates the number of deportations enforced per 100,000 resident EU nationals. Even if the 
shortcomings of this indicator cannot be ignored, it provides valuable information on the relative 
impact of these deportation practices. 
22 On file with the author. 
23 Retrieved on 7 August 2019 from www.defensordelpueblo.es/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Anexo_2_ 
datos_estadistica_media_duracion.pdf. 
24 Retrieved on 7 August 2019 from www.ine.es/dynt3/inebase/es/index.htm?padre=1894&capsel=1895. 
In addition, from 2013 to 2017 an annual average of 121 EU citizens have been detained in Spanish 
migration detention facilities, the majority of them (72.1 per cent) Romanian nationals. 
25 See, though, Valcke 2017; Directorate-General for Internal Policies 2016. 
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forcement of these deportations is widely acknowledged. 26 In fact, some EU na-
tional administrations do not shy away from recognising this law enforcement 
practice. This laudable practice has led a number of national statistics offices to 
make data on the forced return of EU nationals publicly available. 
Germany is a paramount example. In Germany, the removal of EU nationals 
is a long-established migration control practice. Its scope is limited, though, 
compared with the sizeable dimension of the German deportation system. In ad-
dition, in the framework of the recent expansion of this national apparatus, its 
salience is relatively declining. Nonetheless, 1,007 EU nationals were deported 
per year in Germany from 2012 to 2018 (see Table 5). Thus, the German Home 
Office has long been engaged in conducting these deportation operations, many 
of which are carried out by land to neighbouring countries.  
Table 5. – Forced returns of EU nationals carried out in Germany, 2010-2018 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
EU  
nationals 
forced  
returns 
793 ---- 879 994 963 899 1,024 1,115 1,177 
Total forced  
returns 27 7,558 7,917 7,651 10,198 10,884 20,888 25,375 23,966 23,617 
% of  
enforced 
returns 
10.5% ---- 11.5% 9.7% 8.8% 4.3% 4.0% 4.7% 5.0% 
EU nationals  
deportation 
rate 
---- ---- 28.8 29.5 26.2 22.4 23.9 23.7 24.6 
Source: German Parliament 28 and German Federal Statistics Office 29 
 
 
26 See, for example, S. Turnbull, ‘Immigration Detention and the Racialized Governance of Illegality in 
the United Kingdom’, Social Justice, Vol. 44, No. 1, 2017, pp. 142-164; UK Home Office, European 
Economic Area (EEA) Administrative Removal, 2019. Retrieved on 30 April 2019 from http://assets.publi 
shing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/775636/European_Econo
mic_Area_-_administrative_removal.pdf. 
27 The total return data presented in this paper do not take into account the so-called ‘voluntary’ 
return programmes, which in many – albeit not all – EU countries play a significant role within the 
national deportation system. EU nationals are largely excluded from these voluntary return schemes, 
which are frequently focused on specific non-EU national groups. Sweden seems to be a significant 
exception to this. See Migrationsverket, EMN Annual Report on Migration and Asylum 2017. Sweden, 
2018. Retrieved on 12 August 2019 from http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/17a_ 
sweden_arm_part2_2017_en_1.pdf. 
28 Retrieved on 5 August 2019 from www.proasyl.de/thema/fakten-zahlen-argumente/statistiken/. 
29 Retrieved on 7 August 2019 from www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/ 
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In other EU member states, the forced return of EU nationals is a normal-
ised practice as well. In Belgium, on average, 353 Romanian nationals were 
deported per year to their home country from 2015 to 2018 (according to the 
Belgian Federal Immigration Office). 30 Although no data on other EU nation-
al groups are provided, these repatriation operations alone amount to 8.1 per 
cent of the coercive return orders enforced over this 4-year period. 
Conversely, in other member states the deportation of EU citizens seems to 
be a phenomenon of little significance. In the Italian case, this appears to be in 
contrast with the outspoken stance adopted by the national government, which 
in the late 2000s championed a wide-ranging political agenda aimed at deport-
ing Eastern European EU nationals. 31 Still, the narrow scope of these deporta-
tion practices clearly mirrors the ineffectiveness that characterises the opera-
tion of the Italian deportation model. 32 In this respect, the Italian National 
Prison Ombudsman reports 33 record that 39 EU nationals were deported in 
2016, whilst 82 Romanian citizens were deported in 2017 and 57 Romanians 
were forcefully repatriated in 2018. 34 
In contrast to Germany and Spain, Belgium and Italy are not leading de-
porting countries. Although their migration law enforcement systems show 
that the consolidation of the deportation of EU nationals is spreading across 
Europe, neither Belgium nor Italy has spearheaded this migration control 
change. In order to appraise the future prospects of this migration control 
 
 
Migration-Integration/Publikationen/Downloads-Migration/auslaend-bevoelkerung-2010200187004. 
pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 
30 Retrieved on 6 August 2019 from http//dofi.ibz.be/sites/dvzoe/FR/Statistiques/Pages/Rapports-statisti 
ques-de-l%27OE.aspx; see also Maslowski 2015; Valcke 2017. 
31 See I. Clough Marinaro, ‘Between Surveillance and Exile: Biopolitics and the Roma in Italy’, 
Bulletin of Italian Politics, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2009, pp. 265-287; S. McMahon, ‘Assessing the Impact of 
European Union Citizenship: The Status and Rights of Romanian Nationals in Italy’, Journal of 
Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2012, pp. 199-214. This political stance appears to 
have been unearthed in recent months. See A. Scarano, ‘Rimpatriati 13 Detenuti Romeni. Salvini: 
“Questo è Solo l’Inizio”’, Il Giornale, 2 April 2019. Retrieved on 6 August 2019 from www.ilgior 
nale.it/news/cronache/rimpatriati-13-detenuti-romeni-salvini-questo-solo-linizio-1672721.html. 
32 See G. Campesi & G. Fabini, ‘Immigration Detention as Social Defence: Policing ‘dangerous 
mobility’ in Italy. Theoretical Criminology, 2019 (Online First); European Commission, Annex to 
the Commission Communication on the State of Play of Implementation of the Priority Actions 
under the European Agenda on Migration: Italy – State of Play Report, COM(2016)85, 2016. Retrie 
ved on 6 August 2019 from http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/ 
european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-
package/docs/managing_the_refugee_crisis_state_of_play_20160210_annex_03_en.pdf. 
33 Retrieved on 6 August 2019 from www.garantenazionaleprivatiliberta.it/gnpl/it/pub_rel_par.page. 
34 These reports further record that on average 93 EU nationals were confined imprisoned per year in 
Italian migration detention facilities from 2016 to 2018. As usual, Romanians accounted for the 
overwhelming majority of these EU national detainees (85.7 per cent).  
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institution, the United Kingdom and France are much more significant na-
tional cases. In fact, the United Kingdom and France are the EU jurisdic-
tions in which the consolidation of the removal of EU citizens is particular-
ly evident. 
In the United Kingdom, the analysed type of forced repatriation has long 
attracted public attention, incidentally sparking political debates. In line with 
this public interest, this migration law enforcement institution is wholly con-
solidated in the British context. Both in absolute and relative terms, the United 
Kingdom is only paralleled by France in the enforcement of these deportation 
orders. As can be seen in Table 6, on average 4,124 EU citizens were deported 
annually from the United Kingdom over the last five years, rising by 1,317 
deportations carried out per year from 2008 to 2013. In fact, the importance of 
this repatriation scheme has very significantly increased over the last decade, 
since it has escalated from 3.9 per cent of all enforced return orders in 2008 to 
more than 40 per cent in 2017-2018. 
Table 6. – Forced returns of EU nationals carried out in the United Kingdom, 2008-2018 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
EU  
nationals 
enforced 
returns 
676 785 973 1,297 1,815 2,358 3,158 3,848 4,905 4,914 3,797 
Total  
enforced  
returns 
17,239 15,252 14,854 15,063 14,647 13,311 14,395 13,690 12,469 12,049 9,474 
% of  
enforced 
returns 
3.9% 5.1% 6.6% 8.6% 12.4% 17.7% 21.9% 28.1% 39.3% 40.8% 40.1% 
EU  
nationals 
deportation  
rate 
38.2 41.3 47.6 55.2 75.4 91.9 120.4 128.8 153.1 135.4 98.4 
Source: UK Home Office; 35 Eurostat. Population data; UK. Office for National Statistics. Po-
pulation data 36 
 
 
35 Retrieved on 7 August 2019 from www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-statistics-year- 
ending-december-2018/how-many-people-are-detained-or-returned. 
36 Retrieved on 7 August 2019 from www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationand 
migration/internationalmigration/datasets/populationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandna 
tionality. 
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The deportation of EU nationals is also a very salient phenomenon in France. 
As will be analysed later, by the turn of the decade the French government ig-
nited a continent-wide debate on the normalisation of this migration law enfor-
cement practice. Since then, thousands of EU citizens (on average, 4,554 from 
2010 to 2018) were repatriated from France every single year. 37 Still, in the 
context of the so-called ‘migration crisis’ that has essentially involved TCNs, 
the significance of this legal institution has been declining in recent years. No-
netheless, in terms of deportation rates, the scope of this sub-field of the French 
deportation system is far wider than that of other EU nations. 38 In fact, although 
reliable pre-2014 population data are not available, it can be inferred that no less 
than 1 out of 200 EU national residents were targeted by forced return measures 
in France in the early 2010s. 39 
Table 7 – Forced returns of EU nationals carried out in France, 2010-2018 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
EU nationals 
enforced 
returns 
4,243 5,424 7,727 5,300 4,136 4,068 3,653 3,142 3,293 
Total  
enforced 
returns 
19,622 22,927 26,812 22,753 21,489 19,991 16,489 17,567 19,957 
% of  
enforced 
returns 
21.6% 23.7% 28.8% 23.3% 19.3% 20.4% 22.2% 17.9% 16.5% 
EU nationals 
deportation 
rate 
---- ---- ---- ---- 282.1 270.3 239.2 198.4 213.4 
Source: French Home Office 40 and Eurostat. Population data 
 
 
37 See Directorate-General for Internal Policies 2016. 
38 Although no complete data are available, Austria should be added to the list of EU jurisdictions in 
which the removal of EU citizen is playing a prominent part in the deportation system. In 2018, 22.0 
per cent of returns and 33.6 per cent of forced returns carried in Austria involved EU nationals. See 
European Migration Network, Austria. Annual Policy Report 2018, IOM, Wien, 2019. Retrieved on 12 
August 2019 from http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/01a_austria_annual_policy_ 
report_part2_2018_en.pdf). 
39 In addition, France is a partial exception to the irrelevance of ‘voluntary’ return programmes for 
the repatriation of EU citizens. From 2010-2012, on average 5,928 EU nationals were repatriated 
per year under these allegedly voluntary schemes. Since then, though, the impact of these programmes 
on EU national resident populations has constantly and dramatically dwindled (on average, according 
to the French Home Office, 109 EU citizens were voluntarily returned per year from 2013 to 2018).  
40 Retrieved on 7 August 2019 from www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Info-ressources/Etudes-et-
statistiques/Statistiques/Essentiel-de-l-immigration/Chiffres-cles. 
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This analysis of the data available in some EU jurisdictions reveals that the 
removal of EU nationals, in apparent contrast to its regulation, has been nor-
malised across Europe. What is more, in some member states, such as France 
and the UK, this institution has come to play a very significant role within the 
deportation system. This largely unacknowledged scenario raises a number of 
queries, in terms of both ‘why’ and ‘how’. The next section scrutinises the 
forces that have contributed to the generalisation of this severe restriction of 
freedom of movement rights. 
5. Deporting EU Nationals: Xeno-Racism, ‘Criminal Aliens’ and the 
Management of Public Order 
Even a superficial examination of the removal of EU nationals unveils one 
of the most distinctive traits of this sub-field of migration control policies, 
that is, it essentially targets Eastern European national groups, mainly Roma-
nian citizens. 41 The available data are particularly revealing of this markedly 
biased operation. More than 45 per cent (47.0%) of EU citizens deported from 
Spain from 2008 to 2017 were Romanian nationals (according to the Parlia-
mentary question asked by Mr. Jon Iñárritu, MP). Romanians and Polish na-
tionals combined account for 52.0 per cent of EU citizens deported from Ger-
many from 2012 to 2018 (according to the German Parliament). As previous-
ly mentioned, in Belgium and Italy, Romanians are also the clear leader of 
this ranking (according to the Belgian Federal Immigration Office and the 
Italian National Prison Ombudsman). In the United Kingdom, in turn, Roma-
nian nationals and Polish nationals combined accounted for 51.8 per cent of 
EU citizens forcefully returned from 2008 to 2018 (according to the UK 
Home Office). 42 
Although some reports show that Romanians rank very highly in the en-
forcement of removals targeting EU nationals, 43 no comparable data on con-
crete nationalities are provided by the French statistics offices. However, 
France is a critical national case with regard to the biased operation of the de-
portation system. It is estimated that the French government, in implementing 
 
 
41 In 2018, the deportation rates of Romanian citizens in 2018 were 363.7 deportees per 100,000 
residents in Belgium, 286.2 in the United Kingdom, 69.0 in Germany, 34.7 in Spain (2017) and 4.8 
in Italy. 
42 See also M. Evans in Mantu 2017. 
43 Retrieved on 9 August 2019 from www.lacimade.org/publication/?numpage=2&numpage=3&num 
page=1. See also I. Vrӑbiescu, ‘Devised to Punish: Policing, Detaining and Deporting Romanians from 
France’, European Journal of Criminology, 2019 (Online First). These La Cimade reports also note that in 
recent years 1,000-1,500 Romanians were detained annually in French migration detention facilities. 
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a migration management policy that was highly criticised by EU Commission 
officials, removed around 20,000 Roma Bulgarian and Romanian nationals in 
2009-2010. 44 Since then, removals of Eastern European citizens, especially 
Romanians, have continued to be carried out on a daily basis. 45 
It is evident, therefore, that beyond some specific forces operating in certain 
EU member states, such as the xenophobic wave triggered by the Brexit move-
ment in the UK, 46 the two enlargements of the EU carried out in 2004 and 
2007, which resulted in the integration of ten new Eastern and Central EU mem-
ber states, have paved the way for the subsequent consolidation of the deporta-
tion of EU nationals. This is not surprising; the available data show that EU15 
nationals play a small part in the enforcement of this migration control institu-
tion. These Western European nationals accounted for 34.2 per cent of deporta-
tions of EU citizens carried out in Spain from 2008 to 2017, but only 15.9 per cent 
in Germany (2012-2018), and 15.7 per cent in the UK (2008-2018).  
In summary, the accession into the EU of a number of middle income East-
ern European countries has resulted in a (biased) devaluation of EU citizenship 
rights, and more precisely in a significant erosion of the freedom of movement 
and residence. 47 This reveals that the EU enlargements of the mid-2000s gave 
rise to both intra-EU racialisation processes and a stratification of citizenship 
rights, in which some passports are more valuable than others and the re-
strictions of the freedom of movement are de facto dependent on nationality cri-
teria. 48 Singling out the 2000s EU enlargements as a critical turning point in the 
gradual consolidation of the deportation of EU nationals should not mean, how-
ever, seeing them as a sort of unbridgeable cleavage. On the contrary, as will be 
developed later, the analysed phenomenon reveals the operation of some bu-
reaucratic inertia in the enforcement of migration control policies. 
What has been illustrated thus far merely provides a response to a ‘why’ 
question. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the migration law enforce-
 
 
44 See T. Eremenko, N. El Qadim & E. Steichen, ‘Southern Europeans in France: Invisible 
Migrants?’, in J.-M. Lafleur & M. Stanek (Eds), South-North Migration of EU Citizens in Times of 
Crisis, Springer Open, 2017, pp. 123-148; J.-M. Lafleur & E. Mescoli, ‘Creating Undocumented EU 
Migrants through Welfare: A Conceptualization of Undeserving and Precarious Citizenship’, 
Sociology, Vol. 52, No. 3, 2018, pp. 480-496; O. Parker, ‘Roma and the Politics of EU Citizenship 
in France: Everyday Security and Resistance’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 50, No. 3, 
2012, pp. 475-491. 
45 See O. Parker & O. López Catalán, ‘Free movement for Whom, Where, When? Roma EU 
Citizens in France and Spain’, International political sociology, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2014, pp. 379-395. 
46 See K. Hamenstädt & M. Evans in Mantu 2017; Turnbull 2017. 
47 See McMahon 2012; N. Shimmel, ‘Welcome to Europe, but Please Stay Out: Freedom of 
Movement and the May 2004 Expansion of the European Union’, Berkeley Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2006, pp. 760-800. 
48 See Parker & López Catalán 2014. 
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ment change in question, ‘how’ questions should also be answered. More spe-
cifically, they will significantly contribute to analysing the overlapping prisoner 
transfer procedures-deportation procedures, which will be addressed in the con-
cluding section. From this ‘how’ perspective, it can be ascertained that the con-
solidation of the deportation of EU nationals has essentially been the institution-
al reaction to two key political and social concerns on migration. 49 
It is particularly clear that one of these concerns has been crime, namely 
criminal offences perpetrated by EU nationals. As has been previously high-
lighted, the CRD authorises national law enforcement agencies to hand 
down and enforce deportation orders as part of criminal sentences (Article 
33(1)). However, this provision does not mandate member states to punish 
criminal offences perpetrated by EU citizens with deportation orders. In fact, 
Article 27(2) CRD conspicuously establishes that “previous criminal convic-
tions shall not in themselves constitute grounds for taking” such removal 
measures. 
Therefore, EU legal provisions, building on the well-established case law 
of the CJEU, 50 imply that these deportation orders, being a severe limitation 
of significant freedom of movement rights, should be treated as a sort of ulti-
ma ratio measure, not as a legal instrument to be regularly used for crime pre-
vention purposes. However, the analysed legal device has not been immune to 
the crimmigration turn that has spread in recent years across many jurisdic-
tions, EU and non-EU alike. 51 More precisely, the consolidation of the re-
moval of EU citizens should be seen – at least, partially – as a side-effect of 
one of the quintessential aspects of the crimmigration turn, that is, the increas-
 
 
49 On these concerns, see D. Siegel, Dynamics of Solidarity. Consequences of the ‘Refugee Crisis’ 
on Lesbos, Eleven, The Hague, 2019. 
50 See, amongst others, the CJEU judgment of 27 October 1977 in case C-30/77, Bouchereau [1977] 
ECLI:EU:C:1977:172. 
51 See B. Bowling, ‘Epilogue: The Borders of Punishment: Towards a Criminology of Mobility’, in 
K.F. Aas & M. Bosworth (Eds), The Borders of Punishment: Migration, Citizenship, and Social 
Exclusion, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 291-306; J. Stumpf, ‘The Crimmigration 
Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power’, American University Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 2, 
2006, pp. 367-419; J. Stumpf, ‘The Process is the Punishment in Crimmigration Law’, in K.F. Aas 
& M. Bosworth (Eds), The Borders of Punishment: Migration, Citizenship, and Social Exclusion, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 58-75; J. Stumpf, ‘Crimmigration: Encountering the 
Leviathan’, in S. Pickering & J. Ham (Eds), The Routledge Handbook on Crime and International 
Migration, Routledge, London, 2015, pp. 237-250; J. van der Leun, & M. van der Woude, ‘A 
Reflection on Crimmigration in the Netherlands’, in M.J. Guia, M. van der Woude & J. van der 
Leun (Eds), Social Control and Justice: Crimmigration in the Age of Fear, Eleven, The Hague, 
2013, pp. 41-60; M. van der Woude, J. van der Leun, & J.A. Nijland, ‘Crimmigration in the 
Netherlands’, Law and Social Inquiry, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2014, pp. 560-579; N. Wonders, ‘Sitting on 
the Fence – Spain’s Delicate Balance: Bordering, Multiscalar Challenges, and Crimmigration’, 
European Journal of Criminology, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2017, pp. 7-26. 
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ing utilisation of deportation measures as a tool to curb crimes committed by 
so-called ‘criminal aliens’. 52 
This crimmigration turn in the field of deportation practices has had a 
particular impact in the United Kingdom. 53 In Britain, this shift was initiated 
in April 2006, when the UK Home Office acknowledged that since the turn 
of the century no less than one thousand foreign prisoners had been released 
without having considered their eligibility for post-prison removal mea-
sures. 54 The subsequent public scandal forced the Home Office Secretary to 
resign and laid the way for the passing of the UK Borders Act 2007, which 
significantly expanded the scope of the deportation system. Specifically, this 
statute made all foreign prisoners eligible for post-release removal, depend-
ing on a judicial decision. In addition, it made these post-custodial deporta-
tion orders mandatory for foreign inmates sentenced to one year of impris-
onment or more, and for EU inmates sentenced to two years of imprisonment 
or more. 55 
This legal reform, coupled with a number of organisational and logistical 
measures 56 significantly heightened the significance of crime-related remov-
als within the British deportation apparatus. The portion of this type of returns, 
in fact, has gradually increased over the last decade. Still, what is more im-
portant is the striking rise in the number of deportations involving former EU 
 
 
52 See Brandariz & Fernández-Bessa, 2017a; A. Spena, ‘La Crimmigration e l’espulsione dello stra-
niero-massa’, Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica, Vol. XLVII, No. 2, 2017, pp. 495-
514; Stumpf 2013, 2015; van der Woude et al., 2014; Wonders, 2017. 
53 See M. Bosworth, ‘Deportation, Detention and Foreign-National Prisoners in England and Wales’, 
Citizenship Studies, Vol. 15, No. 5, 2011, pp. 583-595; S. Turnbull & I. Hasselberg, ‘From Prison to 
Detention: The Carceral Trajectories of Foreign-National Prisoners in the United Kingdom’, 
Punishment & Society, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2017, pp. 135-154. 
54 See A. Aliverti, Crimes of Mobility: Criminal Law and the Regulation of Immigration, Routledge, 
London, 2013; H.S. Bhui, ‘Alien Experience: Foreign National Prisoners After the Deportation 
Crisis’, Probation Journal, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2007, pp. 368-382; E. Kaufman, ‘Hubs and Spokes: The 
Transformation of the British Prison’, in K.F. Aas & M. Bosworth (Eds), The Borders of 
Punishment: Migration, Citizenship, and Social Exclusion, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, 
pp. 166-182; E. Kaufman, E., Punish and Expel: Border Control, Nationalism, and the New 
Purpose of the Prison, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015; F. Pakes, & K. Holt, ‘Crimmigration 
and the Prison: Comparing Trends in Prison Policy and Practices in England & Wales and Norway’, 
European Journal of Criminology, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2017, pp. 63-77. 
55 See Aliverti, 2013; Bosworth, 2011; M.J. Gibney, ‘Deportation, Crime, and the Changing 
Character of Membership in the United Kingdom’, in K.F. Aas & M. Bosworth (Eds), The Borders 
of Punishment: Migration, Citizenship, and Social Exclusion, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2013, pp. 218-236; E. Kaufman & M. Bosworth, M., ‘The Prison and National Identity: Citizenship, 
Punishment and the Sovereign State’, in D. Scott (Ed), Why Prison? Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2013, pp. 170-188. 
56 See, on this, Aliverti 2013; Bosworth 2011; Kaufman 2013, 2015; Pakes & Holt 2017; Turnbull & 
Hasselberg 2017. 
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national prisoners. 57 In recent years, these national groups have been the tar-
get of 2/3 of all removals involving released inmates.  
Table 8. – Returns and Returns of Former Prisoners Carried Out in the United Kingdom, 
2009-2018. 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Total  
returns 58 38,052 41,968 41,482 44,310 45,489 40,179 41,879 39,626 32,551 23,889 
Former 
prisoner 
returns 
5,528 5,344 4,649 4,765 4,993 5,286 5,768 6,171 6,113 5,209 
% of  
returns 14.5% 12.7% 11.2% 10.8% 11.0% 13.2% 13.8% 15.6% 18.8% 21.8% 
Former EU 
national 
prisoner 
returns 
748 931 1,143 1,653 2,120 2,956 3,361 3,970 4,093 3,516 
% of  
former 
prisoner 
returns 
13.5% 17.4% 24.6% 34.7% 42.5% 55.9% 58.3% 64.3% 67.0% 67.5% 
Source: UK Home Office 59 
In summary, in line with the crimmigration turn, in a critical national case 
such as the UK, the impulse of the repatriation of EU nationals has been driv-
en by the political will to expand the reach of the deportation system within 
the criminal justice field. In this regard, the British case is paramount, but not 
exceptional. Among the other EU member states, 60 Spain has followed – to a 
certain extent – a similar path, in the wake of the crimmigration turn that has 
transformed the operation of the Spanish deportation model. 61 
 
 
57 See Turnbull 2017. 
58 This table presents the total number of returns, including both forced returns and so-called 
voluntary repatriations, because an unknown number of former prisoners were returned following 
‘voluntary’ procedures. 
59 Retrieved on 8 August 2019 from www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-statistics-year- 
ending-december-2018-data-tables. 
60 Media outlets report that in Austria a very significant number of deportations carried out in recent 
years targeted sentenced foreigners. See, for example, Der Standard, ‘Abschiebung nur bei “Be 
sonders Schweren Verbrechen” möglich’, Der Standard, 16 January 2019. Retrieved on 8 August 2019 
from www.derstandard.at/story/2000096352706/abschiebung-nur-bei-besonders-schweren-verbrechen- 
moeglich. 
61 See Brandariz & Fernández-Bessa 2017b; Fernández Bessa, C., El Dispositiu de Deportació. 
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In Spain, a number of logistical, organisational and legal changes have re-
inforced the role played by crime-related removals, the percentage of which 
rose from 14.6 per cent of all deportations enforced in 2008 to 49.9 per cent in 
2016 and 45.4 per cent in 2017. 62 This shift, which was vocally championed 
by the Spanish administration, 63 encompassed non-EU citizens and EU citi-
zens alike. In fact, in March 2015 the Spanish legislature passed a reform of 
Article 89(4) of the Penal Code which mandates the deportation of EU nation-
als convicted of a criminal offence and sentenced to one year of imprisonment 
or more. 64 In addition, the available data illustrate that 48.6% of EU nationals 
deported from Spain from 2008 to 2017 (i.e. 1,772 individuals) were not re-
turned on the basis of a CRD removal order. 65 This infers that in Spain crimi-
nal law deportations have had a significant impact on EU citizens, probably 
even before the 2015 reform was passed. 
Having said that, the ‘how’ question previously posed cannot be adequately 
answered merely by referring to the criminal justice system-deportation sys-
tem nexus. An additional phenomenon has also significantly contributed to the 
gradual consolidation of the deportation of EU nationals. Whilst the United 
Kingdom is the jurisdiction to be examined to grasp the crimmigration dimen-
sion of the analysed topic, this additional dimension requires a second critical 
national case to be considered, that of France. 
In France, the impetus of the deportation of EU citizens was not deter-
mined by collective anxieties over so-called ‘criminal aliens’. By contrast, 
this forced return measure has been regularly utilised for the street-level 
management of public order. Removal procedures in France have primarily 
targeted destitute – and racialised – Eastern European citizens for any sort of 
allegedly anti-social behaviour, including homelessness and nomadism. 66 
This approach to migration law enforcement devices is consistent with a 
negative stereotype, particularly cemented in certain EU societies, which 
brands (Eastern) EU nationals as burdensome foreign populations which put 
 
 
Anàlisi Criminològica de la Detenció, Internament i Expulsió d’Immigrants en el Context Espanyol 
(PhD dissertation, University of Barcelona), 2016. Retrieved on 9 August 2019 from http://dipo 
sit.ub.edu/dspace/handle/2445/97108?mode=full. 
62 See Brandariz & Fernández-Bessa 2017a. 
63 See Brandariz & Fernández-Bessa 2017b. 
64 See D. Boza Martínez, La expulsión de personas extranjeras condenadas penalmente: el nuevo artículo 
89 CP, Aranzadi, Cizur Menor, 2016; E. García España, ‘La expulsión como sustitutivo de la pena de 
prisión en el Código Penal de 2015: ¿de la discriminación a la reinserción?’, Revista Electrónica de 
Ciencia Penal y Criminología, Vol. 18-07, 2016, pp. 1-31. 
65 Data obtained from both Mr. Jon Iñárritu, MP and the Spanish Transparency Portal (on file with 
the author). 
66 See Parker & López Catalán 2014; Vrӑbiescu 2019. 
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untenable pressure on already stressed welfare budgets. 67 The utilisation of 
return legal tools to cope with so-called ‘welfare abusers’ has, in fact, been 
implemented in some EU member states, such as Belgium, Sweden, the Uni-
ted Kingdom and France. 68 
This public order-driven mobilisation of removal orders is apparently 
very distant from the rights-based CRD approach (Articles 14 and 27-33) to 
these measures. 69 However, not only social protection resources are at stake 
in these cases. There is evidence that these policing practices are also being 
used for crime prevention purposes. These administrative return procedures 
operate as a – cost-effective, albeit questionable – alternative to the regular 
management of low-level criminal offences by the criminal justice system. 
In other words, when (especially Eastern) EU nationals are involved, not 
only anti-social behaviours but also petty crimes are dealt by the French 
law enforcement agencies by channelling these individuals into removal 
procedures, thereby circumventing ordinary criminal justice adjudication 
processes. 70 
Surprising as it may seem, the French case does not appear to be an excep-
tion. In Spain, interviews conducted with high-ranking police officials confirm 
that CRD removals are being used in a very similar way, that is, to tackle petty 
crimes and misdemeanours committed allegedly on a regular basis by EU citi-
zens, especially Eastern European nationals. 71 
This ordinary utilisation of administrative removal orders for public order 
purposes reveals an additional and largely unacknowledged aspect of the topic 
in question. Surely, after the impasse produced by the accession to the EU of ten 
new Central and Eastern European member states in 2004 and 2007, bureaucrat-
ic inertia has come to prevail, by reinstating slightly modified old practices. 
Since the mid-2000s, general migration law provisions were no longer available 
to deal with the new EU national groups. However, as illustrated by the French 
case, law enforcement agencies have ultimately ended up using CRD removal 
provisions in a very similar way, despite their more restrictive regulation. 72 
From this perspective, the late 2000s French government’s plan to deport 
 
 
67 See, on this, V. Barker, Nordic Nationalism and Penal Power: Walling the Welfare State, Routledge, 
Abingdon, 2018. 
68 See V. Barker, ‘Democracy and Deportation: Why Membership Matters Most’, in K.F. Aas & M. 
Bosworth (Eds), Borders of Punishment: Citizenship, Crime Control and Social Exclusion, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 237-254; Directorate-General for Internal Policies 2016; Evans 
in Mantu 2017; Maslowski 2015; Parker & López Catalán 2014; Valcke in Mantu 2017. 
69 See, though, Parker 2012 
70 See Maslowski 2015; Vrӑbiescu 2019. 
71 Interviews conducted in February 2019 (on file with the author). 
72 See also Parker 2012; Vrӑbiescu 2019. 
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thousands of Roma Eastern European individuals – allegedly via ‘voluntary’ 
return protocols – can be seen as an attempt to find an alternative solution to 
manage these populations coercively once the regular return provisions be-
came inapplicable. Additional data show the strength of these administrative 
inertias. In the United Kingdom, 1,351 Romanian nationals were deported per 
year from 2004 to 2006 (according to the UK Home Office). Subsequently, 
after they became EU citizens, this number dwindled to 175 removals per year 
from 2007 to 2011. However, it eventually escalated again to 1,056 deporta-
tions annually enforced in the subsequent seven years. 73 In Spain, 2,589 Ro-
manian nationals were deported per year from 2001 to 2006. 74 Subsequently, 
the average number of removals involving Romanian citizens sharply declined 
to 59 per year from 2008 to 2011, before mounting again to an annual average 
of 234 enforced returns from 2012 to 2017, in the context of a significant 
downsizing of the Spanish deportation system (source: information provided 
by Mr. Jon Iñárritu, MP). 
6. Conclusion: The Overlapping of Prisoner Transfer Procedures and 
Deportation Procedures 
This analysis of the gradual consolidation of deportation measures targeting 
EU citizens leads to a number of robust conclusions. Firstly, in marked contrast 
to both the apparent goals of the EU legal framework and the widely proclaimed 
freedom of movement of European nationals, 75 this type of deportation is not an 
exceptional measure, but a migration law device widespread across EU member 
states, in many of which it is most frequently enforced. Secondly, the recent im-
pulse of this legal instrument is closely associated with concerns about crime. 
As previously noted, this is the case not only in countries such as the United 
Kingdom, in which the expanded utilisation of these removal orders has fol-
lowed the lines of the reinforcement of crime-related deportations. It is also the 
case in member states such as France, where these forced return procedures 
have essentially been used for ordinary street-level management of public order, 
petty offences and extreme poverty-related behaviours. 
Consequently, there is some overlapping between Framework Decision 2008/ 
 
 
73 From 2005 to 2009, the annual average of deportations of nationals of the eight Eastern European 
nations integrated in the EU in 2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia) combined was 154. By contrast, it rose to 1,513 removals per year from 
2010 to 2018.  
74 See source in Fernández-Bessa 2016. 
75 See Parker & López Catalán 2014. 
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909/JHA prisoner transfer procedures and deportation practices, as both tackle 
criminal activities carried out by EU citizens. However, what has been highli-
ghted thus far does not suffice to answer the main question addressed by this 
chapter: why and to what extent is the consolidation of the deportation of EU na-
tionals hampering the development of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA pro-
cedures? 
In principle, despite the aforementioned overlapping, transfers and deporta-
tions are heterogeneous legal instruments that target partially different situa-
tions. Their consequences are also markedly different. Transfer procedures 
compel inmates to continue serving their sentences in their home/residence 
member states, but do not entail the imposition of a subsequent ban on entry. 
By contrast, removal orders – even crime-related removal orders – lead to 
the enforcement of ban on entry measures (Article 32 CRD), but they do not 
entitle the criminal justice agencies of the destination country to hold EU cit-
izens/inmates criminally accountable. In criminal deportation cases, this 
generally undermines the principles of proportionality and equality before the 
law. 76 In addition, crime-related deportation orders stand at odds with crimi-
nal law goals, namely social rehabilitation. 77 Counterintuitively, they also 
fail to serve incapacitation purposes. As is widely known, with the exception 
of Ireland, the United Kingdom, and (still) Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and 
Romania, the EU member states are part of the Schengen Agreement. The 
Schengen legal framework, which has essentially lifted internal borders, 
makes ban on entry measures enforced against EU national deportees partial-
ly useless, as they cannot be easily detected as long as they do not travel out-
side Schengenland. 78 
The analysed divergences between transfer procedures and deportations 
might lead to the conclusion not only that both legal tools may perfectly co-
exist but also that transfer procedures should prevail over removal practices 
targeting suspected, indicted and sentenced EU citizens. However, additional 
perspectives should be taken into account to have a more nuanced grasp of 
this issue. In the context of overburdened criminal justice systems that are 
forced to come to terms with the principle of scarcity, the uncontroversial 
coexistence of deportation and transfer measures is, in practice, less feasible 
than legal regulations might lead us to think. This is all the more relevant, 
since in many jurisdictions the development of the criminal justice system is 
increasingly driven by efficiency and cost-effectiveness principles. 79 In this 
 
 
76 See Aliverti 2013. 
77 See Boza Martínez 2016. 
78 See on this Hamenstädt & Evans in Mantu 2017. 
79 See J.A. Brandariz García, El modelo gerencial-actuarial de penalidad: eficiencia, riesgo y 
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regard, transfer procedures should be preferred from a rule of law viewpoint 
but deportations rank first when these pragmatic tenets are considered, as 
they save much needed criminal justice resources, reduce the workload of 
law enforcement agencies, and ultimately realise the political goal of getting 
rid of the unwanted alien as expeditiously as possible. Therefore, efficiency-
oriented mentalities are surely leading removal orders to prevail over trans-
fer procedures in their conflicting coexistence, making the latter practically 
inapplicable. Evidently, this trend does not equally affect all EU jurisdic-
tions; on the contrary, it has a potentially significant impact on countries fea-
turing widely developed systems of deportation of EU nationals. 80 
In scrutinising the overlapping transfers-deportations, an additional aspect 
should be brought to the fore, which considers logistical and organisational 
arrangements and institutional cultures, interests and habitus. Many EU mem-
ber states have succeeded in articulating a comprehensive, wide-ranging and 
burgeoning system to deport unwanted EU citizens. Evidently, this is not sim-
ple at all, as it requires assembling political will, resources, and complex lo-
gistical and organisational measures. In contrast, EU countries seem to have 
failed in organising a similar institutional structure to expand the utilisation of 
prisoner transfer measures. This divergence should be explored from the per-
spective of institutional interests. In carrying out deportation practices, nation-
al executives, and especially police agencies, deal with procedures that are 
almost completely under their control, with few – if any – judicial interven-
tions. Furthermore, deportations are automatic procedures that, in contrast 
with transfers, are not dependent on decisions made by the state of destina-
tion’s judicial authorities on a case by case basis. This obviously facilitates the 
unobstructed development of the migration control agendas of national gov-
ernments. What is more, the deportation of EU nationals is one of the cases in 
which EU member states’ administrations may ensure their national interests 
prevail in the framework of a multi-scalar migration management system such 
as that of the EU. 81  
The judicial actors and bodies, in turn, do not seem to have the political 
determination and political capital needed to set up an all-encompassing in-
stitutional apparatus to enforce transfer procedures. 82 In addition, judicial 
 
 
80 This may explain why the recent plans of the Italian government to repatriate sentenced EU 
nationals will be apparently funnelled through transfer procedures. See Scarano 2019. 
81 See J.P. Laine, ‘The Multiscalar Production of Borders’, Geopolitics, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2016, pp. 
465-482; Moffette 2018; Wonders 2017. 
82 Further research is needed to scrutinise whether national governments have any political 
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cutives are deeply committed to repatriating their fellow nationals imprisoned abroad, e.g. 
Spain in the case of Spanish inmates confined in Latin American prisons. However, it is not 
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officials, being traditionally self-conceived as nation state-centred players, 
have a hard time operating within international arenas in which – such as in 
the case of transfers – no national interests seem to be at play. At least in this 
respect, the highly praised judicial nature of Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA procedures may have countered the goal of consolidating a 
continent-wide institutional system of transferring – rather than deporting – 
sentenced EU citizens. 
 
 
clear whether they prefer these repatriations to be carried out as transfer procedures or they 
actually accept deportations.  
120 José A. Brandariz 
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Abstract: This chapter addresses the main features of the implementation of cross-border 
transfer of prisoners in Italy, Romania and Spain. It aims to provide the reader with an in-
depth analysis of the major strategies enacted by these Member States to ensure the full ef-
fectiveness of FD 2008/909/JHA and the difficulties of putting it into practice. Specifically, it 
shows the particularities regarding the transposition of the European instrument in each 
country, on the number of transfers effectively executed and their difficulties to ensure the 
full effectiveness of the FD under consideration. Based on the desk research and fieldwork 
developed in the RePers project this study addresses the advances in implementing the FD 
and identifies the shortcomings of the implementation. To conclude, this study provides use-
ful comparative notes and a critical assessment of the main shortcomings of the solutions 
adopted nationally. 
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judicial cooperation 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. Transposition of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA in Italy, 
Romania and Spain. – 3. Advances. The Number of Prisoners Actually Transferred. – 3.1. Num-
ber of Transfers out of Number of Prisoners. – 4. Shortcomings of the Implementation of Trans-
fer Procedures in the Different National Contexts. – 5. Conclusions. 
1. Introduction 
The freedom of movement and residence of European citizens within the 
European Union territory poses new challenges for national criminal justice 
 
 
 Cristina Fernandez Bessa drafted para. 1; Valeria Ferraris drafted para. 2; Para. 3, 4 and 5 are the 
result of joint work. Alexandru Damian amended the parts relating to the Romanian legal order. 
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and prison systems which must be addressed by the Members States. The en-
forcement of custodial sentences or measures involving the deprivation of a 
citizen’s liberty issued by a Member State in its own territory and the transfer 
of a European citizen sentenced by a national court to another Member State 
to serve the sentence involve strategies that go beyond ordinary practices and 
routines of legal practitioners, civil servants and judicial authorities. In spite of 
the common legal provisions of Framework Decision (FD) 2008/909/JHA, 
factors such as divergences in transposition, different national legal cultures, 
the situation of communities of EU citizens living in other Member States, and 
prison conditions entail very distinctive features in the implementation of this 
instrument and produce varied results. 
This chapter addresses the main features of the implementation of cross-
border transfer of prisoners in Italy, Romania and Spain. It aims to provide the 
reader with an in-depth analysis of the major strategies enacted by these Mem-
ber States to ensure the full effectiveness of FD 2008/909/JHA and the difficul-
ties of putting it into practice. Specifically, the chapter starts with a brief de-
scription of the transposition process of this tool into the mentioned legal 
frameworks. Secondly, it addresses the advances in implementing the FD, by 
revealing the number of prisoners who have actually been transferred from and 
to Italy, Spain and Romania in relation to the prison population of EU citizens. 
Lastly, it identifies the shortcomings of the implementation, in the opinion of 
practitioners and authorities who actually work on these transfer procedures. To 
conclude, this study provides useful comparative notes and a critical assessment 
of the main shortcomings of the solutions adopted nationally. 
In order to do this, from a methodological point of view, a desk review of 
academic literature was carried out, along with an analysis of the Italian, 
Romanian and Spanish implementing legislations of FD 2008/909/JHA, and 
other relevant documents. This study was complemented by the analysis of 
quantitative and qualitative data concerning transfers between the Member 
States involved. On one hand, we obtained official statistics published in 
each Member State and requested any missing information through national 
transparency procedures or other internal procedures. On the other hand, we 
gathered primary data on the practical shortcomings of the implementation 
of the FD on prisoner transfers within the EU through an online survey and 
the report of two meetings organised within the scope of RePers project. The 
survey was delivered from July 2018 to December 2018, in Italian, Romani-
an and Spanish, to prosecutors, judges, lawyers, ministerial officials and 
scholars involved in implementing the FD. Despite some initial problems in 
obtaining an adequate number of answers to the survey, 1 the research team 
 
 
1 In particular, in Italy, due to the limited numbers of lawyers having expertise in the issue and the fact 
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ultimately received 85 completed questionnaires (30 in Spain, 32 in Romania 
and 23 in Italy). The low number of survey respondents in Italy was largely offset 
by additional activity providing further insights into the functioning of transfer pro-
cedures. Unexpectedly, following numerous requests and contacts, the researchers 
were officially permitted by the Head of the International Cooperation Office of the 
Italian Ministry of Justice to access the case files regarding transfer procedures un-
der Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA. The results of the surveys were present-
ed on the occasion of two workshops held in Bucharest (October 2018) and 
Madrid (14 March 2019) with selected practitioners, who were invited to dis-
cuss the critical points on the implementation of the FD emerging from the sur-
veys. All these research activities provided us with comprehensive information 
on the distinctive features of the implementation of FD 2008/909/JHA which 
will be investigated in the sections below. 
2. Transposition of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA in Italy, Ro-
mania and Spain  
The main characteristics of the transposition process of FD 2008/909/JHA 
are important for contextualising the approach and expectations of each Mem-
ber State towards this instrument, and they provide valuable data for under-
standing its current implementation.  
The timing of the transposition of the FD in Italy, Romania and Spain pre-
sents a significant variation which reveals the different policy agendas of the 
Member States. 
This is one of the few times that Italy transposed an act relating to judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters prior to the deadline, in this case 5 December 
2011. The Government – upon delegation by Parliament through Articles 49 
and 52 of Italian Law dated 7 July 2009, no. 88 – adopted Legislative Decree 
dated 7 September 2010, no. 161, which implements the FD in the Italian legal 
system and defines the procedures for transferring sentenced persons from Ita-
ly to other Member States and vice versa. 
In the aftermath of the transposition, several circular letters 2 issued by the 
Italian Ministry of Justice clarified the reasons underpinning this unexpected 
 
 
that the members of the judiciary are not used to responding to online surveys. In Spain, it was also 
difficult to obtain answers from lawyers who were familiar with the legal procedure of prison transfers.  
2 For a detailed presentation of the content of the circular letters, see V. Ferraris (2019), ‘L’implem-
entazione del d.lgs. 161/2010 sul reciproco riconoscimento delle sentenze di condanna a pena detentiva: 
un caso di doppio fallimento’, Legislazione Penale, 2019, Available at: http://www.lalegislazionepenale. 
eu/limplementazione-del-d-lgs-161-2010-sul-reciproco-riconoscimento-delle-sentenze-di-condanna-a-pe 
na-detentiva-un-caso-di-doppio-fallimento-valeria-ferraris/ 
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diligence by the Italian authorities. In fact, transfers of prisoners were includ-
ed in the action plan to reduce overcrowding in Italian prisons, following the 
well-known ECtHR Torreggiani judgment. 3 
Conversely, Spain transposed FD 2008/909/JHA in a complex legal act 
(Law no. 23/2014 dated 20 November 2014) on the mutual recognition of 
judicial decisions in criminal matters in the EU. This law is a wide-
reaching legal act that regulates or modifies all legal instruments based on 
the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters. Such a long delay 
(more than three years) is quite unusual for Spain which, in general, re-
spects transposition deadlines. This delay was crucially conditioned by the 
will to simplify the dispersed regulations on mutual recognition by encom-
passing everything into just one law, but also by the legal – and political – 
debate on the consequences in Spain of foreign sentences issued in other 
EU jurisdictions. This controversy was triggered by the adoption of FD 
2008/675/JHA regarding the decision to take account of convictions in Eu-
ropean Union Member States during the course of new criminal proceedings, 
which was transposed by Spanish Law no. 7/2014, dated 12 November 2014. 
The issue at stake was whether prison sentences already served in France by 
militants of the armed organisation ETA ought to be taken into consideration 
to mitigate the prison sentences to be enforced for the same offences in 
Spain. This debate was closed by the aforementioned Law no. 7/2014 (Arti-
cle 14) and the Spanish Supreme Court’s rulings no. 874/2014 of 27 January 
2015 and no. 50/2016 of 3 February 2016. The passing of Law no. 7/2014 
paved the way for the immediate passing of Law no. 23/2014 and the trans-
position of FD 2008/909/JHA. 
Romania transposed FD 2008/909/JHA through the Law dated 26 Decem-
ber 2013, no. 302, with a two-year delay. The transposition was carried out 
through Title VI of Law no. 302/2004, on international judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, recently republished. There are two explanations for this de-
lay. On one hand, it was partially caused by the lengthy national legislative 
procedure. On the other hand, only a limited number of public servants are 
familiar with international cooperation and they are burdened by excessive 
workloads. 4 This is something of an administrative vulnerability, rather than a 
pattern for pushing for delayed implementation.  
 
 
3 Torreggiani and others vs. Italy, ECHR (2013). In this decision, the Court verified that the space 
allocated to each applicant in their cell was three square metres and stated that, this being the case, 
the applicants had suffered a breach of their Article 3 rights. The court gave Italy one year in which 
to develop effective remedies for dealing with prison overcrowding. See also F. Favuzza, ‘Torreg-
giani and prison overcrowding in Italy’, Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2017, pp. 153-
173. 
4 This comment was obtained by the Romanian researcher in the interviews with civil servants. 
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It seems clear that each Member State was driven by its own agenda and, 
as we will demonstrate in the following sections, this is certainly not the best 
pre-condition for building an efficient procedure based on mutual trust. 
The three legal acts largely reproduce the FD, 5 with extremely limited 
specificities.  
The use of the same wording as the FD results, for example in Romania, in 
inadequate transposition rules, and in the absence of correlation with other 
rules on international cooperation and other national normative acts, which 
has led to a series of issues generating non-unitary judicial practice, some of 
which have already been settled by the High Court of Cassation and Justice 
(HCCJ). 6 
In the three Member States, the competent authorities are the Ministry of 
Justice and the judicial authorities. A major difference concerns the role of the 
central authority. The International Office of the Ministry of Justice in Roma-
nia and in Italy plays a central role; the Ministry transmits to the foreign au-
thority the sentence and the certificate previously received from the territorial 
judicial authorities, handles the official correspondence, takes on a role of co-
ordination, and acts as a reference contact. 
Conversely, in Spain, the role of the Ministry of Justice is auxiliary to the 
judicial authorities and is limited to receiving quarterly statistical bulletins 
from judges and Courts, together with a list from the General Public Prosecu-
tor containing all mutual recognition instruments issued or executed by Public 
Prosecutor officers during the half-year. The Prison Supervisory Court (when 
a convict is in prison) and the Court (when the convict has not begun to serve 
the sentence) is in charge of all aspects of the procedure. 
Thus, in the three Member States concerned (Spain, Italy and Romania), 
the judicial authorities are responsible for issuing the transfer sentence; how-
ever, there are significant differences in the procedure depending on the fea-
tures of the general functioning of each national judicial system and the cho-
sen manner of transposition. 
Two specificities of the Italian and Romanian legal systems can be high-
lighted. In Italy, the transfer can take place for any offence punished with a pen-
alty having a term of at least three years. The Italian legislator’s intention to 
avoid any limitation of the possibility of transferring detainees to another Mem-
ber State is, therefore, quite clear. Conversely, the transfer from another Mem-
ber State is possible only in relation to the offences indicated by the FD. 
 
 
5 See S. Montaldo’s introduction in this book. 
6 See HCCJ, Formation on the interpretation of certain points of law in criminal matters, Decision 
no. 13/2014, Official Gazette no. 505 of 08/07/2014; Decision no. 15/2015, Official Gazette no. 455 
of 24/06/2015. See also, HCCJ, Criminal Proceedings, Decision no. 253/A of 11 October 2018, 
www.scj.ro 
126 Cristina Fernández Bessa, Valeria Ferraris and Alexandru Damian 
Out of the three Member States, Romania is the only one that grants to the 
sentenced person the right to challenge the transfer decision 7 within 10 days. 8 
In the event of appeal, the final decision is made by the High Court of Cassa-
tion and Justice. 
3. Advances. The Number of Prisoners Actually Transferred 
Along with the different legal cultures and rules, many sociological and 
economic factors (e.g. the mobility of citizens, the labour market, whether 
or not the country is a tourist destination, etc.) influence the features of im-
plementation of this instrument and mainly the target groups of the transfers 
in each country. In this section, we reveal the advances in the implementa-
tion of the FD by analysing the available data on the transfers performed in 
Italy, Spain and Romania. To understand the data in context, the number of 
prisoners effectively transferred to others EU countries from Italy and Spain 
is compared with the number of EU citizens detained in Italian and Spanish 
prisons over recent years. With regard to Romania, as it is mainly a receiv-
ing State, the data reveal the total number of transfer procedures executed 
and focus on the number of Romanian nationals transferred from Italy and 
Spain. 
In Romania and Italy, only a basic set of data is made publicly available in 
the Ministry of Justice’s annual report. The Romanian project team was able 
to obtain data thanks to the national 2001 Freedom of Information Act, Law 
no. 544/2001, which grants access to information of public interest. The data 
were later updated with the assistance of the Division for International Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters (Ministry of Justice). In Italy, the research 
team requested access to the statistics of the international office and received 
all requested data. In Spain, a minimum set of information on prison transfers 
issued is published in the prison system’s annual report (the so-called Informe 
General de Instituciones Penitenciarias); 9 this information was completed by 
way of an information request via the transparency website. The different 
means of accessing data reveal why the three research teams gathered data 
with very varied levels of detail. 
 
 
7 On the right to a redress mechanism, see S. Montaldo’s chapter in this book. 
8 Article 166, line 11 of Law 302/2004 (Romania). 
9 However, as of late October 2019, the 2018 report had not been published; this chapter only 
reveals data on transfers from Spain until 2017. 
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3.1. Number of Transfers out of Number of Prisoners 
Both in Italy and Spain – the issuing Member States – data on the number 
of prisoners divided by nationality are publicly available. This provides in-
formation on the number of transfers out of the number of EU prisoners. In Italy, 
the number of EU citizen detainees is rather stable. They represent almost 20% of 
the total amount of foreign prisoners. As the following table shows, Romanian de-
tainees form the vast majority, representing over 76% of all EU condemned de-
tainees and almost 15% of all foreign citizens deprived of freedom.  
Table 1. – EU condemned detainees in Italy 
 2016* 2017** 2018** 
Member 
States 
No. of  
detainees 
% of EU 
detainees 
No. of  
detainees 
% of EU 
detainees 
No. of  
detainees 
% of EU 
detainees 
Romania 2720 76.94 1668 76.20 1771 78.71 
Bulgaria 163 4.61 84 3.84 80 3.56 
Poland 120 3.39 83 3.79 86 3.82 
Croatia 91 2.57 75 3.43 64 2.84 
France 78 2.21 44 2.01 53 2.36 
Lithuania 50 1.41 40 1.83 27 1.20 
Germany 41 1.16 34 1.55 27 1.20 
Spain 66 1.87 33 1.51 23 1.02 
Slovakia 25 0.71 18 0.82 12 0.53 
Greece 35 0.99 16 0.73 16 0.71 
Slovenia 15 0.42 16 0.73 19 0.84 
Portugal 19 0.54 14 0.64 13 0.58 
Hungary 25 0.71 13 0.59 12 1 
The  
Netherlands 15 0.42 11 0.50 5 0.22 
Belgium 13 0.37 9 0.41 15 0.67 
Czech  
Republic 20 0.57 9 0.41 10 0.44 
United  
Kingdom 13 0.37 8 0.37 9 0.40 
Latvia 9 0.25 6 0.27 5 0.22 
Austria 8 0.23 5 0.23 2 0.09 
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Sweden 4 0.11 2 0.09 0 0.00 
Denmark 2 0.06 1 0.05 0 0.00 
Cyprus 0 0 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Estonia 2 0.06 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Finland 1 0.03 0 0.00 1 0.04 
Ireland 0 0 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Malta 0 0 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Total 3535 100 2189 100.00 2250 100 
*data do include pre-trial detainees 
** data do not include pre-trial detainees 
Table 2 shows the number of prisoners transferred from Italy to other EU 
Member States under FD 2008/909/JHA. In total, around a hundred people 
were transferred every year. In this case, the Romanian prison population also 
represents the most important national group of transferred detainees, fol-
lowed by that of Spain. However, compared to the number of detainees, the 
number of transfers constitutes less than 3%. 
Table 2. – EU nationals transferred from Italy to other EU Member States under FD 
2008/909/JHA 
Member States 2016 % of total transferees 2017 
% of total 
transferees
1st half of 
2018* 
% of total 
transferees 
Romania 89 73.55 67 62.62 26 53.06 
Spain 19 15.70 14 13.08 7 14.29 
France 2 1.65 5 4.67 0 - 
The  
Netherlands 1 0.83 6 5.61 3 6.12 
Belgium 3 2.48 0 - 0 - 
Germany 0 - 2 1.87 4 8.16 
Slovenia 2 1.65 1 0.93 0 - 
United  
Kingdom 0 - 1 0.93 2 4.08 
Greece 1 0.83 3 2.80 1 2.04 
Poland 0 - 2 1.87 0 - 
Hungary 0 - 1 0.93 3 6.12 
Croatia 2 1.65 1 0.93 0 - 
Following page
 Implementation Strategies: Distinctive Features, Advances and Shortcomings 129 
Portugal 0 - 2 1.87 1 2.04 
Latvia 1 0.83 0 - 0 - 
Luxembourg 1 0.83 0 - 1 2.04 
Austria 0 - 0 - 1 2.04 
Slovakia 0 - 1 0.93 0 - 
Sweden 0 - 1 0.93 0 - 
Lithuania* 0 - 0 - 0 - 
Czech  
Republic* 0 - 0 - 0 - 
Total 121 100 107 100 49 100 
* Unfortunately, due to a change in the data collection system of the Italian Ministry of Justice 
we cannot show the data for the full year. 
For Spain, as in Italy, imprisoned EU citizens represent around 20 to 25% 
of the total foreign prison population. Again in Spain, Romanian citizens 
form the majority of EU nationals detained in the prison system; however, as 
can be seen from the following table, despite the absolute numbers of Roma-
nian detainees being similar in both countries, in Spain they represent around 
45% of all EU imprisoned citizens, as there are other national groups which 
are broadly represented (such as Portugal, Bulgaria, France, Italy or the UK). 
Unlike Italy, in which the number of Romanian detainees is increasing, for 
Spain it is significantly decreasing. The major dispersion of Romanians resid-
ing both in Spain and in Italy for over ten years is one of the factors that ex-
plains the high number of Romanian citizens as opposed to other EU citizens 
in both countries. 
Table 3. – EU citizens detained in Spain according to the different nationalities  
 2016 2017 2018 
Member State No. of detainees 
% on EU 
detainees 
No. of 
detainees 
% on EU 
detainees 
No. of 
detainees 
% on EU 
detainees 
Romania 1870 46.74 1650 44.26 1788 45.73 
Portugal 379 9.47 351 9.42 315 8.06 
Bulgaria 260 6.5 273 7.32 279 7.14 
France 239 5.97 248 6.65 253 6.47 
Italy 252 6.3 249 6.68 233 5.96 
United  
Kingdom 185 4.62 222 5.95 237 6.06 
Lithuania 168 4.2 143 3.84 139 3.55 
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Poland 144 3.6 118 3.17 114 2.92 
The  
Netherlands 138 3.45 128 3.43 146 3.73 
Germany 100 2.5 99 2.66 117 2.99 
Belgium 48 1.2 39 1.05 52 1.33 
Croatia 37 0.92 37 0.99 34 0.87 
Czech  
Republic 27 0.67 25 0.67 27 0.69 
Hungary 24 0.6 24 0.64 17 0.43 
Latvia 26 0.65 34 0.91 33 0.84 
Estonia 16 0.4 12 0.32 11 0.28 
Slovakia 14 0.35 11 0.3 18 0.46 
Ireland 18 0.45 17 0.46 20 0.51 
Greece 16 0.4 14 0.38 23 0.59 
Slovenia 11 0.27 8 0.21 7 0.18 
Sweden 10 0.25 3 0.08 20 0.51 
Austria 5 0.12 5 0.13 5 0.13 
Denmark 6 0.15 10 0.27 15 0.38 
Malta 2 0.05 1 0.03 1 0.03 
Finland 2 0.05 4 0.11 4 0.10 
Luxembourg 3 0.07 0 0 1 0.03 
Cyprus 1 0.02 3 0.08 1 0.03 
Total 4001 100 3728 100 3910 100 
As shown in the following table, the situation in Spain is quite similar to 
that of Italy, with some specific features. In 2015, the first year of application 
of FD 2008/909/JHA, the transfers formed about 3.2% of detained EU nation-
al citizens and it dropped to 2.4% in 2016 and to 2.7% in 2017. In 2015 the 
transferred detainees reached 137 units but, in the years thereafter, they did not 
exceed one hundred per year. In addition, as for Italy, Romania has the highest 
amount of transferred people. The Netherlands, despite the limited number of 
detainees from the Netherlands in Spanish prisons, is the second Member State 
by number of transferees. This is a clear indication that judicial cooperation is 
functioning very well between these two countries. 
The other Member States in which there is a significant number of trans-
ferees are mostly neighbouring countries: respectively Spain and France for 
Italy; Italy and France for Spain. 
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Table 4. – EU nationals transferred from Spain to other Member States under FD 
2008/909/JHA 
Member State 2015 % of total transferees 2016 
% of total 
transferees 2017 
% of total 
transferees 
Romania 42 30.66 26 27.08 23 23.0 
The 
Netherlands 25 18.25 17 17.71 26 26.0 
Italy 12 8.76 11 11.46 7 7.0 
France 11 8.03 9 9.38 10 10.0 
Portugal 11 8.03 5 5.21 8 8.0 
United  
Kingdom 10 7.3 7 7.29 11 11.0 
Bulgaria 9 6.57 4 4.17 5 5.0 
Germany 7 5.11 3 3.13 4 4.0 
Belgium 4 2.92 6 6.25 3 3.0 
Sweden 2 1.46 0 - 1 1.0 
Denmark 1 0.73 0 - 0 - 
Ireland 1 0.73 1 1.04 0 - 
Lithuania 1 0.73 0 - 0 - 
Malta 1 0.73 0 - 0 - 
Austria 0 - 1 1.04 1 1.0 
Czech  
Republic 0 - 0 - 0 - 
Estonia 0 0 1 1.04 0 - 
Finland 0 0 1 1.04 0 - 
Greece 0 - 0 - 1 1.0 
Hungary 0 - 1 1.04 0 - 
Latvia 0 - 0 - 0 - 
Poland 0 - 2 2.08 0 - 
Slovakia 0 - 1 - 0 - 
Slovenia 0 - 0 - 0 - 
Total 137 100 96 100 100 100 
The data regarding the total files of transfers managed by the Romanian au-
thorities confirmed the impressions emerging from the data of Italy and Spain: 
Romania is mainly an executing State. This means that, as shown in table 5, 
the number of passive procedures, that is, when Romania is the receiving State 
for the enforcement of a custodial sentence or a measure involving a depriva-
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tion of liberty issued in other EU countries against Romanian citizens or resi-
dents, is significantly higher (around 90%) than the number of active proce-
dures (less than 10%), that is when Romania asks another country to execute a 
sentence issued by a Romanian Court. 
Table 5. – Passive and active procedures in Romania (2014-2017) 
 2014 
%  
of total  
procedures 
2015 
%  
of total  
procedures 
2016 
%  
of total  
procedures 
2017 
%  
of total  
procedures 
Passive  
Procedures 
(Romania as 
receiving/ex
ecuting 
State) 
645 98.90 534 91,75 453 94.18 395 90.39 
Active  
Procedures 
(Romania as 
issuing 
State) 
7 1.07 48 8.25 28 5.82 42 9.61 
Compared to the high amount of transfer files received by Romania, signif-
icantly fewer transfers are ultimately implemented. The data on transfers (Ta-
ble 6) provided by the Romanian authorities are similar to those provided by 
Italy and Spain, although they do not entirely converge. This divergence may 
reflect the gap between the number of EU national prisoners released to be 
transferred and that of released inmates for whom the transfer procedure is ul-
timately enforced. 
Table 6. – Persons transferred to Romania, from Italy and Spain 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Persons  
transferred to 
Romania by 
FD 909 
85 237 264 249 237 
No.  
from Italy 34 (42)* 109 (100) 92 (89) 61 (67) 77 
No.  
from Spain -- -- (42) 8 (26) 22 26 
* The number according to Italy and Spain is shown in brackets 
 Implementation Strategies: Distinctive Features, Advances and Shortcomings 133 
As will be seen in the following section, due to the significant length of 
these procedures, particularly between Italy and Romania, the sentenced per-
son may serve the full sentence before the transfer takes place. However, the 
case files are not always formally closed and consequently they formally 
count as a pending procedure even if they are de facto closed. This makes any 
consideration in terms of efficiency of the system almost impossible. In addi-
tion, in Spain, the interconnection with the return procedure significantly re-
duces the number of potential transferees, 10 and makes the Spanish data diffi-
cult to compare with other countries that do not have such a large implementa-
tion of return procedures of EU nationals. 
The comparison of the data on the number of successful transfer proce-
dures between Member States entails some additional difficulties. The Mem-
ber States do not collect and process data according to a common standard. 
In Italy, the international branch of the Ministry of Justice collects and pro-
cesses the data. It has recently implemented new text analysis software which 
does not provide accurate time series. However, the collected data confirms 
that, in recent years, the level of implementation of FD 2008/909/JHA is 
stable, from a quantitative point of view (around 100 transfers per year is-
sued from Italy and Spain and around 250 transfers received in Romania). 
This represents a significant step forward in cooperation on criminal mat-
ters at EU level. However, the number of transfers actually performed in 
Spain and Italy is very far from the target group that could benefit from 
this measure. The next section analyses the shortcomings of this limited 
implementation.  
4. Shortcomings of the Implementation of Transfer Procedures in the 
Different National Contexts  
FD 2008/909/JHA has undoubtedly simplified the procedure for transfer-
ring prisoners in the EU. However, as the figures show, the number of trans-
fers completed is much lower than one would expect in relation to the prison 
population that could benefit from this type of measure. This section explores 
the possible reasons for the unsuccessful implementation of this tool. 
The research carried out within the scope of the RePers project identified 
the most common shortcomings of the implementation of FD 2008/909/JHA 
in the different countries. Based on a series of exploratory interviews and the 
analysis of the case files regarding transfer procedures under this FD in Italy, 
the research team identified the following: 
 
 
10 See the chapter by J.A Brandariz Garcia in this book. 
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– Lack of knowledge and awareness of the FD 
– Lack of/difficulty in gathering information on the prisoner’s family, so-
cial and work background 
– Excessive length of the procedure 
– Lack of cooperation from foreign judicial authorities 
– Lack of mutual trust between national authorities 
– Poor quality of the activity of the judicial authorities involved (e.g. accu-
racy of the certificate) 
– Difficulty in identifying the competent foreign authorities 
– Lack of cooperation from local prison staff 
– Unreliability of information provided by the prisoner 
– Inadequate selection of cases actually deserving attention  
Through the aforementioned online survey, we asked practitioners how prob-
lematic these issues were for the full implementation of FD 2008/909/JHA. The 
answers to this question provided us with insights into the individual priorities 
when approaching a case. The results revealed extensive concerns over the dif-
ficulties in gathering information on the prisoner’s family, social and work 
background, followed by the excessive length of the procedure. The third most 
pressing criticism was the lack of cooperation from the foreign judicial authori-
ties. 11 Conversely, the less important obstacles for practitioners were the unreli-
ability of information provided by the prisoner and the inadequate selection of 
cases actually deserving attention. 
An open question of the survey asking if there were other obstacles to the 
full effectiveness of the FD allowed us to validate the reliability of the pro-
posed shortcomings and to discover unidentified problems to be further ex-
plored. Most of the answers to this question revealed that the practical obsta-
cles to transfers were already outlined in the previous question. In other cases, 
this question was used to illustrate the aforementioned shortcomings with de-
tails and also to add the following problems:  
– The lack of knowledge of the prison situation and the laws of the execut-
ing countries 
– The critical intersection between the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) 
and FD 2008/909/JHA 
 
 
11 The differences regarding the priority of the shortcomings is very slight between the countries: in Italy, 
the perceived main problem was the excessive length of the procedure, followed by the difficulties in 
gathering information on the prisoner’s social ties and the lack of mutual trust between the national au-
thorities. For Spain, the main obstacles were the lack of knowledge and awareness of the Framework De-
cision and the difficulties in gathering information on the prisoner’s social context, followed by the exces-
sive length of the procedure. In Romania, the main shortcoming was also the lack of knowledge and awa-
reness of the Framework Decision, followed by the lack of cooperation from foreign judicial authorities 
and, thirdly, difficulties in gathering information on the prisoner’s family, social background, etc. 
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– Fragmentation of legal orders, decentralisation, lack of a clear distribu-
tion of powers and lack of communication between different authorities of the 
same countries 
– Lack of clear guidelines (to understand and to complete the certificate, to 
adapt the sentence, etc.) 
– Lack of involvement of the penitentiary authorities  
– Insufficient staff/excessive workload 
– Lack of consent of the detainee/refusal to execute the sentence (in Roma-
nia)  
– Overlap with other legal instruments, such as the possibility of serving 
probation in one’s own country and deportation (in Spain) 
The research identified two main areas of shortcomings: one related to na-
tional issues, i.e. the implementation of the FD in the specific Member States, 
the other related to cooperation issues. The two areas are connected, particu-
larly as some of the national issues turn into obstacles to cooperation. 
Several national issues were identified. The most significant were: the lack 
of knowledge and awareness of the FD by the different players, including the 
need for a precise distribution of powers; the fragmentation of legal orders; the 
decentralisation of the competent authorities and the lack of communication 
between different national authorities; the lack of knowledge of detention 
conditions and laws of executing countries; the limited involvement of peni-
tentiary authorities. 
These types of issue can usually be resolved with more information, train-
ing and new organisational solutions. 
The most significant national issue is the lack of knowledge, which is often 
the primary reason for other shortcomings. 12 This lack of knowledge is not on-
ly an issue of the competent authorities at local level, but also of lawyers and 
detainees. Lawyers are almost always absent in the execution phase and the 
majority of them are not familiar with the procedure and do not support detain-
ees in their path towards cross-border transfer. The level of knowledge of de-
tainees is also limited. In 2014, the Italian prison administration carried out a 
mapping of ‘transferable’ detainees, also obtaining their opinion on a possible 
transfer. For Italy, this initiative was a way of boosting an increasing number of 
procedures, but the quality of information given to detainees was generally 
poor. However, the initial mapping helped to spread information on the exist-
ence of the possibility of being transferred to the Member State of origin.  
This does not seem to be the case in Spain.  
In Spain, a recent directive of the General Secretariat of Penitentiary Insti-
 
 
12 It is worth mentioning that the lack of competence and specialization is not referred to the 
authorities at central level. 
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tutions (I-03/2019) 13 on foreign inmates established that social workers must 
give to foreign detainees an information leaflet within a maximum period of 5 
days from their entry to prison. This leaflet should contain all relevant infor-
mation on the different possibilities available for applying for a transfer in or-
der to continue the sentence in the country of origin. In the case of the Catalan 
Prison Service (the penitentiary administration in charge of executing criminal 
sentences in Catalonia) a 2019 notice was also issued by the Secretary of pe-
nal measures, rehabilitation and attention to victims by the Government of 
Catalonia (notice 2/2019) 14 which states that the person able to serve the sen-
tence in another State must be informed of this possibility. The notice also es-
tablishes the requirements for the procedure and the documentation that must 
be sent to the penitentiary surveillance judge (the competent authority for issu-
ing the transfer). As these measures are relatively new, we are unable to assess 
their outcome in terms of greater involvement by the penitentiary authorities 
in the procedure. 
The lack of knowledge of authorities is a mixed issue. In some countries, for 
instance, in Italy, it is connected to difficulties in dealing with ordinary work-
loads. Transfer procedures generally involve additional work for offices that are 
already understaffed; this certainly requires a better organisational solution. 
The degree of decentralisation of the authorities 15 that take relevant deci-
sions is a further technical issue related to the implementation of the FD. In 
Italy, the decision is taken by the competent prosecutor at territorial level, un-
der Article 658 or Article 665 of the Italian Criminal Procedure Code, depend-
ing on the circumstances. In Spain, the certificate could be issued by both the 
sentencing judges and the prison supervision judges; in practice, though, these 
decisions are mostly made by the latter. This means that hundreds of judicial 
authorities are involved in issuing the certificate, with a lack of specialisation 
and also an unclear attribution of responsibilities. The issue of fragmentation 
of competence is closely related to the fragmentation of national legal orders, 
which is still a hurdle making it difficult for the local courts and prosecution 
offices to be aware of and to become familiar with foreign legal systems, for 
the purposes of transfer procedures. 
Moreover, the split of powers makes the issue of proper training and know-
ledge of the procedure crucial for guaranteeing smooth cooperation. For exam-
 
 
13 Its name in Spanish is ‘Normas generals sobre internos extranjeros’. Available at: http://www.insti 
tucionpenitenciaria.es/web/export/sites/default/datos/descargables/instruccionesCirculares/I_3-2019-Extra 
njeros.pdf 
14 Its name in Catalan is: ‘Circular 2/2019, sobre estrangeria als centres penitenciaris de Catalunya’. 
Available at: http://justicia.gencat.cat/web/.content/home/ambits/reinsercio_i_serveis_peni/serveis_peni 
tenciaris/instruccions_i_circulars/circulars/circular-2-2019.pdf 
15 See A. Neira-Pena in this book. 
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ple, the lack of expertise at local courts level involves a huge waste of time in 
drafting the documentation. 
For instance, in the case of multiple sentences, the Romanian authorities 
require the parties to submit one certificate for each sentence, for the purposes 
of its formal recognition, on an individual basis. The issuing authorities should 
then provide a summary of the certificates, aimed at clarifying the overall ac-
cumulation of punishments. It often happens that the authorities competent for 
issuing the certificates are not fully aware of the rules and practices of another 
Member State, Romania in this case, and this results in the certificates being 
sent back and forth between the issuing and executing States, due to incom-
pleteness. 
The involvement of prison authorities in the process could be very helpful 
for overcoming some of the obstacles, also due to the identified lack of 
knowledge. Prison officers or social workers have direct access to the prison-
ers or easier ways of collecting information regarding their family, work and 
social ties in the country of origin or in the country where the person was con-
victed (which is very difficult for judges or prosecutors to obtain) and they are 
aware of the more convenient possibilities for the social rehabilitation of de-
tainees. Although the FD does not mention the involvement of prison authori-
ties in transfers, at national level, this may be solved by a change in the na-
tional law, or even only in practices. 
The obstacles to smooth cooperation relate to the variable mutual trust be-
tween foreign authorities and differences in the legal cultures (Nelken, 2001; 
Engle Merry 2010). Some Member States take a more pragmatic approach: the 
transfer procedure is almost entirely an administrative procedure where com-
munications between the countries occur very easily by e-mail and the recog-
nition of the judgment is carried out without formalities through an official let-
ter. No right to appeal is guaranteed to the detainees. This is the case in the 
Netherlands. Other Member States take a more rights-based approach: the 
procedure is entirely judicial, the communications are more formal, the de-
tainees are given more opportunity to oppose a transfer but the procedure is 
often very lengthy. 
The Netherlands, as is clear from the Spanish data, adopts a very pragmatic 
and efficient approach which facilitates the transfer (and deportation) and which 
is also driven by the national policy on detention, to avoid, by any means, over-
crowding. 
The failure to achieve mutual trust (see, on the challenges of mutual trust, 
Sicurella 2018, Persak 2014) between the countries is certainly the biggest short-
coming for the implementation of any judicial cooperation measure. There may 
need to be a trade-off between efficiency and a rights-based approach to reco-
gnition. On one hand, a high degree of pragmatism risks resulting in a huge re-
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duction of the rights of detainees while, on the other hand, a more formal ap-
proach risks resulting in a tedious procedure, which fails to achieve the aim of 
the transfer even in cases where the detainee clearly favours the transfer. 
The differences in terms of legal cultures emerge from these different ap-
proaches, along with the predominance of the unilateral agenda of the Member 
States. 
The cooperation between Romania and Italy is also a good example of the 
complex relationship between willingness to cooperate and trust. On 29 April 
2015, Italy and Romania signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). 
This MoU aims to deal with a number of problems that have surfaced over 
time, relating to the transfer of sentenced persons. Above all, the most im-
portant issues concern the difficulty of obtaining additional information from 
the issuing State, delays due to translation issues and the response times by the 
competent authorities of the two States, the lack of clarity of the documents 
sent by Italian authorities, the incomplete completion of the certificate, and 
difficulties related to the identification of the person to be transferred. 
In other words, Italy and Romania resort to ad hoc bilateral cooperation 
mechanisms to overcome issues arising in the wake of the implementation of 
the FD. Quite interestingly, it seems that the MoU has not been crucial in solv-
ing the outlined issues, as a further demonstration that legal obligations do not 
necessarily enhance mutual cooperation. Instead, mutual trust is a process that 
cannot be imposed by law or by additional bilateral rules. Mutual recognition 
reveals that - despite the legal differences - the criminal system of the other 
country is reliable and aims towards the same common purpose, i.e. the social 
rehabilitation of the detainee. 
The crisis of mutual trust emerges precisely when the Member State is guided 
by its own agenda and priorities, which intertwine with the purpose of the FD. In 
the cooperation between Italy and Romania the common problem of prison over-
crowding deteriorates the mutual trust between the two Member States.  
On one side, Italy pushes for the transfer of Romanian prisoners to Roma-
nia irrespective of the relations with the country with the aim of reducing 
overcrowding in Italy and, on the other side, bureaucratic obstacles may be put 
in place to avoid the transfer to Romania, which risks definitively hampering 
mutual trust. 
Other issues relate to the costs and time needed for translating the sentence, 
as well as the critical intersection between the EAW and FD 909 and the over-
lapping between the return procedure and FD 909. All these issues have been 
analysed in other chapters of the book. 16 
 
 
16 On the EAW see A. Rosanò, on deportation see J.A. Brandariz García, in this book. 
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5. Conclusions 
This chapter has focused on the implementation of cross-border transfers of 
EU detainees and their functioning in practice. The rules always depend on 
both legal and extra-legal factors and, in the transfer of detainees, the distance 
between “law in the books” and “law in action” is increasingly significant. 
As has been shown in this chapter, the features of the transposition process 
of the FD in Italy, Spain and Romania provide a better understanding of the 
approach towards and expectations of each Member State in relation to this 
European legal instrument which is very insightful for contextualising its im-
plementation in relation to the national agendas. 
According to the available data, over recent years there have been some 
clear advances in the implementation of transfers, in Italy and Spain as issuing 
countries and in Romania as executing state. However, it seems that in both 
Italy and Spain the number of transfers has almost reached its inherent peak, at 
around one hundred transfers per year. This is a very low number compared 
with the prison population that could, at least in theory, benefit from this pro-
cedure. Major shortcomings hamper its more extensive implementation. 
Based on our fieldwork, we have identified multiple shortcomings to the 
implementation of the FD, which could be systematised as national issues and 
cooperation issues. The first relate to national adaptation to the FD as it differs 
according to the distribution of powers established by the transposition law, 
the structure and resources of the judicial system, and the commitment and 
awareness of the different players in prison transfers. The second kind of ob-
stacle relates to cooperation issues, including the lack of permanent mutual 
trust in the foreign authorities and differences related to the legal culture of the 
different EU countries. These issues are translated into a set of more practical 
problems related to requirements concerning documentation, official commu-
nications, language obstacles, etc., all of which contribute to increasing the 
length of a procedure initially conceived as expedited and simplified. The crit-
ical intersection and overlapping of the FD 909 with other EU instruments, 
such as EAW or the return procedure, also implies a cooperation problem. 
Each obstacle requires a different approach. National issues could easily be 
improved through training and organisational solutions at national and local level. 
However, cooperation shortcomings pose deeper challenges. It is a fact that there 
are different legal cultures in the different EU Member States, but effective coop-
eration in criminal matters and the creation of a European space of justice, liberty 
and security requires a further standardisation of legal procedures. Mutual trust 
needs to be strengthened with clearer mutual objectives. Mutual trust is a process 
that cannot be imposed by law, organisational measures or more training. It is the 
result of a process of mutual recognition of reliability. 
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The national agenda and priorities of the different countries regarding, for 
instance, the situation of their own prison system or the return of unwanted 
migrants, constitute major shortcomings for mutual trust. Besides, the unequal 
application of the FD, due to the different forms of transposition, institutional 
reasons or the amount of resources allocated to the implementation of this in-
strument, leads to discriminatory treatment of EU citizens in the different 
countries, but also within the same country. The commitment of Member Sta-
tes to the social rehabilitation of detainees - the main objective of their transfer 
- as a common purpose should become a guideline for the functioning of this 
instrument which could provide the necessary equal treatment of citizens and 
foreigners in EU prisons and mutual trust in the field of criminal cooperation. 
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Proposals for Improving the Implementation  
of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA 
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Abstract: The chapter gathers together some of the findings of the RePers project in rela-
tion to possible improvements in the implementation of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, 
particularly in light of the Italian, Romanian and Spanish experiences and perspectives. The 
analysis addresses the main phases of the cross-border transfer procedure, from the identifi-
cation of the potential transferee to the decision on recognition and the possible overlap 
with other procedures, such as the European Arrest Warrant. 
Keywords: Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, implementation, certificate, prisoner, mu-
tual recognition. 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. Identification and Selection of Potential Transferees. – 3. The 
Prisoner’s Opinion and His or Her Consent. – 4. Filling out of the Certificate. – 4.1 
Determination of the Sentence and Explanation of the Part of It Remaining to Be Served in the 
State of Transfer. – 4.2. Filling out of fhe Certificate: Cases of Accumulation of Sentences 
And Continuation of Offences. – 5. Transmission of the Judgment and of Its Translated 
Version. – 6. Assessing the Chances of Social Rehabilitation. – 7. Coordination with the 
European Arrest Warrant. – 8. Concluding Remarks. 
1. Introduction 
The book has thus far provided a cross-sectional analysis of the main ad-
vances and shortcomings concerning cross-border transfers within the European 
Union. Specific attention has been paid to three national case studies, namely 
Italy, Romania and Spain, which were the focus of the activities performed in 
the context of the RePers project. In fact, as demonstrated in previous chapters, 
 
 
 Stefano Montaldo drafted this chapter in its entirety. Both Alexandru Damian and José A. 
Brandariz amended the parts relating to the Romanian and Spanish legal orders.  
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these Member States represent an important test bed for the material functioning 
of the cooperation mechanism set out in Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 
27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to 
judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involv-
ing deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European 
Union (OJ L 327, 5.12.2008, pp. 27-46, hereinafter, the ‘Framework Decision’) 
for two principal and closely related reasons. Firstly, the prison systems of these 
Member States have high rates of foreign EU nationals serving prison sentenc-
es. Secondly, and consequently, as already discussed in the book, the relevant 
national authorities have enacted extremely diversified normative and opera-
tional strategies to cope with this phenomenon, including considerable efforts to 
facilitate cross-border transfers. 
Building on the analysis developed thus far, this closing chapter focuses on 
some proposals for material improvements to the conduct of cross-border trans-
fer procedures. In fact, the RePers project activities were designed with a view 
to distilling existing best practices and possible future steps concerning the im-
plementation of the Framework Decision in the three Member States involved 
and, possibly, beyond. As such, this operational perspective is a direct comple-
ment to the analysis of the normative layer developed in the preceding chapter.  
Due to the focus on Italy, Romania and Spain, the proposals presented here 
are not all-encompassing but often stem from the specific features of the do-
mestic legal orders under consideration and from the expertise developed by 
the relevant competent national authorities. At the same time, many of the pit-
falls we identify represent generalised flaws in transfer procedures; according-
ly, the respective improvement proposals could be effectively replicated in 
other Member States, with the due adjustments. 
The structure of the chapter is modelled in terms of the timeline of the 
transfer procedure codified in the Framework Decision and in the national im-
plementing legislations, in relation to certain aspects of the procedure. There-
fore, the analysis firstly considers the organisational measures to ensure that 
potential transferees are appropriately identified and provided with adequate 
and reliable information on the relevant rules and procedures in the pre-
transfer context (Section 2). Section 3 addresses the prisoner’s role, with a 
specific focus on his or her opinion and consent to the cross-border transfer, 
whereas the following Section 4 deals with more practical issues concerning 
the filling out of the certificate, which can have a significant effect on the out-
come of the procedure. Section 5 addresses another important practical aspect, 
namely the forwarding of the certificate and the judgment, along with a trans-
lation of the latter document into the official language of the executing State. 
As already discussed in previous chapters, a key aspect of the entire cross-
border transfer mechanism is its objective of enhancing the prisoner’s chances 
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of social rehabilitation: Section 6 addresses this topic, by highlighting possible 
solutions to the current loopholes identified in the three Member States invol-
ved. Section 7 analyses the possible overlap of the transfer procedure and the 
European Arrest Warrant, in light of the provisions of the Framework Deci-
sion and of the relevant practice. 
Lastly, but most importantly, we must provide some words of thanks. In 
drafting this chapter, we benefited greatly from the crucial contribution of the 
practitioners and experts involved in the RePers project activities, to whom we 
are profoundly indebted. They provided vital contributions to many of the re-
search activities we carried out in preparing this chapter and the book as a 
whole. Aside from a great deal of desk research, this analysis stems from fiel-
dwork conducted in cooperation with a number of national groups of practi-
tioners. The Italian team consulted archives and documents on transfer proce-
dures. In addition, almost one hundred key practitioners answered a question-
naire that was prepared to ascertain their views on the shortcomings and pit-
falls of the Framework Decision’s procedures. Some of these practitioners we-
re also interviewed. Moreover, this research benefited greatly from the debates 
raised and the conclusions reached in the framework of a number of mutual 
learning activities, in which dozens of Italian, Romanian and Spanish judges, 
public prosecutors, ministerial officials and scholars took part. In short, the 
comments and perspectives of these selected groups of practitioners were ex-
tremely useful and inspiring.  
2. Identification and Selection of Potential Transferees 
Identifying and selecting potential transferees is as complex as strategic 
tasks, which can have a significant effect on the (quantitative) success of 
Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA. Some recurring factors affect the activity 
of the competent authorities and the expectations of prisoners in this pre-tran-
sfer phase. 
Firstly, these critical tasks fall outside the scope of the Framework Deci-
sion and of the domestic rules of implementation. This normative vacuum 
means that no minimum common standards apply. The procedure is, in princi-
ple, initiated ex officio by the domestic judicial authorities, but several factors 
influence the effectiveness of this phase. For instance, the dialogue between 
judicial authorities and prison administrations is often poor, limiting the for-
mer’s opportunities for identifying potential transferees. Moreover, prisoners 
often lack appropriate legal support, with a view to facilitating the communi-
cation to the competent judicial authorities of their will to be transferred. This 
is even more complicated in cases where the sentenced person is kept in a pri-
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son facility which is very distant from the place where he or she was convict-
ed. Prisoners might also be transferred in itinere to other detention locations, 
thereby further blurring their contacts with the relevant stakeholders.  
Consequently, this essential preliminary step is dealt with by national au-
thorities in an uncoordinated fashion, very often through unilateral strategies 
based on soft-law measures and extemporary operational solutions. Moreover, 
the latter usually lack continuity over time and largely depend on the changing 
landscape of political priorities and the availability of public funds. Therefore, 
a key prerequisite for triggering the transfer procedure is left to the goodwill 
of the domestic authorities – usually national governments and more specifi-
cally the Ministry of Justice – in stark contrast with the structure of EU judi-
cial cooperation in criminal matters, which primarily relies on principles of 
mutual trust and mutual recognition between judicial authorities. 
Secondly, in line with existing literature, 1 the RePers project activities 
demonstrated the limited awareness and knowledge of the existence of a legal 
framework allowing for fast-track cross-border transfers. This phenomenon is 
cross-sectional and involves all relevant players, namely prisoners, lawyers, 
prison staff, public prosecutors and members of the judiciary. This situation is 
further compounded by a widespread lack of knowledge on the actual func-
tioning of intra-EU prisoner transfers. On the one hand, lawyers very seldom 
provide appropriate assistance to their clients in this area of the criminal exe-
cution phase. On the other hand, judges and public prosecutors often perceive 
these procedures as an additional burden to their – already heavy – workload, 
especially in smaller districts, which have no specific units for dealing with 
international cooperation cases. 2 Moreover, this obstacle is further heightened 
by the fact that the execution phase is the most disregarded part of the criminal 
adjudication process, by both judicial authorities and lawyers. 
Thirdly, both the prisoners and the professionals concerned suffer from a 
knowledge gap regarding foreign penitentiary regimes, covering both the main 
features of in-prison treatment and the rules governing post-sentence criminal 
law enforcement, as well as post-release re-socialisation programmes of for-
mer inmates. This situation highlights the persistent barriers fragmenting the 
 
 
1 See inter alia V. Ferraris, ‘L’implementazione del d.lgs. 161/2010 sul riconoscimento delle sentenze di 
condanna a pena detentiva: un caso di doppio fallimento’, La legislazione penale, 2019, pp. 1-15. Re-
trieved on 17 September 2019 from http://www.lalegislazionepenale.eu/limplementazione-del-d-lgs- 
161-2010-sul-reciproco-riconoscimento-delle-sentenze-di-condanna-a-pena-detentiva-un-caso-di-dop 
pio-fallimento-valeria-ferraris/. 
2 In some Member States, specific organisational measures have been enacted to cope with these 
procedures. In Romania, for instance, the competence for cross-border transfers is conferred to the 
Court of Appeals, with designated judges for international cooperation matters. However, the heavy 
workload is a persistent concern, which deprives the identification of specialised judicial authorities 
of its actual effectiveness. 
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European judicial space. Beyond the surface of mutual trust and mutual 
recognition, the actual grip of these principles is challenged by the fragmenta-
tion of national legal orders and practices, which reaches its peak in the crimi-
nal execution phase.  
In this context, besides the ordinary support from prison staff, two main 
practices have been developed in Italy, Romania and Spain. 
Firstly, in Italy, screening activity has been conducted since 2015 by the 
penitentiary authorities, on a yearly basis, to ascertain whether any foreign na-
tional detainees are willing to be transferred. The penitentiary staff members 
distribute a form among these detainees and then send the forms they collect 
to the Ministry of Justice, which has been identified as the central authority for 
the purposes of the Framework Decision.  
Data show that this screening has contributed to boosting the phenomenon 
of consensual transfers. However, this approach – although promising – re-
quires some adjustments. Firstly, the final recipient of the forms is not proper-
ly identified. On many occasions, the Ministry of Justice is perceived to be the 
natural addressee of the forms submitted at local level. This situation has two 
main pitfalls. On the one hand, the office for international judicial cooperation 
of the Justice Affairs Department at the Ministry of Justice is overloaded by 
too many files, which its staff members are simply unable to handle promptly 
and efficiently. On the other hand, this approach unnecessarily duplicates the 
institutional layers, since the central authority is then expected to alert the 
competent judicial authority at territorial level, thus wasting time and re-
sources, and exacerbating the risk of unfruitful procedures. In fact, the Italian 
experience reveals that the competent judicial authority is sometimes not will-
ing to deal with the transfer procedure, or at least to deal with it swiftly, as it 
ought to do. In other cases, the judicial authority receives no further feedback 
from the prison service, with which it has limited contacts, and eventually de-
cides to leave the case in limbo, with the passing of time making the transfer 
increasingly unlikely. 
A similar situation occurs in Spain, where the Prison Service Office has not 
traditionally played an active part in the transfer procedure. The Office’s role 
in this regard is somewhat irrelevant, as it merely informs the Ministry of 
prisoners who meet the conditions for being transferred. Again, the subsequent 
institutional steps could be made simpler and smoother. 
Secondly, the forms undergo no preliminary selection on the basis of some 
objective parameters such as duration of the sentence, length of the sentence 
remaining to be served, or factors regarding the prisoner’s personal situation. 
Therefore, these documents include cases that seemingly justify the start of the 
relevant procedure, but have no actual chance of reaching a positive conclu-
sion. This situation entails a mismatch between time, resources and costs, the 
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first two usually being very limited in comparison with the significant expens-
es related to – inter alia – the ministerial staff involved and the translation of 
the certificate and the judgment.  
Thirdly, the form leaves very limited room for an appropriate explanation 
of the prisoner’s opinion and personal and family situation. This is paradoxi-
cal, as prison staff members have access to a plethora of information deriv-
ing from the treatment and supervision of the inmate, including the activities 
in which he or she is involved, the rehabilitation programmes and the expec-
tations regarding his or her post-release life. This body of information re-
mains untouched, even though it could be useful in the subsequent steps of 
the transfer procedure.  
In conclusion, periodic screening performed by the prison administration at 
territorial level could play a significant role in increasing the number of cross-
border transfers. However, this screening should be carefully structured at lo-
cal level, establishing clear and direct communication channels between pris-
on staff and the competent judicial authorities. Moreover, the collection of the 
forms should be followed by a case-by-case preliminary assessment of the ac-
tual chances of successfully completing the transfer procedure. This selection 
could be made on the basis of objective criteria, such as the duration of the sen-
tence, the length of the sentence remaining to be served, correlation between the 
rest of the sentence to be served and the duration of the transfer procedure and 
the rehabilitation programmes in which the prisoner is involved at that time. 
Lastly, the form should pay specific attention to the prisoner’s opinion and situ-
ation, with a view to avoiding unnecessary hasty references to this additional 
information at subsequent steps of the procedure. Clear-cut evidence on the cen-
tre of gravity of the person concerned could also be considered, as a way of sup-
porting the activity of the competent judicial authority and helping it to make 
informed decisions on the transfer proposals. 
Another key issue in this preliminary phase of the mechanism refers to the 
‘if’ and to the ‘how’ prisoners are informed of the possibility of opting for a 
cross-border transfer, as well as of the main features and requirements of the 
procedure and the relevant legal regime in the destination Member State. This 
is a deep-rooted concern regarding the implementation of the Framework De-
cision which has been ongoing since the very early years after its adoption. 
Scholars have repeatedly pointed out the need to provide prisoners with a clear 
set of information, as a way of fostering both the effectiveness of the judicial 
cooperation mechanism and the prisoner’s prospects of rehabilitation. As dis-
cussed in-depth by Faraldo-Cabana in this book, timely and substantially 
complete information is essential to the start of a transfer procedure and to the 
achievement of its inherent purpose of fostering the prisoner’s chances of so-
cial rehabilitation. 
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In this respect, Italy, Romania and Spain display remarkable convergence. 
In these Member States measures have been adopted to provide proper infor-
mation support to prisoners who are foreign EU nationals. In Romania, these 
detainees receive general information on the domestic legal order and on the 
competent judicial and governmental authorities both in Romania and in the 
possible State of destination.  
In Spain, since 14 February 2019, following an internal order of the Head 
of the Central Prison Administration, prison staff members have been obliged 
to inform foreign inmates about transfer procedures immediately as soon as 
they enter a prison facility. This information includes an explanation of the 
relevant procedures at national level and the main aspects of the domestic leg-
islation of some key Member States. Prisoners are also provided with useful 
contacts if they want to request further information from the authorities of 
their Member State of nationality or residence. Moreover, due to the high in-
cidence of Romanian cases, the Spanish and Romanian authorities have issued 
a common document providing the relevant information on key aspects of the 
Romanian legal order. 
Finally, the Italian Ministry of Justice has very recently prepared a booklet 
on the Framework Decision and its implementation at national level. This 
booklet is currently being printed and will be made available, as a rule, to pri-
soners who are foreign EU nationals. This tool also includes some information 
on foreign legal orders, with a specific focus on Romania. However, the in-
formation contained in the booklet has not been discussed and agreed in ad-
vance with the Romanian authorities. 
These sources of information appear to be fit for purpose, as they in-
form potential transferees of the availability of cross-border transfers at EU 
level and may trigger requests for further details addressed to institutional 
players (namely, the prison administration, the competent judicial authority, 
the central authority) or professionals (primarily lawyers and social assi-
stants). 
In conclusion, upon entering a prison facility, foreign EU nationals should 
be provided with information on the availability of the cross-border transfer 
mechanism. This information should include the general features of the proce-
dure itself, its scope and its pre-conditions. Prisoners should also be provided 
with useful institutional contacts (e.g. competent judicial authority, relevant 
office of the central authority, prison ombudsman) as well as with general in-
formation on the criminal execution phase and penitentiary rules in the possi-
ble destination state. 
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3. The Prisoner’s Opinion and His or Her Consent 
The project activities revealed the extent of the fragmentation and diversity 
of the scenario – at least in Italy, Romania and Spain – in relation to obtaining 
the prisoner’s opinion and his or her consent to the transfer. This variety of 
approaches and practices is often due to two converging factors. On the one 
hand, the Framework Decision does not provide specific requirements and 
common standards for obtaining the prisoner’s opinion. On the other hand, the 
initial phases of the procedure are usually highly decentralised: prison staff, 
courts and public prosecution offices (and sometimes even each public prose-
cutor within a single office) develop their own methodologies and pursue their 
theoretical preferences and priorities. 
In some cases, as recalled above in relation to Italy, the prisoner’s opinion 
is summarised in a form, which merely contains generic statements on the so-
cial environment of the person concerned or his or her view on a cross-border 
transfer. In other legal orders, such as in Sweden, the prisoner is heard by a 
judge during a hearing. In most cases, no clear rules are provided and the 
opinion may be obtained either orally or in writing. Be that as it may, usually 
no real and in-depth information on this aspect is made available to the com-
petent judicial authorities in the issuing and executing Member States: unless 
the latter requires additional clarifications, the prisoner’s opinion takes the 
shape of a yes/no tick in a box on the certificate. 
As discussed earlier in this book, 3 it follows that a decision on transfer is 
often taken without any clear indication of the prisoner’s actual preferences. 
This situation fragments the implementation of the Framework Decision into 
as many bits and pieces as the varied domestic practices and endangers the 
achievement of the primary objective of cross-border transfers, namely of-
fenders’ social rehabilitation. 
At the same time, the lack of clear normative standards leaves room for 
radically opposing approaches. As demonstrated by the interviews we con-
ducted, some judicial authorities at territorial level – particularly in Spain and 
Romania – deem the prisoner’s consent to be a de facto pre-condition for for-
warding a certificate, as it is considered an essential component of the inmate’s 
journey towards rehabilitation. Even though this practice might appear in line 
with the rationale of a cross-border transfer, it is in plain contrast with the 
wording of the Framework Decision, which removes the requirement for con-
sent in many cases, as already discussed in the previous chapters. 4 
Therefore, both situations raise concerns as to their compliance with the 
 
 
3 See Faraldo-Cabana’s chapter in this book, addressing this topic extensively. 
4 Ibidem. 
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Framework Decision. On the one hand, the prisoner’s opinion should be taken 
into due consideration. On the other hand, it cannot amount to an additional 
and automatic ground for pre-selecting transfer procedures. 
In conclusion, the competent judicial authorities should – as a rule – insist 
upon obtaining a complete, specific and informed opinion from the person 
concerned. To do so, some converging measures could be useful: 
– improved set of information available to the prisoner (see Section 2 
above); 
– the prisoner should be granted ex ante support from a lawyer; 
– the obtaining of a written statement from the prisoner or the transcription 
of his or her oral statements in full. For this purpose, increased importance 
should be given to this aspect in communications between the institutional 
players and the professionals involved; 
– where possible, the reliability of the prisoner’s opinion should be sup-
ported by relevant documents and/or the indication of personal contacts; 
– the forwarding of the complete prisoner’s opinion to the central authority 
tasked with coordination and communication with the State of transfer, also 
with a view to minimising the multiplication of in itinere requests for clarifi-
cations and additional information between the executing and issuing authori-
ties; 
– all relevant information and documents should be included in the certificate 
or attached to it, also depending on the specific circumstances of each case. 
4. Filling out of the Certificate 
4.1. Determination of the Sentence and Explanation of the Part of It 
Remaining to Be Served in the State of Transfer 
The correct, complete and clear filling out of the certificate is a recurring 
concern in the practice of the Member States involved in the project. Incom-
plete or imprecise information compels the executing judicial authority to un-
dergo consultations and submit requests for clarifications and amendments, 
thereby delaying the procedure. In some cases, inaccurate certificates and the 
subsequent need for in itinere bilateral consultations trigger dilatory strategies 
on the part of the executing authority. In other circumstances, this situation af-
fects the prisoner, who has no effective remedies for overcoming such institu-
tional stumbling blocks.  
The analysis of bilateral relationships between Italy and Romania shows that 
the determination of the sentence is the most critical issue, on two main grounds. 
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Firstly, the overall length of the sentence is often the outcome of complex domes-
tic legal regimes involving various provisions of criminal law and criminal pro-
cedural law (aggravating and alleviating circumstances, specific rules on 
reoffending, procedural rules on plea bargaining or other deflation mechanisms, 
rules on parole and early release, incidence of the provisions regarding the ap-
plication of the more favourable criminal law, determining the resulting pun-
ishment for competing offenses, etc.). Multiple legal layers contribute to either 
scaling up or scaling down the penal tariff provided by the main substantive cri-
minal rule, as the cumulated sentence is rarely a mathematical operation. In Ro-
mania, a penalty increase is added to the sentence bearing the harshest punish-
ment (main punishment).  
These legal complexities might not be easy to grasp for the executing judi-
cial authority, even if the issuing authority attempts to explain them in the cer-
tificate. Secondly, some prison benefits apply in itinere and therefore lead to a 
slight decrease of the sentence remaining to be served while the transfer pro-
cedure is pending. This requires the issuing authority to forward additional no-
tices complementing the certificate, with a view to updating the situation of 
the prisoner concerned. On many occasions, the Romanian authorities, soon 
before recognising an Italian judgment, ask the issuing authorities whether 
last-minute updates should be taken into consideration. These additional ex-
changes of information are necessary but amplify the risk of mistakes and – 
again – slow down the procedure. 
Due to the non-unitary judicial practice in Romania, which often needs to 
be settled by the High Court of Cassation and Justice, Romanian authorities 
are often confronted with the issue of determining the remaining sentence to 
be served in Romania, which delays the transfer process. This has happened 
predominantly in Romania’s relationships with Italy as it was unclear if days 
of early release granted to sentenced persons or the length of sentence consid-
ered to have been served, based upon work carried out and good conduct, 
were applicable to the remainder of the sentence in Romania. Following a de-
cision by the High Court of Justice, after recognising the decision and transfer 
of the sentenced person, Romania does not deduct from the sentence to be 
served in Romania the duration considered served by the sentencing state on 
the basis of work performed and good conduct.  
These difficulties are not confined to Italy and Romania, as the criminal 
execution phase and the rules governing the imposition of a sentence fall un-
der the exclusive competence of the Member States and therefore follow very 
different patterns. 
Conversely, the Spanish legal order is an exception to this scenario, as in 
itinere reductions in sentences or early release procedures do not condition the 
execution of the sentence abroad once the final judgment has been issued; 
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therefore, the custodial sentence remains basically unchanged during the exe-
cution phase. As in any other EU member state, Spanish prison law provisions 
include parole and early release measures. However, in practice, this national 
regulation does not affect mutual cooperation procedures and does not ob-
struct prisoner transfers. 
The project activities confirmed that the problems stemming from incom-
plete or incorrect certificates – particularly with regard to the determination of 
the sentence and the part of it remaining to be served – are crucial factors in 
the unsatisfactory application of the Framework Decision. Measures should 
therefore be taken to prevent unnecessary additional exchanges of information 
and to inform the executing judicial authority of any update on the length of 
the sentence remaining to be served. 
In particular, 
– when filling out the certificate, the issuing judicial authority should pay 
particular attention to describing the rules that have been applied in determin-
ing the custodial sentence. It should also describe step-by-step the sequence of 
steps followed to reach such a final outcome. The text of the relevant provi-
sions should be included in the certificate; 
– in the event of in itinere changes to the sentence remaining to be served, 
prompt updates should be sent to the executing judicial authority (through the 
central authority, if such a task falls under its remit), with a view to comple-
menting the forwarded certificate. No new, additional or revised certificates 
should be sent or requested. 
4.2. Filling out of the Certificate: Cases of Accumulation of Sentences 
and Continuation of Offences 
The absence of a clear and uniform operational approach towards explain-
ing to the executing authorities the determination of the length of the sentence 
– and of the part remaining to be served – in cases of accumulation of sen-
tences and continuation of offences is another recurring obstacle which ham-
pers the effectiveness of transfer procedures.  
Accumulation of sentences – particularly as far as the Romanian, Italian 
and Spanish legal orders are concerned – refers to those situations where mul-
tiple sentences for different offences are added together, in order to calculate 
the overall amount of detention period to be served. As such, it is essentially 
an operation that clarifies the duration of the future deprivation of liberty, but 
it has no implications on the formal autonomy of each sentence involved. 
Therefore, in these cases, the judicial authorities face a variety of judgments 
contributing to the total detention period. 
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Continuation of offences, on the other hand, involves a formal connection 
between two or more distinct offences, which are deemed to fall under the um-
brella of the same criminal programme. Continuation of offences can be ascer-
tained and declared in the trial or, in some legal orders, during the execution 
phase. 5 In the former situation, the outcome is a single judgment issued in rela-
tion to a plurality of interrelated offences. In the latter case, previously distinct 
judgments are ex post reciprocally and formally connected by the judicial au-
thority competent for the criminal execution phase. This decision in executivis 
influences the sentence remaining to be served, as it involves a slight reduction 
of the total sentence (namely, the sum of each custodial sentence). Therefore, 
judicial authorities are faced with a single order formally unifying various judg-
ments, which were previously autonomous and are now merged in a new judi-
cial decision which replaces them all. In addition, this merged sentence usually 
re-determines the length of the period of deprivation of liberty, based upon cri-
teria pre-defined by national substantive or procedural criminal law. 
In both cases, the key question is whether multiple certificates – one for each 
judgment – or a single certificate should be sent to the executing judicial author-
ity. Clearly, the existence of these alternatives amplifies the risk of diversified 
solutions on both sides of the judicial cooperation mechanism. On the one hand, 
different authorities within a given issuing State may opt for the solution they 
unilaterally consider to be more effective (probably adjusting it further accord-
ing to their habits or preferences). On the other hand, the central and judicial au-
thorities in the executing Member State may be willing to impose a preferred 
approach upon any issuing State, regardless of how its authorities deal with this 
legal loophole and irrespective of the relevant domestic legal background. For 
instance, in Italy, prosecution offices at district court level follow both ap-
proaches, depending on the magistrates involved. This diversified practice is 
further exacerbated by the Romanian authorities, which sometimes ask for one 
certificate to be sent for each judgment, basically because they want to check if 
all of them can be recognised and determine the resulting punishment for com-
peting offences (even though in cases of continuation in executivis the merged 
judgment formally replaces the pre-existing ones). 
Following the example of other Member States – e.g. Germany – the Min-
istries of Justice of Italy and Romania are now pushing for the most efficient 
and less time-consuming solution, namely the forwarding of a single certifi-
cate, in both cases of accumulation of sentences and continuation of crimes.  
In order to respond to concerns regarding the possibility of partial recogni-
tion, the certificate at issue should be carefully filled out. In particular, it 
 
 
5 That is the case for Italy and Romania, but not for Spain, where there is no further and subsequent 
judicial decision in the case of continuation of offences. The continued nature of the perpetrated acts is 
taken into account within the single decision, assessing and sentencing those offences. 
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should include a detailed explanation of its various components, both in terms 
of legal and factual descriptions of the offences involved and in terms of cal-
culating the duration of the custodial sentence. Moreover, in cases of accumu-
lation of sentences, all relevant judgments could be attached to the certificate, 
for the sake of transparency and clarity. This would allow the executing judi-
cial authority to pinpoint the specific part of the overall certificate which re-
fers to a partial sentence that cannot be recognised.  
However, from an issuing State perspective, this solution is not completely 
conclusive for those States – such as Italy – where continuation of offences 
leads to the issuance of an entirely new and autonomous judicial decision which 
replaces the sentences merged into it. In principle, since the judicial decision 
declaring the continuation formally unifies previously autonomous judgments, 
there should be no room for partial non-recognition. Moreover, the principle 
of mutual recognition binds the executing judicial authority to accept the judi-
cial decision issued abroad, even if the application of domestic rules would 
have led to a different outcome. Therefore, in these situations the executing 
judicial authority should be expected to take into consideration only the last 
judicial decision. At the same time, this approach could lead to a side-effect, 
as it could trigger refusals of recognition of the entire judgment even in those 
cases where recognition is barred only for some of the offences involved. 
These exceptional situations could be solved by way of the possibility of mu-
tual exchanges of information, leading the issuing authority to expunge the of-
fence at stake from the single certificate for the sole purposes of completing 
the judicial cooperation mechanism. 
In any event, preliminary consultations between the judicial authorities in-
volved represent an effective form of support in these situations. 
In conclusion, 
– in both cases of accumulation of sentences and continuation of offences 
(in trial or in executivis) only one certificate should be filled-in and forwarded. 
The certificate should provide clear information on the substantive criminal 
rules describing the offences involved, the factual background and the specific 
conduct of the transferee. Moreover, in the event of accumulation of sentenc-
es, all relevant judgments should be attached to the certificate, unless agreed 
otherwise with the executing judicial authority; 
– the issuing judicial authority should pay particular attention to the de-
scription of how the final length of the sentence to be served has been calcu-
lated and to the relevant national legal provisions; 
– in the event of partial recognition, the executing authority should clearly 
point out in relation to which offence and judgment the recognition is denied. 
In the case of continuation of crimes in executivis, a specific solution should 
be agreed by the judicial authorities involved; 
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– any doubt or unclear aspect should be solved by means of bilateral con-
sultations between the competent judicial authorities. 
5. Transmission of the Judgment and of Its Translated Version 
On many occasions, judgments are lengthy and involve several persons 
having participated in a crime. This raises the question as to what extent the 
transmission of the whole text of the judgment is actually essential for the 
purposes of recognition by the executing Member State. Besides the implica-
tions in terms of the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition, much 
more operational concerns related to data protection – and in particular data 
minimisation – and to the principle of proportionality suggest that the for-
warding of the whole judgment is not always an absolute pre-condition. On 
the other hand, where possible, the issuing authority should be allowed to at-
tach to the certificate only those parts of the judgment that refer to the trans-
feree and are actually relevant for determining its situation for the purposes of 
the judicial cooperation procedure. 
Another issue refers to the translation of the foreign judgment. From this 
point of view, Article 23 of the Framework Decision provides that (only) the 
certificate must be translated into the official language of the executing Mem-
ber State. Conversely, as clarified by para. 2 of the same article, “no transla-
tion of the judgment [attached to the certificate for the purposes of recogni-
tion] shall be required”.  
Despite this unequivocal wording, the approach of the Member States var-
ies extensively. Some Member States request, on a regular basis, that the 
complete translation of the judicial decision be sent in their official languages. 
This practice derives from a declaration submitted by some Member States 
(Romania is a key example) 6 on the occasion of the transposition of Frame-
work Decision 2008/909/JHA. According to this declaration, the authorities of 
these Member States – when acting in their capacity as executing authorities – 
are always entitled to seek the full translation of the judgment. However, as 
demonstrated by some cases involving Romania as an executing Member 
State, such translations are time consuming and very expensive, and can influ-
ence the effectiveness of the judicial cooperation procedure.  
In this respect, in the second half of 2018, the Austrian Presidency of the 
EU Council expressed doubts on the compatibility of these declarations with 
 
 
6 For a comprehensive view on these declarations, see the page dedicated to the Framework Deci-
sion on the website of the European Judicial Network, retrieved on 23 September 2019 from https:// 
www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu/ejn/EJN_Library_StatusOfImpByCat/EN/36.  
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the founding pillars of judicial cooperation in criminal matters across the EU. 
In addition, and more specifically, the Austrian Presidency – with the support 
of some Member States – complained that this practice is not in line with Arti-
cle 23(3) of the Framework Decision, which is the legal basis for the submis-
sion of such declarations. In fact, this provision states that: 
Any Member State may, on adoption of this Framework Decision or later, in a 
declaration deposited with the General Secretariat of the Council state that it, as an 
executing State, may without delay after receiving the judgment and the certificate, 
request, in cases where it finds the content of the certificate insufficient to decide on 
the enforcement of the sentence, that the judgment or essential parts of it be ac-
companied by a translation into the official language or one of the official languages 
of the executing State or into one or more other official languages of the Institutions 
of the European Union. Such a request shall be made, after consultation, where 
necessary, to indicate the essential parts of the judgments to be translated, between 
the competent authorities of the issuing and the executing States. 
In fact, the wording of the Framework Decision is very clear in providing 
that the submission of a declaration does not amount to an absolute right to 
impose the burden of translation of the judgment on the issuing authority. On 
the other hand, even after a declaration is deposited, the request for translation 
of the foreign judgment cannot be considered a general rule. In principle, such 
requests may be made only when the content of the certificate is insufficient 
for deciding upon the enforcement of the sentence. Accordingly, before re-
questing the translation, the executing State should undergo preliminary con-
sultations, to agree with the issuing Member State (meaning the issuing judi-
cial authority or the central authority depending on each national case) the es-
sential parts of the judgment that actually need to be translated. In any event, 
the full translation of the judgment is an exceptional and last resort, to be tak-
en when no less demanding measures are feasible or proportionate in the rele-
vant circumstances. 
On the occasion of the meetings of the project experts, the representatives 
of Italy, Romania and Spain shared the view that the proper and complete 
compilation of the certificate is an essential pre-requisite and may minimise 
the need for translations and further information. This applies, in particular, to 
those sections of the certificate concerning the relevant domestic provisions of 
substantive criminal law, the determination of the sentence, and the descrip-
tion of the facts of the case. 
In principle, the Romanian representatives expressed the intention to stick 
to the declaration of their government. Nonetheless, they acknowledged that, 
despite the declaration itself, there are cases where Romanian judicial authori-
ties are satisfied with the partial translation of a foreign judgment, as long as it 
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is essential for the purposes of recognition, in line with Article 23(3) of the 
Framework Decision.  
In this context, the experts involved in the RePers project identified the 
possible content of the notion of ‘essential parts’ of a judgment, worthy of be-
ing translated into the official language of the executing State, namely the 
parts providing a more precise understanding of:  
– the relevant national legislation; 
– the elements of the offence(s); 
– the offenders’ conduct; 
– the operative section of the judgment, including the determination of the 
punishment. 
The experts also agreed on the fact that a solution on a case-by-case basis 
should be sought, for instance through preliminary consultations between the 
issuing and the executing authorities pursuant to Articles 4(2), 9(4) and 10(1) 
of the Framework Decision, especially in cases of very long judgments, judg-
ments involving many offenders, judgments concerning highly sensitive per-
sonal information of third parties, and repetitive judgments issued in relation 
to minor offences. 
Another important and very practical issue refers to the costs of such trans-
lations. The Framework Decision is not unequivocal on who must bear the 
(heavy) burden of these translations. Whereas the final part of Article 23(3) of 
the Framework Decision seems to allocate these expenses to the issuing au-
thority, unless the executing one decides differently, Article 24 states that the 
costs stemming from the application of the Framework Decision shall be 
borne by the State of execution “except for the costs of the transfer of the sen-
tenced person to the executing State and those arising exclusively in the sov-
ereign territory of the issuing State”. Once again, normative gaps leave room 
for diversified practices. The example of the Italy-Romania bilateral coopera-
tion can be used, as Italy always bears the expenses of the translations im-
posed by the Romanian authorities as a pre-condition for recognition. Con-
versely, in Spain, the costs of translation services are allocated to the foreign 
judicial authority which requests them. 
In conclusion, as a rule, for the purposes of recognising a foreign judicial 
decision, the executing judicial authority should be satisfied with the content 
of the certificate, provided that the latter is clear and complete. 
On the other hand, the full translation of the judgment(s) should be consid-
ered an exceptional and last resort measure. If this service is needed, the transla-
tion of selected (essential) parts of the judgment should be prioritised. For this 
purpose, the essential parts of the judgments are considered to be the relevant 
national legislation; the elements of the offence(s); the offenders’ conduct; and 
 The Road Ahead 157 
the operative section of the judgment, including the determination of the pun-
ishment.  
In any event, particularly in complex cases involving many offenders and/or 
characterised by very lengthy judgments, the judicial authorities involved could 
undertake bilateral consultations on a case-by-case basis, in order to identify 
more carefully the parts of the judicial decision worthy of translation.  
Moreover, in cases where third parties are involved, attention should be 
paid to data protection principles and duties (e.g. data minimisation and the 
need to process sensitive data). 
6. Assessing the Chances of Social Rehabilitation 
The project activities have repeatedly addressed the issue of how the pris-
oner’s future chances of social rehabilitation are and should be assessed by the 
competent judicial authorities. This topic has been widely addressed earlier in 
this book by Faraldo-Cabana, so we focus here only on some specific aspects 
of the complex set of measures and factors that contribute to achieving the 
primary objective of the Framework Decision. 
Understandably, practices regarding the assessment of the prisoner’s pro-
spects of social rehabilitation are extremely varied. Once again, the lack of 
common normative standards offers leeway to the national authorities, both in 
terms of methods and of criteria for evaluating an inmate’s situation. As ex-
tensively noted by scholars, 7 the discretion entrusted to the domestic authori-
ties leaves room for the ‘managerial ambitions’ of the Member States.  
Aside from any theoretical analysis concerning the actual rationale under-
pinning the implementation of the Framework Decision, practice demonstrates 
that the issuing Member State usually lacks clear evidence on the prisoner’s 
personal situation, especially when it comes to his or her family and societal 
environment in the executing Member State. As Italy and Romania both face 
overcrowded prisons, there have been cases where Italy has requested trans-
fers of prisoners to Romania despite their connection with Romania being 
minimal, a procedure that depended solely on the citizenship of each individu-
al (in this case, Romanian), not taking into consideration the chances of social 
rehabilitation. 
Moreover, the competent judicial authorities are sometimes bewildered by 
the specific features of the cross-border assessment they are expected to per-
 
 
7 V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Third Wave of Third Pillar Law’, European Law Review, Vol. 34, Issue 3, 
2009, p. 523, and A. Martufi, ‘Assessing the Resilience of ‘Social Rehabilitation’ as a Rationale for 
Transfer: A Commentary on the Aims of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA’, New Journal of 
European Criminal Law, Vol. 9, Issue 1, 2018, p. 49. 
158 Stefano Montaldo, Alexandru Damian and José A. Brandariz 
form, as it is inherently different from ordinary checks made at domestic level 
by prison supervision courts. In the latter case, the competent judicial authori-
ties can use a significant series of reliable documents, such as the reports of 
prison staff and the notices of social assistance services. Many of these docu-
ments have little relevance in cross-border cases, unless they are used from a 
negative perspective, namely to demonstrate that the prisoner’s centre of grav-
ity is in the issuing Member State.  
These difficulties are further exacerbated by the widespread absence of the 
technical support of defence lawyers. In addition, the analysis of the state of 
the art has shown that the role of the detainees’ ombudsmen is also, generally, 
limited. 
Bearing in mind this scenario, the project activities have been focused on 
discussing the most promising criteria and tools (and their respective order of 
priority/importance) for assessing a prisoner’s prospects of rehabilitation 
abroad, also in light of the practice of the experts involved. 
In particular, the issuing judicial authority should take into due consideration 
the objective and subjective factors capable of demonstrating that the prisoner’s 
social bonds are essentially focused on the issuing Member State. Particular at-
tention must be paid to the relationship between Romania and Italy due to the 
high number of Romanian citizens involved in the Italian prison system with 
minimal or inexistent connections to Romania at the time of sentencing.  
For this purpose, a reliable body of information, such as the reports of prison 
staff and of social assistance services, should play a prominent role. In order to 
assess the actual chances of social rehabilitation abroad, the issuing judicial au-
thority should consider: the prisoner’s current nationality/residence/domicile; 
the grounds on which he or she resides/lives in the issuing State and the dura-
tion of such a situation; the previous residence(s)/domicile(s) and their duration; 
the family situation (if there are minor children, special consideration should be 
given to their best interests); the current and previous work activities and the 
possibility of finding a job in the issuing or executing Member State (if any in-
formation is provided/available on the latter aspect); the prisoner’s opinion; 
whether the prisoner will be deported after the sentence has been served; the 
knowledge of the language of the issuing State; the social environment in the 
issuing and executing Member States; any other economic, cultural and social 
links in the issuing and executing Member States.  
Even though this list reflects the importance usually attached to the criteria 
listed therein by the experts involved, the actual importance of each of these 
factors should be assessed on an individual basis, depending on the circum-
stances of each case. 
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7. Coordination with the European Arrest Warrant 
Another recurring stumbling block to bilateral cooperation is the overlap-
ping of the scope of application of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 
June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures be-
tween Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, pp. 1-20) and Framework Deci-
sion 2008/909/JHA. The subject is partially covered by Article 25 of the latter 
instrument, which provides that: 
Without prejudice to Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, provisions of this 
Framework Decision shall apply, mutatis mutandis to the extent they are 
compatible with provisions under that Framework Decision, to enforcement of 
sentences in cases where a Member State undertakes to enforce the sentence in 
cases pursuant to Article 4(6) of that Framework Decision, or where, acting under 
Article 5(3) of that Framework Decision, it has imposed the condition that the 
person has to be returned to serve the sentence in the Member State concerned, so 
as to avoid impunity of the person concerned. 
However, the two Framework Decisions do not provide specific rules for 
cases in which the respective procedures overlap. This happens when a State 
issues a European Arrest Warrant (hereinafter, ‘EAW’) but then seeks a trans-
fer in the State of execution of the EAW, while surrender is pending or is 
about to be performed. 
Again, the Italian-Romanian experience is illustrative, as, on many occa-
sions, the Italian judicial authorities issue two parallel certificates, the first 
pursuant to Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA and the second under Frame-
work Decision 2008/909/JHA, with a view to soliciting the arrest of the re-
quested person and in the meantime allocating the execution of the sentence in 
the Member State where he or she lives. In other cases, the Italian authorities 
have submitted a request for suspension of the surrender, with a view to for-
warding a new certificate under Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, to re-
place the EAW. These approaches concretely go right to the heart of the prob-
lem, but raise several concerns as to their actual compliance with the Frame-
work Decisions under consideration. For instance, no such ground for sus-
pending the surrender is provided by Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA. 
Moreover, a certificate under Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA cannot au-
tomatically replace an EAW: They are two complementary but different pro-
cedures and any certificate requires formal recognition from the executing au-
thority. Since the two mechanisms pursue very different purposes, a judgment 
could be recognised for the purposes of an EAW, but not in the framework of a 
cross-border transfer. In addition, the Framework Decision on the EAW impos-
es strict deadlines for keeping the requested person in custody. Any suspension 
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or undue delay may see the executing authorities being forced to release the per-
son concerned, thereby increasing the risk of absconding and impunity.  
On the other hand, considering the aforementioned relationship between 
Romania and Italy, the Romanian authorities consider that they are overbur-
dened with two overlapping procedures: The European Arrest Warrant proce-
dure and the transfer based upon the Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, which 
have different conclusions: surrender to Italy or delegation (transfer of enforce-
ment) to Romania. The Romanian authorities consider that it would be better for 
only one procedure to be requested by the Italian authorities: either on the ba-
sis of the EAW, or delegation of the procedure on the basis of Framework De-
cision 2008/909/JHA.  
The handbook on the issuing and the execution of EAW allows the issuing au-
thorities to forward directly a certificate under Framework Decision 2008/909/ 
JHA, without a previous EAW having been issued. The handbook is not clear- 
cut in describing which situations could lead to this straightforward solution. 
However, the inherent differences between the two instruments lead us to be-
lieve that such an outcome should apply when: 
– the requested person is in the territory of the State of execution, and 
– having due regard to the maximisation of the requested person’s chances 
of social rehabilitation, it seems more appropriate to allocate the enforcement 
of the custodial sentence in the executing Member State itself. 
The approach suggested by the European Commission handbook avoids 
cumbersome overlapping of different mechanisms and too lengthy procedures. 
In addition, it is in line with the rationale of the two instruments. In fact, while 
Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA is entirely devoted to enhancing the pris-
oner’s chances of social rehabilitation, Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA provides for a specific optional ground for refusing surrender if 
the wanted person is a national of the executing State or lives or resides there-
in. As the Court of Justice has clarified, 8 the latter provision is precisely in-
tended to prioritise the person’s centre of gravity and to avoid his or her fami-
ly and societal environment being plainly disrupted due to surrender. 
The issuing authority is then expected to assess whether issuing an EAW or 
a certificate pursuant to Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA better fits the cir-
cumstances of a given case. The choice ultimately reflects the identification of 
the place in which the sentence should be served, in light of the future oppor-
tunities of rehabilitation in a post-release era. If the executing State is consid-
ered the best option, the issuing authority should start a cross-border transfer 
 
 
8 See, for instance, Judgment of 6 October 2009 in case C-123/08, Dominic Wolzenburg, [2009] 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:616. 
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procedure, even though the person concerned is already in the territory of the 
destination State.  
In conclusion, the parallel issuing of an EAW and of a certificate under 
Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA should be avoided. The issuing authority 
should give priority to the certificate under Framework Decision 2008/909/ 
JHA, if it deems that the enforcement of the sentence in the Member State in 
which the requested person is/resides/lives would better suit the rehabilitation 
goals underpinning transfer procedures. For this purpose, the issuing authority 
could undergo preliminary consultations with the competent judicial authori-
ties in the executing Member State. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
The general, everyday implementation of the principle of mutual recogni-
tion puts mutual trust under stress. Besides theoretical assumptions, the daily 
practice unveils multi-faceted approaches to centrally harmonised judicial co-
operation procedures within the EU. This variety of domestic practices and 
strategies reflects differences which are inherent to the construction of the Eu-
ropean judicial space and to the different legal cultures converging under the 
aegis of the Union. From this point of view, the practical and legal difficulties 
raised by the implementation of the Framework Decision highlight the core of 
potential flaws and centrifugal forces affecting the mutual trust and mutual 
recognition paradigm. 
Four main aspects are worthy of attention in this brief concluding section. 
Firstly, the system of cross-border transfers relies heavily on the organisa-
tional capacity and efficiency of the Member States. Several converging fac-
tors, such as the variety of stakeholders involved and the complex dynamics of 
prison life, often make it very difficult to identify inmates who are suitable for 
a transfer (and, hopefully, willing to be transferred) and to conduct the proce-
dure appropriately. Crucially, today’s practice shows that the Member States – 
or at least those involved in this research – face the risk of being unable to 
transfer rapidly prisoners asking for their removal. 
Secondly, notwithstanding the wording of the Framework Decision and the 
increasing debate on this issue, the social rehabilitation objective underpinning 
cross-border transfers still raises concern. The use of cross-border transfers 
with a view to deflating prison overcrowding and expelling undesired Union 
citizens is a recurring challenge to the mechanism at issue, as confirmed by 
the interviews held with practitioners during the project. The spectre of public 
order and budgetary concerns may trigger abuses of the Framework Decision 
and thus require appropriate checks and judicial remedies. 
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Thirdly, legal fragmentation – which reaches its peak precisely in the do-
main of the criminal execution phase – is still today one of the most pressing 
factors of departure from mutual trust and mutual recognition. Whether it is 
how prison benefits are regulated, the normative standards for determining 
prison conditions, or the regime of reductions and remissions in sentence, the 
differences (and the often related lack of mutual knowledge and awareness) 
between the legal orders of the Member States involved is a recurring concern. 
While it seldom blocks cooperation per se, legal fragmentation triggers sever-
al obstacles, such as incomplete or ineffectively filled out certificates, repeated 
clarification requests, and requests for various updates in itinere on the sen-
tence remaining to be served, thereby slowing down the procedure and dis-
couraging the already overloaded judicial authorities. 
Finally, various problems of interconnection of the Framework Decision 
with other parallel and complementary instruments are gradually emerging. As 
we have seen, the choice between issuing a certificate under Framework Deci-
sion 2008/909/JHA or an EAW requires the competent authority to make a dif-
ficult preliminary assessment, without conclusive normative and jurisprudential 
guidance. This issue is just one example of a new future branch of litigation in 
this domain. Thus far, the overarching success of the EAW has led national 
courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union to focus almost exclu-
sively on this instrument. However, the increasing practice of cross-border 
transfers and the introduction of other instruments such as Framework Deci-
sions 2008/947/JHA of 27November 2008 on the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition to judgments and probation decisions with a view to the su-
pervision of probation measures and alternative sanctions (OJ L 337, 
16.12.2008, pp. 102-122) and 2009/829/JHA of 23 October 2009 on the appli-
cation, between Member States of the European Union, of the principle of mu-
tual recognition to decisions on supervision measures as an alternative to provi-
sional detention (OJ L 294, 11.11.2009, pp. 20-40) will put to the test the inter-
nal coherence of the judicial cooperation system set up by the EU legislature.  
All these aspects – which highlight just some of the issues raised by cross-
border transfers – have a key common denominator, namely the need for tai-
lor-made conduct of the transfer procedure, in light of the circumstances of 
each individual case. This is actually one of the most challenging aspects of 
the implementation of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA. The RePers ac-
tivities have led the research consortium to stress how the combination of di-
versified domestic legal solutions and informal implementation strategies with 
the specific situation of the prisoner concerned makes it difficult to identify 
all-encompassing and easily replicable solutions to existing problems. This 
factor further requires the judicial authorities and professionals involved to 
take their tasks seriously on a case by case basis. 
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